Pennsylvania courts have consistently recognized that the sentencing court's oral statements, which are not incorporated into the written judgment signed by the sentencing court, are not a part of the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226 (Pa. 2013); Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2014); Commonwealth v. Hodge, 369 A.2d 815, 820 (Pa. Super. 1977); Commonwealth v. Green, 335 A.2d 392, 393 (Pa. Super. 1975); Commonwealth v. Foster, 324 A.2d 538, 539 (Pa. Super. 1974);see Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287, 1292 (Pa. 1983) ("Generally, the signed sentencing order, if legal, controls over oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated into the signed judgment of sentence."). "In Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the [oral] statements a trial court makes about a defendant's sentence, is determinative of the court's sentencing intentions and the sentence imposed."
The issue of whether the trial court erred in correcting a clerical error or clarifying a judgment of sentence raises a question of law, and our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. See Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1225 (Pa. 2013) (OAJC).
Id. at 9. In Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (Borrin I), aff'd, 80 A.3d 1219 (Pa. 2013) (plurality) (Borrin II), the Borrin I Court explained the standard of review as follows: "[t]he issue in the case, whether the trial judge had the authority to correct an alleged sentencing error, poses a pure question of law. Accordingly, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo.
Pennsylvania courts have consistently recognized that the sentencing court's oral statements, which are not incorporated into the written judgment signed by the sentencing court, are not a part of the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226 (Pa. 2013); Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2014); Commonwealth v. Hodge, 369 A.2d 815, 820 (Pa. Super. 1977); Commonwealth v. Green, 335 A.2d 392, 393 (Pa. Super. 1975); Commonwealth v. Foster, 324 A.2d 538, 539 (Pa. Super. 1974); see Commonwealth v. Isabell, 467 A.2d 1287, 1292 (Pa. 1983) ("Generally, the signed sentencing order, if legal, controls over oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated into the signed judgment of sentence."). "In Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the [oral] statements a trial court makes about a defendant's sentence, is determinative of the court's sentencing intentions and the sentence imposed."
The typed sentencing order, which is dated the same day as the sentencing hearing and bears an official date stamp indicating it was filed on March 28, 1996, precisely reflects the trial judge's intended sentence as stated on the record, including the concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted murder of Donna. We acknowledge that, in Commonwealth v. Borrin , 622 Pa. 422, 80 A.3d 1219 (2013) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court), we explained that a "signed sentencing order, if legal, controls over oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated into the signed judgment of sentence," and we held that "comments the trial court made after-the-fact ... regarding its subjective intent when sentencing [the defendant] and the sentence it meant for [the defendant] were irrelevant to the process of order clarification the trial court was authorized to undertake." Id. at 1226-27. As noted, however, the trial court's oral statements in the instant case were not made after-the-fact to explain its prior sentence; rather, the court described the sentence it was going to impose, which was fully consistent with the typed sentencing order.
Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226 (Pa. 2013).
Lastly, "[i]n Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the statements a trial court makes about a defendant's sentence, is determinative of the court's sentencing intentions and the sentence imposed." Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226 (Pa. 2013).
We now address the effect of the March 16, 2022 order from which Appellant has appealed. In making our assessment, we examine a similar case, Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), aff'd, 80 A.3d 1219 (Pa. 2013) (OAJC), where Borrin entered an open guilty plea to twenty counts. At sentencing, the trial court orally imposed a sentence of incarceration at count one and then declared that several other periods of incarceration were "consecutive" to that count but did not specify whether each of those terms was consecutive to each other or merely consecutive to count one (and thus concurrent to each other).
"In Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the statements a trial court makes about a defendant's sentence, is determinative of the court's sentencing intentions and the sentence imposed." Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226 (Pa. 2013). Notwithstanding the trial court's oral statement at sentencing, the written sentencing orders control, therefore, Appellant's aggregate sentence is seven-and-a-half to twenty years' incarceration. See Borrin, 80 A.3d at 1226.
Although the trial court stated that this sentence was 54 to 108 years at the sentencing hearing, where there is a discrepancy between the trial court's written sentencing order and its statements at the sentencing hearing, it is the sentencing order that controls what the defendant's sentence is. Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226 (Pa. 2013); Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 451-52 (Pa. Super. 2018); Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1010-11 (Pa. Super. 2013).