Opinion
20-P-1092
06-21-2021
COMMONWEALTH v. Courtney CASEY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Convicted after a jury-waived trial of animal cruelty, G. L. c. 272, § 77, the defendant appeals, arguing that the judge should have allowed her motion for a required finding of not guilty because there was insufficient evidence to establish that she inflicted unnecessary cruelty upon her dog or unnecessarily failed to provide it with proper drink. We affirm.
The standard for reviewing the denial of a defendant's motion for a required finding is "whether the Commonwealth produced enough evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, to satisfy any rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that each element of the crime was present." Commonwealth v. Hilton, 398 Mass. 63, 64 (1986). Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the evidence at trial established that the defendant was the owner of a French bulldog named Nigel. French bulldogs are brachycephalic, i.e., short-headed, and as a result are more susceptible to breathing problems, choking, aspiration, and overheating. A veterinarian opined that Nigel's brachycephaly was "an extreme example."
On October 15, 2017, the defendant and her boyfriend visited Salem. At about 1:05 P.M. , they parked their vehicle on the third floor of a parking garage. Leaving the front driver's side and passenger's side windows open "very very slightly," the defendant left Nigel in the vehicle without food or water. A short time later, two witnesses parked nearby and noticed the dog, who was "energized," "pretty friendly," and was "running around" inside the defendant's vehicle.
About five hours later, around 6:00 P.M. , the two witnesses returned to the parking garage. Inside the defendant's vehicle, the dog was lying on the driver's seat, his head resting in vomit. The witnesses tried to rouse him by knocking on the window, but he "didn't move," so they called 911. Responding police officers also tried unsuccessfully to awaken the dog by banging on the windows of the defendant's vehicle. The weather that day was "warm for ... October" and "in the seventies." When the two witnesses opened their own car doors, "heat came pouring out."
Soon thereafter, the defendant and her boyfriend returned to the vehicle and opened it. Nigel was dead. The defendant told police that she and her boyfriend had gone to a carnival and out to lunch. She admitted that Nigel was "a sick dog" with "kidney problems" and that "due to his health problems, [he] was unable to walk far." She claimed that during the afternoon she had come back and checked on Nigel and saw him "jumping inside of the car." At first she said she did not give him any water then, but later contradicted herself and claimed she "gave [him] whatever was in [her] bag." Police looked in in the defendant's vehicle for water and found none, nor any bowl or container for water. Review of the garage surveillance video did not depict the defendant returning to the vehicle at any point prior to 6:00 P.M.
After a necropsy, a veterinarian opined that Nigel had died from "respiratory failure secondary to mechanical obstruction and pulmonary edema from aspiration," caused by factors including "the poorly ventilated environment," the "increasing environmental temperature," and the lack of access to water.
The defendant contends that she was entitled to a required finding of not guilty because the Commonwealth did not prove precisely when and how Nigel died. We disagree. The relevant portion of the statute reads, "[W]hoever, having the charge or custody of an animal, either as owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon it, or unnecessarily fails to provide it with proper ... drink ... shall be punished ..." G. L. c. 272, § 77. That the unnecessary deprivation of proper drink caused the animal to die is not an element of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 178 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1153 (2010) (relevant portion of G. L. c. 272, § 77, does not require proof of harm or risk of harm). See also Commonwealth v. Curry, 150 Mass. 509, 511-512 (1890) (statute does not require that animal cruelly suffered because of failure to provide proper food, drink, and protection). Nor does "[t]he part of the statute under consideration here ... mandate proof of a specific intent to cause harm. Rather, the statute simply requires that a defendant intentionally failed to provide" proper drink to an animal. Erickson, supra at 177.
Moreover, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence for the judge to conclude that the defendant's leaving Nigel, a sick and brachycephalic dog, in a warm car for about five hours without water "had some tendency to cause harm, injury, or suffering." Erickson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 178. While the defendant points to other possible causes of Nigel's death, the judge was entitled to credit the veterinarian's opinion that Nigel suffered and that "[t]he lack of water ... would have contributed to dehydration, thickening of saliva and increased respiratory difficulty." "The inferences that support a conviction ‘need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.’ " Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014).
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the judge as trier of fact to find that the defendant inflicted unnecessary cruelty upon her dog or unnecessarily failed to provide it with drink. Therefore, we conclude that the judge properly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.
Judgment affirmed.