Opinion
412 WDA 2024 J-S34023-24
12-18-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ROBERT EUGENE ADAMS Appellant
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 19, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-32-CR-0000564-2021
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
LANE, J.
Robert Eugene Adams ("Adams") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his jury conviction of failure to comply with registration requirements ("failure to report") under the Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). We affirm.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.75. Throughout the notes of testimony, parties' briefs, and trial court opinion, the parties and trial court referred to "Megan's Law." As our state legislature replaced Megan's Law with the first version of SORNA in 2011, we generally refer to the presently in-effect SORNA, except when quoting the trial evidence where suitable.
Previously, in March 2019, Adams pleaded guilty to indecent assault of his intellectually disabled adult sister. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 24. The trial court determined he was a sexually violent predator ("SVP"), which in turn triggered lifetime registration under Subchapter H of SORNA. Adams must, inter alia, report his address and telephone number to law enforcement every three months.
See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42 (Subchapter H); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(6) (providing that an SVP "shall register for the life of the individual").
The parties do not dispute that on November 23, 2020, Adams appeared at the Pennsylvania State Police barracks and provided a home address of "520 High Hollow Road, Marion Center." Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/24, at 2 (emphasis added). However, no such road or address existed, and instead, there was a 520 Honey Hollow Road in Marion Center. Pennsylvania State Police troopers determined that Adams' relative lived at that address, while Adams lived in a camper parked in his sister's yard at 658 Bethel Church Road, Rayne Township.
The Commonwealth charged Adams with failure to report, and this matter proceeded to a jury trial on October 25, 2023. Adams' defense theory was that when he registered, he was very ill and confused, and he was not aware he gave an incorrect address. As Adams challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we review the trial evidence in detail.
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Richard Nuttall ("Trooper Nuttall") testified that he recorded Adams' registration information on November 23, 2020. The address given, "520 Honey Hollow Road," was different from a Plumville Borough address last reported in August 2020. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 53-54. When asked about Adams' appearance that day, Trooper Nuttall replied that aside from being in a wheelchair, which Adams had used for a few years, the trooper did not notice anything odd. See id. at 51. Adams did not appear confused or disoriented, nor had any difficulty or hesitation answering the questions. Trooper Nuttall provided Adams with a form showing his new address, and Adams signed it.
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Philip Dern ("Trooper Dern") testified to the following. He was not initially aware that Adams provided an address of "520 High Hollow Road," as the "Megan's Law unit" "confirmed and changed" the address to 520 Honey Hollow Road. N.T, 10/25/23, at 108, 121. Seven days after Adams registered his address, Trooper Dern went to this address to verify his residence. With the assistance of the next door neighbor, Trooper Dern talked, over the telephone, to the owner and resident of 520 Honey Hollow Road, Ronald Gaston ("Gaston"). Gaston told the trooper that Adams did not live there, but was living in a camper behind his (Adams') sister's house on Bethel Church Road. See id. at 110.
Trooper Dern thus went to 658 Bethel Church Road, Marion Center, and observed a camper next to the house. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 111. At this juncture, we summarize that Gaston's brother, James Gaston ("James"), was engaged to Adams' sister, Melissa Adams ("Melissa"), and they lived at the house at 658 Bethel Church Road. Also living in the house, in November 2020, were James' two children, aged fifteen and twelve years old, and Melissa's two nieces, one of whom was seventeen. See id. at 100, 140.
Trooper Dern further testified to the following. He talked to Adams' fiancée, Emily Aikens ("Fiancée"), who was at the 658 Bethel Church Road property. Initially, Fiancée denied living there, but then stated she did live there. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 114. Fiancée was aware that Adams had to register under SORNA, and stated they used a different address "due to children possibly being at the house and might be not allowed [sic]." Id. at 114-15. Inside the camper, Fiancée retrieved Adams' prescription medicine and a letter addressed to him from the hospital. Both were dated within the month and bore Adams' former Plumville address. See id. at 117-18. Trooper Dern attempted to call Adams, but the telephone numbers listed on his registration "did not work." Id. at 118. Finally, Trooper Dern testified that he had met with Adams six months earlier, and at that time, Adams did not have any "strange physical attributes." Id. at 125.
