Therefore, on this record, we find no basis for concluding that the state court's determination was an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's decision in Brookhart.See Slip Opinion at 1 ("we have repeatedly stated that the procedure employed in this case should be avoided because it invites hairsplitting appeals") (citing Commonwealth v. Abrams, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 584, 589, 692 N.E.2d 532 (1998)). III.
July 28, 1998. Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 44 Mass. App. Ct. 584 (1998).
May 26, 1998Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 44 Mass. App. Ct. 584 (1998).
Discussion. OAS for OUI charge. The defendant asserts that defense counsel's stipulation to the Commonwealth's documentary evidence of her prior convictions and license suspension or revocation for OUI during the second phase of the trial amounted to a guilty plea and required waiver. "In examining the validity of the defendant's claim that this proceeding was nothing more than a de facto guilty plea, we must determine 'whether the defendant effectively stipulated to the truth of facts which constituted all the elements of the offense charged and were conclusive of guilt or whether he simply stipulated that the Commonwealth's witnesses would testify in the manner asserted by the prosecutor. If [he] did nothing more than stipulate as to evidence which warranted, but did not require, [a] finding[] of guilty, he is not to be taken as having pleaded guilty.'" Commonwealth v. Abrams, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 587 (1998), quoting from Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 259, 265 (1986). See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 399 Mass. 761 (1987).