The debtor's argument overlooks a long line of appellate court decisions construing Pennsylvania law and holding to the contrary. See Commonwealth ex. rel. Margiotti v. Cunningham, 337 Pa. 289, 298, 10 A.2d 559 (1940) ("A debt, though barred by limitation, is still a debt."); Woods v. Irwin, 141 Pa. 278, 293, 21 A. 603 (1891) ("A debt barred by the statute of limitations is still a debt, though the remedy upon it be suspended or gone. Its force as an existing obligation, even though only moral, is such that a promise to pay is binding without other consideration."); McIntosh v. Condron, 20 Pa.Super. 118, 1902 WL 3732, at *3 (1902) (citing Woods v. Irwin ); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp./CBS v. W.C.A.B., 584 Pa. 411, 425 n. 11, 883 A.2d 579 (2005) ("A statute of limitations is procedural and extinguishes the remedy rather than the cause of action."); In re Philadelphia Elec. Co., 352 Pa. 457, 463-64, 43 A.2d 116 (1945) ("A statute of limitations provides a procedural limitation but does not deal with substantive rights."); 2 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d, § 13:11 (2008).

The debtor's argument overlooks a long line of appellate court decisions construing Pennsylvania law and holding to the contrary. See Commonwealth ex. rel. Margiotti v. Cunningham, 337 Pa. 289, 298 (1940) ("A debt, though barred by limitation, is still a debt."); Woods v. Irwin, 141 Pa. 278, 293 (1891) ("A debt barred by the statute of limitations is still a debt, though the remedy upon it be suspended or gone. Its force as an existing obligation, even though only moral, is such that a promise to pay is binding without other consideration.");

In Pennsylvania, a debt is not extinguished by virtue of the running of the statute of limitations; rather, the statute merely operates to prevent judicial enforcement. In re Keeler, No. 08-14079, 2009 WL 2902740, at *9 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. May 4, 2009);see Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 10 A.2d 559, 563 (Pa. 1940) ("A debt, though barred by limitation, is still a debt."); Woods v. Irwin, 21 A. 603 (Pa. 1891) ("A debt barred by the statute of limitations is still a debt, though the remedy upon it be suspended or gone."). The same appears to be true in New Jersey.

The law is well settled that a court will not heed objections to the constitutionality of an Act unless the complainant is harmed by the particular feature alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution. In re Knowles' Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 580, 145 A. 797, 63 A.L.R. 1086; Commonwealth ex. rel. Margiotti v. Cunningham, 337 Pa. 289, 305, 10 A.2d 559; Turco Paint Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 436, 184 A. 37. The County, by virtue of the alleged discriminatory feature of the amendment, is not harmed, but, on the contrary, may have been benefited by the provision which it contends makes the amendment unconstitutional.

When, therefore, the constitution declares that it is the exclusive function of the courts to try private cases of disputed right, and that they shall administer justice "by the law of the land," and "by due course of law;" it means to say, that the law relating to the transaction in controversy, at the time when it is complete, shall be an inherent element of the case, and shall guide the decision; and that the case shall not be altered, in its substance, by any subsequent law.Menges, 33 Pa. at 495; see also Kay v. Pa. R.R. Co., 65 Pa. 269, 277 (Pa. 1870) ("[W]e are bound therefore to say that this law is retrospective in its operation on this case, deprives the plaintiff of a vested right, and is inoperative."); Lewis v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 69 A. 821, 823 (Pa. 1908); Com. ex rel. Margiotti v. Cunningham, 10 A.2d 559, 565 (Pa. 1940). In Gibson, we summarized these cases and others as holding that "[i]t is well-settled that the Legislature may not extinguish a right of action which has already accrued to a claimant."

When, therefore, the constitution declares that it is the exclusive function of the courts to try private cases of disputed right, and that they shall administer justice "by the law of the land," and "by due course of law;" it means to say, that the law relating to the transaction in controversy, at the time when it is complete, shall be an inherent element of the case, and shall guide the decision; and that the case shall not be altered, in its substance, by any subsequent law. Menges , 33 Pa. at 495 ; see alsoKay v. Pa. R.R. Co. , 65 Pa. 269, 277 (Pa. 1870) ("[W]e are bound therefore to say that this law is retrospective in its operation on this case, deprives the plaintiff of a vested right, and is inoperative."); Lewis v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 220 Pa. 317, 69 A. 821, 823 (1908) ; Com. ex rel. Margiotti v. Cunningham , 337 Pa. 289, 10 A.2d 559, 565 (1940). In Gibson, we summarized these cases and others as holding that "[i]t is well-settled that the Legislature may not extinguish a right of action which has already accrued to a claimant."

It is well settled that procedural due process concerns are implicated only by adjudications, not by state actions that are legislative in character.SeeBi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S. Ct. 141 (1915); Bernitsky v. The County of Schuylkill, 381 Pa. 128, 112 A.2d 120 (1955); Fetfatzes v. City of Phila., 108 Pa. Commw. 552, 529 A.2d 1220 (1987); W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 186 Pa. Super. 526, 142 A.2d 419 (1958); but cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Cunningham, 337 Pa. 289, 10 A.2d 559 (1940) (invalidating, as violative of due process, a statute depriving depositors of a cause of action against the sheriff and authorizing county officers to transfer to the county treasurer certain unclaimed moneys, where a subsequent claimant to those moneys could not obtain judicial review of an adverse decision by the county treasurer). Because issuance of the Bulletins was not an adjudication, Appellants cannot succeed on a procedural due process theory.

However, for many years prior thereto, it had generally been held that the running of a statute of limitations was of no consequence to the right of the state to the unclaimed property. 30A C.J.S. Escheat §§ 3, 11; Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 337 Pa. 289, 10 A.2d 559 (1940); In re Lamberton's Estate, 352 Pa. 531, 43 A.2d 94 (1945). The Uniform Act did not attempt to change that rule, for without it, the effectiveness of any unclaimed property law would be greatly diminished.

" Lewis v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 220 Pa. 317, 324, 69 A. 821, 823 (1908) (quotations omitted); see Rebel v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 340 Pa. 313, 319, 16 A.2d 534, 537-38 (1940); Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Cunningham, 337 Pa. 289, 301-02, 10 A.2d 559, 563-64 (1940); accord, Creighan v. Pittsburgh, 389 Pa. 569, 574, 132 A.2d 867, 870 (1957); Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 641, 161 A.2d 150, 154 (1960). The separation of powers doctrine suggests a fortiori that the Legislature may not disturb actions which have accrued under the Judiciary's authority.

The constitutional guarantee in such connection is likewise subject to an appropriate exercise of the State's police power: Zeuger Milk Company v. Pittsburgh School District, 334 Pa. 277, 280, 5 A.2d 885. The fact that the statute of limitations may have run against the owners of the property in controversy as between them and the accountable corporate custodian does not operate to defeat the Commonwealth's escheatage: Commonwealth ex rel. v. Cunningham, 337 Pa. 289, 297-298, 10 A.2d 559. A statute of limitations provides a procedural limitation but does not deal with substantive rights.