Next, Adams' sister, Melissa testified to the following. In November 2020, she was aware that Adams had to register under SORNA. Adams and Fiancée lived in the camper, parked in her yard, for two or three months. Initially, Melissa believed the camper could use her address. However, "[w]hen they [sic] came out and talked to [Adams and his daughter, they] said we needed to get a 911 address [sic] for the camper." N.T., 10/25/23, at 143. Melissa explained the procedure for obtaining a "911 address:" "You have to call 911 . . . and then they go from my address[ and] said because we shared a driveway, it would be a similar address." Id. In November 2020, the camper was assigned an address of 660 Bethel Church Road.
When asked who "they" were, Melissa instead replied, "She [sic] just said the Megan's Law coordinator and the state" officer. N.T., 10/25/23, at 144.
With respect to Adams' SORNA registration, Melissa testified as follows: "They [sic] said he needed a mailing address, [and] I thought . . . he could use my address, [but] they said no, . . . it needed another address. So my brother-in-law[, Gaston,] was going to let him use it to get his mail and stuff there." N.T., 10/25/23, at 144. Melissa asked Gaston about using his address "for mail purposes," and Gaston agreed. Id. at 145. Melissa stated, "[W]e were under the impression they were using it for mailing purposes," and she told Adams to use Gaston's address for these "mailing purposes." Id. at 146. Finally, Melissa testified that when Adams moved to the camper, "he was really sick," and he subsequently learned he had cancer. Id. at 145.
Meanwhile, Gaston testified that Adams' sister asked whether Adams could "use [his] address [because Adams was not] allowed to have the same address as his other sister." N.T., 10/25/23, at 73. Gaston did not know why Adams could not use his sister's address. He "figured [he would] help out," as his brother was dating Adams' sister. Id. at 74. Gaston did not know Adams was an SVP until Trooper Dern told him. See id. at 77. Finally, Gaston stated that Adams never lived at his home with him. See id. at 73.
Gaston did not identify which sisters he was referring to.
Adams' adult daughter, Brandy Hoover ("Daughter"), testified to the following. She worked as a "nurse, LPN, CNA." N.T., 10/25/23, at 146. She was aware that Adams had to register as an SVP. In November 2020, Adams "looked awful" and learned he had cancer. Id. Additionally, Adams' "mind was[ not] there," and he "barely knew who [Daughter] was let alone to give an address [sic]." Id. at 149-50. Daughter helped take Adams to medical appointments and SORNA registrations, and helped with "pretty much anything other than" his finances. Id. at 147-48. Daughter had to obtain a "911 address" for Adams "[b]ecause he was on Megan's Law and . . . needed somewhere for mail to go." Id. at 148.
Fiancée testified that she and Adams had been together for approximately thirty years. Previously, she and Adams lived in Plumville, but they were evicted after she lost her job on September 11, 2020. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 132. She and Adams thus moved into the camper, for which she reported at trial as having an address of 650 Bethel Church Road. See id. at 80. However, Fiancée also testified, twice, that they moved into the camper in March 2020. See id. at 132, 135. When asked about this discrepancy, Fiancée stated she was "not really sure on the dates." Id. at 138.
Fiancée stated that on the day Trooper Dern visited the camper, Adams was in the hospital with COVID. See id. at 89. Fiancée denied telling Trooper Dern that she and Adams did not live in the camper, or that they were using a different address to avoid SORNA restrictions. See id. at 86-87. At this juncture, we note that Trooper Dern, who had heard this testimony, reaffirmed that Fiancée did make these statements to him. See id. at 114-15. Additionally, Fiancée testified that Adams' prescription bottle and letter from the hospital bore the address 650 Bethel Church Road. See id. at 88. The Commonwealth, however, presented photographs taken of these items, which showed a Plumville address. See id. at 117-18.
