Summary
In Tanner, the Commonwealth was permitted to amend an indictment to include additional offenses arising from the facts of the criminal episode.
Summary of this case from Com v. WeigleOpinion
October 9, 1950.
November 13, 1950.
Criminal law — Practice — Indictment — Higher grade of offense cognate to one returned by coroner's jury — Manslaughter — Murder.
1. Where the district attorney is satisfied from his investigation that a higher grade of offense cognate to the one returned by the coroner's jury is properly chargeable against a defendant, he may draw the bill of indictment accordingly. [421]
2. The finding of a coroner's jury is merely advisory to the public authorities charged with the administration of the criminal law. [422]
3. In a habeas corpus proceeding, in which it appeared that a coroner's jury had recommended that relator be held for the grand jury upon a charge of manslaughter; that the district attorney had prepared a bill of indictment charging murder and voluntary manslaughter, upon which a true bill had been found by the grand jury; and that relator had been tried and convicted of murder in the first degree; it was Held that relator was not entitled to discharge on the ground that he had been indicted and tried for the commission of a crime different from that for which he had been held to await the action of the grand jury. [420-22]
Before DREW, C. J., STERN, STEARNE, JONES, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.
Appeal, No. 177, Miscellaneous Docket, 1950, from order of Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, July T., 1950 No. 738, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Clarence E. Tanner v. Stanley P. Ashe, Warden, Western State Penitentiary. Order affirmed.
Habeas corpus.
Order entered dismissing petition and denying writ, opinion by PATTERSON, P.J. Relator appealed.
W. Gordon Rauck, for appellant.
Owen B. McManus, Assistant District Attorney, with him William S. Rahauser, District Attorney, for appellee.
Convicted some years ago of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment, the relator, Clarence E. Tanner, applied to the court below for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had been indicted and tried for the commission of a crime different from that for which he had been held to await the action of the grand jury. The court below refused the writ, from which order the relator now appeals.
The homicide arose out of a quarrel between the relator and one Riley during the course of a crap game; following an argument between them the relator shot and killed Riley. A coroner's inquest held into the death of the deceased "recommended" that Tanner be held for the grand jury upon a charge of manslaughter. The district attorney prepared a bill of indictment charging murder and voluntary manslaughter; a true bill was found by the grand jury and the relator was tried thereon, convicted and sentenced as above stated.
For some unexplained reason, the relator, notwithstanding the return of the grand jury on the murder bill, was admitted to bail a month later to answer a charge of manslaughter.
In Maginnis's Case, 269 Pa. 186, 195, 112 A. 555, 558, it was stated that "It is established law that, when a prosecuting officer is satisfied from his investigations that a higher grade of offense, cognate to the one returned by the committing magistrate, is properly chargeable against a defendant, he may draw the bill accordingly. . . ." In that case the return by a justice of the peace charged the defendant with simple assault and battery; it was held not improper on the part of the district attorney to draw an indictment charging felonious assault and battery, — a higher degree of the crime. In Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 303, 35 A.2d 307, 309, it was stated that a "defendant should not be required to answer a charge different from, and unrelated to, the one for which he was arrested and held to bail." In Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 96 Pa. 503, where an information had been made for seduction under promise of marriage, it was held that an indictment could properly include counts for fornication and bastardy. In Commonwealth v. Danner, 79 Pa. Super. 556, 558, it was said that "Any crime arising out of the same transaction can be laid in the indictment"; it was there held that an indictment for receiving stolen goods could be presented by the district attorney upon an information charging larceny. See also Commonwealth v. Ruff, 92 Pa. Super. 530, 536.
The killing of Riley was a single act. The circumstances attending it, its justification, and the grade of the crime thus committed, could properly be determined only upon the trial of the case even though the coroner's inquest "recommended" that the relator be held for manslaughter. The finding of a coroner's jury "is merely advisory to the public authorities charged with the administration of the criminal law. It has been held that a coroner's verdict . . . is merely advisory, . . . notwithstanding the verdict may make it the duty of the coroner to issue a warrant for the arrest of the person suspected . . . ." 13 Am. Jur. 113, § 12. Murder and manslaughter are "cognate" to one another and are not "unrelated", murder being a higher grade of felonious homicide than manslaughter, and both being properly joined as counts in a bill of indictment. If the relator was surprised when he found upon arraignment that he was called upon to answer to the graver charge of murder an application for time to prepare to meet it would undoubtedly have been allowed: Commonwealth v. Carson, 166 Pa. 179, 183, 30 A. 985; Commonwealth v. Gouger, 21 Pa. Super. 217, 232; Commonwealth v. Danner, 79 Pa. Super. 556, 558, 559.
Order affirmed; costs to be paid by the County of Allegheny.