Appeal from Superior Court. See 88 Pa. Super. 216. Indictment in quarter sessions for offenses committed by president of a bank in his official capacity.

A veritable multitude of authorities in our appellate courts enunciate, albeit in varying language, this familiar principle. For example: Commonwealth v. Coles, 265 Pa. 362, 366, 367, 108 A. 826, 827; Commonwealth v. Weiss, 284 Pa. 105, 109, 110, 130 A. 403, 404; Commonwealth v. Bell, 288 Pa. 29, 34, 135 A. 645, 647; Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 151, 143 A. 904, 906; Commonwealth v. Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 177-179, 169 A. 564, 565, 566; Commonwealth v. Strantz, 328 Pa. 33, 195 A. 75, 81; Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 20-22, 198 A. 99, 107, 108; Commonwealth v. Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 553, 50 A.2d 325, 326, 327; Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 438, 439, 65 A.2d 348, 349; Commonwealth v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259, 281, 282, 66 A.2d 663, 674, 675; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405, 410, 411; Commonwealth v. Weaver, 61 Pa. Super. 571, 577, 578; Commonwealth v. Elias and Johns, 76 Pa. Super. 576, 579, 580; Commonwealth v. Bell, 88 Pa. Super. 216, 223, 224; Commonwealth v. Flick, 97 Pa. Super. 169, 174, 175; Commonwealth v. Huster, 118 Pa. Super. 24, 31, 178 A. 535, 537; Commonwealth v. Mezick, 147 Pa. Super. 410, 420, 24 A.2d 762, 767; Commonwealth v. Krolak, 164 Pa. Super. 288, 290, 64 A.2d 522, 523, 524; Commonwealth v. Thurman, 167 Pa. Super. 642, 646, 76 A.2d 483, 484, 485; Commonwealth v. Gusciora, 169 Pa. Super. 27, 33, 82 A.2d 540, 542, 543; Commonwealth v. Ransom, 169 Pa. Super. 306, 314, 315, 82 A.2d 547, 551. It would seem too clear for discussion that the circumstances surrounding the murders of Woodward and Pitts and the shooting of Shepard brought the present trial within the compass of the exceptions to the general rule.

"While ordinarily evidence is not admissible of a crime distinct from that for which the defendant is being tried, the fact of such crime, and defendant's connection with it, may be proved whenever it tends to show guilty knowledge, design, plan, motive or intent, if these matters are in issue in the case on trial. * * * the evidence referred to would have been admissible if the first four counts had never been drawn. Upon this point it is well said by the Superior Court ( 88 Pa. Super. 216, 223): `This evidence, documentary and oral, was admissible under the well-settled rule that evidence of similar and unconnected offenses may be offered to show guilty knowledge, design, plan, motive and intent when such is in issue, and this is true although the other offenses are beyond the statutory period: [Citing authorities.] Here the evidence tended to show that the offenses charged were part of a system * * *'." ( Commonwealth v. Bell, 288 Pa. 29, 135 A. 645.)

Declaration of deceased indicated fear of death at hands of third person. The test whether a fact inquired of in cross-examination is collateral is, whether the cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it as part of his case: Hildeburn v. Curran, 65 Pa. 59; Com. v. Craig, 19 Pa. Super. 81; Com. v. Bell, 88 Pa. Super. 216; Com. v. Williams, 41 Pa. Super. 326; Launikitas v. Traction Co., 241 Pa. 458. Fred B. Trescher, Special Assistant District Attorney, with him Victor Bouton, District Attorney, and Marquis Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee, cited: As to remarks of court: Com. v. Stallone, 281 Pa. 41; Com. v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505.

H. O. Bechtel and R. A. Freiler, for appellants. — The Act of 1925 is constitutional: Marysville Water Co. v. Ry., 13 Pa. Dist. R. 365; Com. v. Bell, 88 Pa. Super. 216; Harris v. County Commrs., 30 Pa. Dist. R. 834; Com. v. Kebort, 212 Pa. 289; Com. ex rel. v. Boro., 272 Pa. 189. It cannot be seriously contended that Schuylkill County was actually created a new poor district when it had been a county unit since 1831: Com. v. Wyman, 137 Pa. 508.

The Act of 1919 is unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to impose bonus upon an increase of capital at an arbitrary value per share of no par stock, because no notice is given in the title, either that the act applies to increase of stock, or that the act makes a change in bonus policy. The Act of 1919, insofar as it imposes a bonus upon no par shares at the arbitrary valuation of $100 each, is unconstitutional, because of the inadequacy of its title: Provident Life Tr. Co. v. Hammond, 230 Pa. 407; Phoenixville Road, 109 Pa. 44; Union Pass. Ry. Co.'s App., 81* Pa. 91; Com. v. Bell, 88 Pa. Super. 216; Spector v. Ins. Co., 285 Pa. 464; Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. v. Phila., 124 Pa. 219. Philip S. Moyer, Deputy Attorney General, with him Thomas J. Baldrige, Attorney General, for appellee. — On the incorporation of Pennsylvania companies without authority to issue shares of stock with nominal or par value and likewise upon incorporation of companies with authority to issue shares of stock without nominal or par value, bonus is imposed without reference to the amount of capital or assets which such companies may then have or may thereafter acquire.

