Summary
holding that a Section 4A violation for crossing the yellow line between lanes did not require evidence that the crossing had "created a risk of safety"
Summary of this case from United States v. LawrenceOpinion
14-P-1521
02-02-2016
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor, third offense, and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, he asserts error in the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of what he claims was an unjustified stop of his motor vehicle.
A finding of a marked lanes violation was placed on file and is not before us.
The motion to suppress was allowed in part on other grounds not relevant here.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge found as follows: At approximately 9:00 on the evening of January 6, 2012, Officer Andrew Richardson was on patrol on Main Street in Tewksbury when he observed a black pickup truck pull out of a parking lot and make a left hand turn onto Main Street. The truck travelled over the double yellow lane marker of the road and then was driven for 50 to 60 feet partly on the wrong side of the road. Officer Richardson stopped the truck and identified the defendant as the driver. Based on subsequent observations and field sobriety tests, the defendant was placed under arrest. The motion judge concluded that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was justified because Officer Richardson had observed the defendant committing a marked lanes violation. See G.L. c. 89 sec. 4A.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress we accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error. Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 381 n.8 (1995). We independently determine whether the judge correctly applied constitutional principles to the facts as found. See Commonwealth v. Robbins, 407 Mass. 147, 151 (1990). In this case, the defendant does not challenge the judge's finding that Officer Richardson observed him drive over the double yellow lines. He claims, however, that this observation is not sufficient to justify the stop because there was no evidence that his driving over the lines created a risk of safety. This argument has no merit. As the Commonwealth notes in its brief, the observation of the marked lane violation -- whether or not that violation could be proved -- was a sufficient objective basis to justify the stop. See Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 207 (1995) (stop for a broken tail light proper even though stop occurred during daylight), and Commonwealth v. Damon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 168 (2012) (despite light traffic, failure to signal a turn constituted a traffic violation that justified the motor vehicle stop).
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Green, Vuono & Hanlon, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: February 2, 2016.