Fiancée further testified to the following. In November 2020, Adams had COVID as well as a skin disorder, "PRP," which caused the skin to peel off his face and "whole body." N.T., 10/25/23, at 131. Adams was also hospitalized for stomach cancer. Fiancée helped take Adams to his medical appointments and helped with his SORNA registration, and she accompanied him when he registered in November 2020. On that day, Adams was "in horrible condition," as he was "really weak" and "his skin was peeling off his face." Id. at 134.
Adams testified in his own defense to the following. In November 2020, he had PRP and his skin peeled badly; Fiancée could "peel the skin off [his] head[] and [his] hair could come right off with it." N.T., 10/25/23, at 154. Adams was hospitalized in Pittsburgh, but he could not remember how long.
After he was released, he "was only home a day or so" before going to a hospital in Indiana. Id. at 155. Adams was also very sick from COVID. Fiancée lived at the camper more than Adams did, as he "basically lived at the hospital." Id. at 158.
Adams registered at the State Police barracks on the day, or the day after, he was released from the hospital. At that time, he "was in pretty bad shape" and his "eyes could barely open." Id. at 157. Adams was taking medication and had "a lot of forgetting" and confusion. Id. at 158. Although Fiancée accompanied him to the barracks, she did not go into the processing room with him when he provided his information. At trial, Adams did not remember what address he gave, but thought his "sister wrote the address on a piece of paper for [him] to remember it." Id. at 159-60. Adams did not "take notice" of the address as it was "hard to focus because his head [spun] all the time." Id. at 160. Adams did not know why he did not voice any concern about his ability to complete the registration, and testified he did not know he was providing the wrong address. See id. at 161-62, 164.
On cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Adams about purportedly not knowing Melissa's address, despite his own testimony that she lived there for thirty-five years. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 165-66. Adams responded, "I was on so much medication. Half the time I didn't remember anything." Id. at 166. Adams acknowledged that he was placed on probation as a result of his conviction, and was required to report any change in address to the probation department. The Commonwealth asked about a conversation he purportedly had with the probation department four days before he registered, concerning his ability to visit his grandchildren. See id. at 168. Adams objected on the ground the question went beyond the scope of direct. The trial court overruled the objection. In response to the question, Adams testified that he did not remember the conversation. See id. at 169. He conceded, however, that his probation officer "might have" told him he was not able to visit his grandchildren. Id. at 170. When shown the photograph taken of him on the day of registration and asked about the condition of his skin and eyes, Adams stated that was "the beginning of [his] PRP." Id. at 170-71.
Additionally, we summarize that prior to the presentation of evidence, the Commonwealth agreed that while it would introduce Adams' indecent assault conviction and SVP designation, it would not present details of the underlying incident. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 15. Adams requested a limiting jury instruction - that SORNA registration is not necessarily based on a crime against a child. See id. at 14. The Commonwealth objected, arguing such an instruction could imply that Adams never committed an offense against a child. See id. at 29. However, the record from Adams' SVP hearing included a psychiatrist's report, which indicated he previously committed offenses against victims aged fourteen through eighteen, and this history informed his diagnosis of pedophilia. See id. at 25. The trial court pointed out that any reference to the age of his indecent assault victim - his disabled sister - could "open[] the door to further testimony about her condition and mental state." Id. at 26. Adams did not disagree with this analysis, and the trial court denied his request for the limiting instruction. We note Adams did not raise any objection after the court charged the jury. See id. at 200.
The jury found Adams guilty of failure to report, a felony of the first degree. On January 19, 2024, the trial court imposed a sentence of five to ten years' imprisonment - which was at the bottom of the standard sentencing guideline range. Adams filed a timely post-sentence motion, which argued the verdict was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court should have imposed a mitigated range-sentence. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Adams filed a timely notice of appeal. He and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Adams raises the following issues for our review:
[1. W]hether the Trial Court erred in finding that the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, and in therefore declining to grant [Adams'] motion for a judgment of acquittal.
