Commonwealth of Ky. Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins

12 Citing cases

  1. Hall v. Hospitality Resources

    276 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2009)   Cited 68 times
    Stating that "[w]e have often said that statutes will not be given [such a] reading where to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion."

    "We have often said that statutes will not be given [such a] reading where to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion." Wesley v. Board of Ed. of Nicholas County, 403 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ky. 1966); see also Commonwealth of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, 320 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Ky. 1959). The Appellant's motion, therefore, was clearly filed within the four year period of the statute of limitations contained in KRS 342.125(3), as the motion to reopen filed on November 7, 2003, was within four years from the February 14, 2001, order granting benefits.

  2. Whitley Whiz, Inc. v. Whitley County ex rel. Whitley County Fiscal Court

    812 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1991)   Cited 4 times

    Board of Education of Laurel County v. McCollum, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 703 (1987). Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125 (1959). A few years ago, former Justice John S. Palmore penned a memorable line which is appropriate here. "When all else is said and done, common sense must not be a stranger in the house of the law."

  3. Bell v. Helton

    NO. 2015-CA-000353-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2017)

    "We have often said that statutes will not be given [a party's asserted interpretive] reading where to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion." Wesley v. Board of Ed. of Nicholas County, 403 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ky. 1966); see also Commonwealth of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, 320 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Ky. 1959). The legislature's failure to delineate in the statute every sub-category of plaintiff does not compel a reading that would exclude those sub-categories from our reading of the statute, and so does not relieve Bell of his obligation, under that statute, as a third-party plaintiff.

  4. Kenton County Water District No. 1 v. Rogers

    433 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 3 times
    In Kenton Co. Water District No. 1 v. Rogers, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 891 (1968), we held that this act outlines the exclusive steps for an appeal and CR 72.01 has no applicability.

    The statute specifies the method of taking an appeal. The appeal procedure is similar to that provided in KRS 177.087 and we have held that since that statute outlines the necessary steps to perfect an appeal, CR 72.01 does not apply. Commonwealth ex rel. Curlin v. Taylor, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 813; Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Hale, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 831. It is also contended that the appellees failed to file a statement of costs but KRS 416.280 has no such requirement, and, as we have just said, CR 72.01, which requires a statement of costs, does not apply. In any event, appellant did file the papers required by CR 72.01 within the time allowed for an appeal, and under Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125, and Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Chenault, Ky., 371 S.W.2d 948, this cured the alleged defect in the landowners' appeal. Appellant further contends that the award of $9,000 is grossly excessive and that the testimony of the landowners' witnesses should have been stricken as lacking in probative value.

  5. Beth-Elkhorn Corporation v. Thomas

    404 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 16 times
    In Beth-Elkhorn Corporation v. Thomas, Ky., 404 S.W.2d 16, we said that KRS 342.316(4) has no effect on a claim arising from two years of injurious exposure in Kentucky unless and until that exposure has been interrupted by injurious exposure outside Kentucky.

    We cannot construe the statute as having such a meaning, since to do so would lead to an absurd and unreasonable conclusion. See Commonwealth of Kentucky, Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125; Kentucky Mountain Coal Company v. Witt, Ky., 358 S.W.2d 517; Jefferson County Board of Election Commissioners v. Russell, Ky., 323 S.W.2d 864; Wesley v. Board of Education of Nicholas County, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 28 (decided May 20, 1966). In order to give significance to KRS 342.316(4) and reconcile it with KRS 342.316(3) and the cited decisions of this court, we are impelled to the view that it is only when "injurious exposure" in Kentucky for two years has been interrupted by "injurious exposure" outside Kentucky that KRS 342.316(4) comes into play.

  6. Wesley v. Board of Education of Nicholas County

    403 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 21 times
    Holding "the fundamental touchstone [is] that the will or intent of the legislature must be a pole star to guide us"

    We have often said that statutes will not be given a strict or literal reading where to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion. Cf. Commonwealth of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125; Kentucky Mountain Coal Company v. Witt, Ky., 358 S.W.2d 517; Jefferson County Board of Election Com'rs v. Russell, Ky., 323 S.W.2d 864. The judgment is reversed, with directions to enter a new judgment rescinding the ouster order.

  7. City of Manchester v. Asher

    396 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965)

    It will be recalled that although the city did not comply strictly with CR 72.01 in appealing to the circuit court, it did file the original quarterly court record, including the judgment from which the appeal was taken. This accomplished the basic purpose of the requirement that a certified copy of the judgment be filed. Cf. Commonwealth of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125, 126 (1959). Hence the irregularity was not fatal. But it would seem elementary that no appeal could be perfected without either the original or a copy of the judgment or order from which it is taken, and we are satisfied that the provisions of KRS 92.530(2) in this respect are mandatory. Cf. Cain v. Magoffin County, 198 Ky. 598, 249 S.W. 766 (1923)

  8. Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Sangalli

    383 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)   Cited 1 times

    The Commonwealth did not ask for it, but a certified copy of the judgment was filed in each of these cases pursuant to motions of the landowners. Since the copies became a part of each record, failure to file them by the Commonwealth would not of itself be fatal to its appeal. Commonwealth of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125. No exceptions were taken by the Commonwealth to the awards made by the commissioners in county court.

  9. Commonwealth v. Chenault

    371 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 1 times

    PALMORE, Judge. In Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125 (1959), it was held that if one party, in appealing to the circuit court from a county court judgment pursuant to KRS 177.087, has filed a certified copy of the county court judgment, failure of the other party to file a copy of the same judgment with his separate appeal thereafter filed is not fatal to the latter appeal. In this case the landowners appealed first, but failed to file with their statement of parties and exceptions a copy of the county court judgment as required by KRS 177.087. Thereafter and within thirty days following the date of the county court judgment the condemnor also appealed.

  10. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Prather

    369 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 5 times

    The cross-appellants recognize that where the landowner fails to appeal or cross-appeal to the circuit court or to file exceptions in that court upon stated grounds, he may not complain; or, if he fails to state a specific ground of exception, he is bound by the county court judgment as to it. KRS 177.087; Bullitt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 298 S.W.2d 290; Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Wilkins, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 125; Commonwealth v. Mayo, Ky., 324 S.W.2d 802. The landowners did not file an appeal or cross-appeal in the circuit court. They had filed in the county court an "Answer and Exceptions to Report of Commissioners" in which they admitted the Department's right to condemn the property but denied that $16,500 was the total value of the property taken and resulting damages and alleged the values and damages sustained were $40,000. The cross-appellants contend that as this document was in the record transmitted to the circuit court, they are entitled to have it regarded as the equivalent of filing an appeal and exceptions in the circuit court. The procedure prescribed in condemnation of land is that commissioners appointed by the county court make an appraisement of the fair compensation and file their report in the county court. If the court finds that the petitioner has the right to condemn the property, it merely confirms the report of valuation and enters judgment accordingly.