The rebuttal testimony was properly admitted in evidence to impeach appellant Marmon's credibility on an important and material issue in this case. See Flowers v. Green, 420 Pa. 481, 218 A.2d 219; Com. v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952); Com. v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 85 A.2d 425 (1951); Com.v. Duca, 312 Pa. 101, 165 A. 825 (1933); Blauvelt v. Delaware,L. W. R. Co., 206 Pa. 141, 55 A. 857 (1903); Com. v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153, 31 A. 481 (1895); Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102 (1861); Com. v. Kettering, 180 Pa. Super. 247, 119 A.2d 580 (1956); Com. v. Graham, 170 Pa. Super. 343, 85 A.2d 632 (1952); Com. v. Shultz, 115 Pa. Super. 177, 175 A. 288 (1934); Com. v. Benedict, 114 Pa. Super. 183, 173 A. 850 (1934); Com. v. Bell, 88 Pa. Super. 216 (1926), affirmed 288 Pa. 29, 135 A. 645. On the question of rebuttal evidence, the court below carefully instructed the jury on its limited purpose as follows: "Members of the jury, I am quite certain you realize that this testimony is not for the purpose of establishing some wrongful act that is not involved in this case, it is for the purpose of contradicting a portion of her testimony, and on that basis if you believe it does then it does go to her credibility and the weight that you are going to attach to her testimony."

At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the court restricted this evidence to John Mezick alone and cautioned the jury to disregard it totally in passing upon the guilt of any other defendant except John Mezick. While ordinarily evidence is not admissible of a crime distinct from that for which defendants are being tried, the fact of such crime and the defendants' connection with it may be proved whenever it tends to show guilty knowledge, design, plan, motive or intent, if these matters are in issue in the case on trial: Com. v. Bell, 88 Pa. Super. 216, 223; affirmed 288 Pa. 29, 34, 135 A. 645; Com. v. Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 178, 169 A. 564; Swan v. Com., 104 Pa. 218; Com. v.Rabinowitz, 73 Pa. Super. 221, 226-7 (PORTER, J.); Com.v. Flick, 97 Pa. Super. 169, 174-5. Or as stated in Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388, 398, "Under some circumstances, evidence of another offense by the defendant may be given. Thus it may be to establish identity; to show the act charged was intentional and wilful, not accidental; to prove motive; toshow guilty knowledge and purpose, and to rebut any inferenceof mistake" (Italics supplied).

(1) No error was committed in admitting the testimony of Rosenberg that Polnsky had "carried the package" for him at other fires set by him. It was limited by the court, and the district attorney, to Polnsky, who was a co-defendant, and its purpose was to show a course of conduct between Rosenberg and Polnsky, and the guilty knowledge and intent of the latter. Its admission was warranted by the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court in Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388, 398, 399; Com. v. Bell, 288 Pa. 29, 34, 135 A. 645, affirming 88 Pa. Super. 216, 223; Com. v.Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 178, 169 A. 564; Com. v. Rabinowitz, 73 Pa. Super. 221, 226, 227; Com. v. Flick, 97 Pa. Super. 169, 174, 175; Com. v. Huster, 118 Pa. Super. 24, 31, 178 A. 535. (2) The brief reference to this testimony in the charge (97a-98a), complained of by appellant, was made while discussing Polnsky's connection with the crime: "Samuel Polnsky, the other defendant, whom Rosenberg identified as the man who on other occasions carried the various apparatus necessary to be used in setting fire to these places, testified he had known Rosenberg for fifteen years, but had never carried any apparatus for Rosenberg to set fire to any place; that he had moved Rosenberg's personal belongings from place to place on several occasions and the last time was eight years ago; that he never carried or delivered any carton containing gasoline and papers; that he never had anything to do with Weinstein, and, Weinstein testified he never had anything to do with Polnsky."

In Underhill on Criminal Evidence (3d Ed.) Sec. 629 (p. 867) the text writer says: "Evidence of similar forgeries, or of the possession of forged papers about the same time is admissible to show a uniform course of acting from which guilty knowledge and criminal intent may be inferred." The ruling of the court below is sustained by the decisions of the Supreme Court, inter alia, in Com. v. Bell, 288 Pa. 29; Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388; and of this court in Com. v. House, 6 Pa. Super. 92; Com. v. Rabinowitz, 73 Pa. Super. 221; Com. v. Dwyer, 79 Pa. Super. 485, 491; Com. v. Bell, 88 Pa. Super. 216, 223; Com. v. Griffin, 42 Pa. Super. 597. See also McCartney v. State, 3 Ind. 353; Bell v. State, supra, p. 117; The State v. Robinson, supra, p. 513; People v. Frank, supra.