[2. W]hether the Trial Court erred in finding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that [Adams] knowingly failed to provide accurate registration information, and in therefore declining to grant [Adams'] motion for a judgment of acquittal.
[3. W]hether the Trial Court erred in denying his post-sentence motion for a new trial, both due to the verdict being against the weight of the evidence and due to the Commonwealth's failure to present sufficient evidence, and due to several issues which occurred over the course of the trial which unfairly
prejudiced the jury against [Adams] and rendered him unable to have a fair and impartial trial.
[4. W]hether the Trial Court erred in declining to amend the sentence imposed on January 19, 2024 to one within the mitigated range.
Adams' Brief at 15-16(unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We review together Adams' first two claims - that the jury's verdict was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We consider:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted).
Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Baker, 313 A.3d 1112, 1116-17 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
Meanwhile,
[a] motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
Thus, to allow an appellant "to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the [trial] court."Juray, 275 A.3d at 1046-47 (citations omitted).
This Court has
explained that a sufficiency of the evidence review does not include an assessment of credibility of testimony offered by the Commonwealth. Instead, such arguments are more properly characterized as challenges to weight of evidence. [See] Commonwealth v. W.H.M., Jr., . . . 932 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining a claim that the jury erred in crediting a victim's version of events over that of [the a]ppellant goes to the weight, not to the sufficiency of the evidence).
In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an "appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail[,]" where an appellant phrases an issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but the argument that the appellant provides goes to the weight of the evidence.Id. at 1043 (some citations omitted).
Our Crimes Code defines the offense of failure to report, in pertinent part, as follows:
An individual who is subject to registration under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9799.13 (relating to applicability) commits an offense if he knowingly fails to:
* * * *
(3) provide accurate information when registering under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15 . . . or 9799.25.18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(3).
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.15(a)(6), 9799.25(a)(4) (providing that "[a]n individual designated as a sexually violent predator shall appear in person at an approved registration site quarterly").
In his first issue, Adams asserts the trial court erred in denying relief on his claim that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Adams maintains that in November 2020, he was suffering from a rare skin condition and COVID, he was "in the hospital more than [he] was outside," and at trial, he "and multiple witnesses testified that [he] was too ill and dependent on others to knowingly give an incorrect address." Adams' Brief at 25-27. Adams further insists that on the day he registered at the State Police barracks, his sister had written the address on a piece of paper, he was in "pretty bad shape, . . . his eyes could barely open," and he did not "take notice" of the address because it was hard to focus as his "head [spun] all the time." Id. at 27. Adams extensively relies on the trial testimony of his Fiancée, his sister Melissa, and Daughter.
In his second issue, Adams argues the trial court erred in finding the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Adams acknowledges that he reported an address of "520 Honey Hollow Road." However, he insists "the Commonwealth was unable to provide evidence that [he] knowingly gave the wrong address, especially in the face of the testimony" cited in his above weight argument. Adams' Brief at 31-32.
In denying relief on Adams' weight claim, the trial court reviewed the following Commonwealth evidence. First, Trooper Nuttall provided "credible" testimony that on the day Adams registered, his behavior or appearance were not unusual, and he did not show confusion, disorientation, or difficulty in answering questions. Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/24, at 5-6 (citing N.T., 10/25/23, at 51). Gaston testified that Adams' sister asked if Adams could use his address because Adams was "not allowed to have the same address as his other sister." Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/24, at 6 (citing N.T., 10/25/23, at 73). Furthermore, Gaston confirmed that Adams never lived at his home at 520 Honey Hollow Road. Trooper Dern and Fiancée gave conflicting testimony as to whether Fiancée initially told the trooper that she and Adams did not live at the camper, and that Adams used another address due to a concern that children were living at Melissa's house. Finally, Daughter testified Adams' "mind was[ not] there." Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/24, at 7 (citing N.T., 10/25/23, at 150). The trial court concluded that the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and here, the verdict reflected that it believed some witnesses over others. The trial court also found that the Commonwealth's evidence was not so tenuous or uncertain that the verdict shocked its conscience.
In denying relief on the sufficiency challenge, the trial court cited Adams' own testimony that he was aware of his SORNA requirements and was familiar with the process. The court also considered Adams' concession at trial, "I'm saying I screwed up. I gave the wrong address." Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/24, at 9 (citing N.T., 10/25/23, at 167). The trial court found that the jury did not find his explanations credible, "perhaps based on the distance between the" two addresses or the fact "that he should be familiar with his sister's address." Id. at 9-10.
After careful review of the record, we conclude that no relief is due on Adams' claims. First, we note that Adams' sufficiency discussion implies that the defense's evidence should have been greater weight. See Adams' Brief at 31-32 (arguing that the Commonwealth did not present evidence that he knowingly gave the wrong address, "especially in the face of" his witnesses' testimony). Nevertheless, we determine Adams has properly raised a sufficiency argument, as he avers the Commonwealth presented no evidence that he knowingly reported the wrong address. On the merits, however, we deny relief. In citing only the testimony advantageous to his defense, Adams has wholly and opportunely ignored the Commonwealth's relevant evidence, even when the trial court clearly discussed it. Adams does not address: (1)
Gaston's testimony, that Adams' sister asked to use his address because Adams could not use another sister's address; (2) Trooper Nuttall's testimony that on the day he registered, Adams' appearance and behavior were not unusual; (3) Trooper Dern's testimony that Fiancée initially told him that they could not use Melissa's address because children lived at her home; and (4) Adams' own purported failure to remember a conversation with his probation officer, four days before he registered, that he was not permitted to be around his grandchildren. As the trial court properly pointed out, the jury was free to believe some, all, or none of the testimony. See Baker, 313 A.3d at 1116-17. Furthermore, we reiterate that wholly circumstantial evidence may support a conviction "as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Juray, 275 A.3d at 1042. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we determine the record supports a finding that Adams knowingly provided an inaccurate address. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(3).
We apply the same rationale to conclude no relief is due on Adams' weight challenge. Again, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of his and his family members' testimony concerning his health on the day he registered. Additionally, it was within the jury's province to weigh his evidence against the Commonwealth's evidence. Accordingly, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on Adams' weight claim. See Juray, 275 A.3d at 1046-47. No relief is due on Adams' first two issues.
In his third issue, Adams raises "several issues which occurred over the course of the trial." Adams' Brief at 32. He first avers the trial court erred in denying his request for a limiting jury instruction - "that one need not have committed an offense against children to be required to register under" SORNA. Id. at 33-34. Adams does not dispute the trial court's reasoning -that this would have "open[ed] the door to the Commonwealth's revealing to the jury that the victim [of his indecent assault] was [his] intellectually disabled sister." Id. at 35. Nevertheless, Adams "maintains that not providing this limiting instruction did prejudice [him], as the general public's understanding of [SORNA] is that it affects only defendants who sexually violate children." Id. Adams complains that he "was unable to clarify to the jury that [his] registration requirements were not a result of victimizing a child[]" without opening the door to evidence that he "victimized an intellectually disabled person." Id. We determine Adams has waived this issue for appellate review.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 647(C) provides: "No portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate." Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C).
[O]ur Supreme Court has held that the plain language of Rule 647(B) requires a specific objection to assign error to a controverted aspect of or omission from a jury charge. The Court has held further that in the event counsel fails to posit the appropriate objection prior to the jury's retirement for
deliberation, the underlying point is not preserved for appellate review and will be deemed waived on appeal.Commonwealth v. Baker, 313 A.3d 1112, 1118-19 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations omitted).
After the trial court completed the jury charge - which did not include the requested instruction - the court specifically asked the parties whether they had "[a]ny objections to the charge as read." N.T., 10/25/23, at 199. Both parties replied they did not. See id. at 200. Thus, Adams did not preserve an objection, and has waived his third issue for our review. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C); see also Baker, 313 A.3d at 1118-19.
Next, Adams contends the trial court erred in denying his objection to the Commonwealth's cross-examination of him about the purported conversation with his probation officer. See Adams' Brief at 37. By way of background, we reiterate that Adams objected on the ground the issue was beyond the scope of direct examination. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 168. The Commonwealth responded that Adams because testified he had "no recollection of where he resided or [his] addresses," it should be permitted to ask whether "he had conversations with probation at this address at that time." Id. The trial court overruled the defense objection.
We note the applicable standard of review: "Questions of the admission and exclusion of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. The basic requisite for the admissibility of any evidence in a case is that it be competent and relevant." Baker, 313 A.3d at 1123 (citations omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 611(b) provides that generally, "[c]ross-examination of a witness . . . should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting credibility, however, the court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." Pa.R.E. 611(b). This "rule specifically notes the trial court retains the discretion to admit other inquiry as it deems proper." Commonwealth v. Yale, 150 A.3d 979, 984 (Pa. Super. 2016).
On appeal, Adams' sole argument is that although he "denied [the conversation with the probation officer,] the question insinuated to the jury a motive to lie about his address. Furthermore, this line of questioning took advantage of the court's decision to not give the limiting instruction described above." Adams' Brief at 38 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Adams' remaining discussion concerns the denial of his requested limiting jury instruction, and he contends: "The cumulative effect of these errors deprived [him] of a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 39.
In its opinion, the trial court reiterated its reasoning for overruling the objection - that the Commonwealth's question did not go beyond the scope of direct examination. The trial court stated:
[Adams] provided detailed testimony on direct examination about the fact that his sister gave him the incorrect address and that his medical condition impaired his ability to think clearly. Certainly, the Commonwealth [was] permitted to ask questions about
conversations that may provide a motive for providing the incorrect address, thereby disputing the reasons for the "mistake" provided by [Adams].
Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/24, at 12.
After review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Baker, 313 A.3d at 1123. Adams' defense theory, and trial testimony, was that he was too ill, or had cognitive deficiencies such that, he was incapable of understanding what his address was. Given the deference given to the trial court, especially within Rule 611(D) to "permit inquiry into additional matters," we do not disturb the trial court's ruling. See Pa.R.E. 611(b); see also Yale, 150 A.3d at 984. Furthermore, Adams acknowledges that he denied there was such a conversation with his probation officer. See Adams' Brief at 38. To the extent Adams now argues the mere asking of the question was prejudicial, we observe: "It is axiomatic in a criminal trial that all evidence offered by the prosecution will be prejudicial to the defendant. Were mere prejudice the standard, virtually all evidence could reasonably be excluded." Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 224 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude no relief is due on Adams' third issue.
In his final issue, Adams asserts the trial court erred in not considering mitigating factors and not imposing a sentence within the mitigated guideline range. This claim goes to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).Hicks, 151 A.3d at 226 (some citations omitted).
Here, Adams filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his issue by raising it in a timely post-sentence motion, and included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. See id.; see also Adams' Brief at 41. Within the Rule 2119(f) statement, however, Adams solely argues that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, such as his age, infirmity, and acceptance of responsibility. Such an argument, alone, does not raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 257 A.3d 75, 79 (Pa. Super. 2021). Accordingly, we conclude Adams has not properly invoked this Court's jurisdiction to review his sentencing issue. See Hicks, 151 A.3d at 226. We thus do not disturb the sentence imposed.
On appeal, however, Adams continues to deny he knowingly reported an incorrect address, and instead maintains he merely "made a mistake fueled by illness[,] frequent hospitalization[, and] his dependence on family members to instruct him as to the correct address." Adams' Brief at 42.
We note this Court has held that a claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, in conjunction with a claim of an excessive sentence, raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Diclaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2019). However, Adams' argument presents no additional claim that his sentence was excessive. See Adams' Brief at 41-42.
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that no relief is due on Adams' issues. Thus, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered,
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.