Opinion
0109536/2005.
January 31, 2006.
DECISION/ORDER
This action concerns the future of the building located at 119 Avenue B in Manhattan which houses the Church of St. Brigid, formerly known as the Church of St. Bridget.
The Church, designed by the Irish-American Architect Patrick C. Keely, was built by Irish shipwrights in 1848, during the large-scale immigration resulting from the Great Famine. Incorporated under the Religious Corporation Law (RCL) in 1869, St. Brigid is one of the oldest Roman Catholic churches in New York City. During its history, the Church served the Irish immigrant community and other largely immigrant communities of New York's Lower East Side. On or about October 30, 1940, Archbishop Francis Spellman conveyed the Church building and the associated land to the Church of St. Brigid.
In June 2001, defendant Edward Cardinal Egan visited the parish and ordered that the Church be closed, because serious structural problems had made the Church building unsafe. The then pastor of the Church, Father Michael Conway, thereupon began celebrating Mass in the cafeteria of the parish school, adjacent to the Church, and also began a restoration fund which, the parties agree, eventually collected approximately $103,000.
Although defendant contends that this fund, which was set up by Father Conway, was unauthorized, the Archdiocese has stated that it is committed to return all money collected to refurbish or rebuild the Church, up to the sum of $103.000.00, if said contributions can be verified.
Plaintiffs Edwin Torres, Catherine King, Nilsa Fiol, Maria Tornin and Ruth Burgos were all parishioners of St. Brigid and claim to have contributed to the restoration fund in reliance on Father Conway's promise that the church was going to be repaired.
In September 2003, the Archdiocese, through its architect, filed an application with the New York City Department of Buildings for the conversion of the Church into residential apartments. Sometime in 2004, The Trinitarian Order which had provided priests for St. Brigid, notified the Archdiocese that they could no longer renew their commitment to serve St. Brigid, and, in fact, withdrew from all the parishes they were staffing in the Archdiocese of New York. In August 2004, Bishop Robert Brucato, the Vicar General for the Archdiocese, announced that the St. Brigid parish would be closed within two weeks. The last Mass was held at St. Brigid on September 12, 2004.
Recently, the Archdiocese has removed the altar, tabernacle, statues, organ, and pews from the Church, and has begun to take the steps necessary to obtain a permit to demolish it.
Defendant claims that its construction consultants concluded in February 2005 that it would cost $6.9 million to restore the building. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the condition of the building may not be as dire as defendant claims and suggest that the cost of repairing the building may only be about $500,000.00. The plaintiffs further request that their expert be granted an opportunity to inspect the building.
Plaintiffs' Complaint sets forth claims based on promissory estoppel (first cause of action), breach of fiduciary duty (second cause of action), alleged violation of RCL § 91 (third cause of action), and breach of express or implied contract (fourth cause of action), and seeks a judgment:
(a) enjoining Cardinal Egan or anyone acting on his behalf or at his direction from taking any steps to demolish the building, in whole or in part;
(b) directing Cardinal Egan to reopen St. Brigid and allow it to continue to operate as a parish church;
(c) directing Cardinal Egan to use all funds collected for the repair and renovation of the building housing St. Brigid for that purpose and that purpose alone; (d) subjecting St. Brigid to a constructive trust to be administered in accord with the purpose for which said funds were collected, to wit, as a parish church;
(e) directing Cardinal Egan to take all steps necessary to establish a proper Board of Trustees for St. Brigid which Board of Trustees shall work to further the repair and renovation of the building housing St. Brigid and its operation as a parish church; and
(f) declaring any permit issued for the whole or partial demolition of the building housing St. Brigid, including but not limited to that issued pursuant to Application No. 103562681, null and void, and enjoining defendant Patricia J. Lancaster, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings, from issuing any other permits.
Plaintiffs now move by Order to Show Cause for a preliminary injunction: (a) enjoining defendant Egan from demolishing, in whole or in part, the building known as the Church of St. Brigid; and (b) directing defendant Lancaster to revoke any permit heretofore issued which would allow the total or partial demolition of said building, on the grounds that:
Pursuant to Stipulation dated July 13, 2005 (so-ordered by the Hon. Michael Stallman, to whom this case was originally assigned), plaintiffs' complaint against the City of New York (i.e., Commissioner Lancaster) was discontinued with prejudice.
(1) plaintiffs' contributions to the restoration fund established by Father Conway created an enforceable obligation on the part of the Archdiocese to restore and reopen the Church (see, First Methodist Episcopal Church of Mount Vernon v. Howard, 133 Misc. 723 [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co. 1929], aff'd, 233 A.D. 753 [2nd Dep't 1931]);
(2) no legal decision has been or can be made to close or demolish St. Brigid absent an action by a Board of Trustees, as set forth in Religious Corporations Law § 91; and
(3) Cardinal Egan is subject to a constructive trust to act in the interests of the parishioners of St. Brigid who desire to keep the Church open.
Pursuant to the July 13, 2005 Stipulation, the temporary restraining order contained in the Order to Show Cause was modified to provide as follows:
Pending final submission of this motion (or any cross-motion), Cardinal Egan or any person acting as his agent or representative, is restrained from demolishing, in whole or in part, the building at 119 Avenue B, NY, NY, known as the Church of St. Brigid. Nothing herein shall prevent Cardinal Egan or his agents/representatives from removing and preserving any personalty (including fixtures) from the Church interior; or from seeking any appropriate permit/permission/license or making any application to any City agency concerning the building, including seeking authorization for demolition/alteration; or from erecting/installing any scaffolding or other equipment in or around or on the building (subject to any necessary permit) necessary to maintain the building and/or the safety of others.
This Court continued the temporary restraining order, as modified, on the record on August 30, 2005, pending the determination of this motion and cross-motion.
Defendant opposes the motion for a preliminary injunction and cross-moves for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(1), (2), (5) and (7) dismissing plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds that: (i) this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment; (ii) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; (iii) the plaintiffs are without standing; and (iv) the claims are barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Specifically, the defendant argues that the hierarchal Roman Catholic Church has the authority to administer church property according to the ecclesiastical law of the Church, "even in disregard of the wishes of the congregation" (see, Faith United Christian Church v. United Christian Church, 266 A.D.2d 428, 429 [2nd Dep't 1999]); plaintiffs lack standing to seek the imposition of a constructive trust because Cardinal Egan owes no fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs; and plaintiffs' claim that the Archdiocese has a contractual obligation to keep the Church open in perpetuity is barred by the Statute of Frauds.
It is well settled that "[t]he State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).See also, Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). However, it is also clear that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution "prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice" (Jones v. Wolf, supra at 602) and "requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchial church organization." (Id.)
Thus, a civil court may resolve a dispute involving church propertyonly where the "case can be decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of contract law, without reference to any religious principle" (Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 115, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817) and where "the underlying controversy does not involve determining religious doctrines or ecclesiastical issues" (Trustees of the Diocese of Albany v. Trinity Episcopal Church of Gloversville, 250 A.D.2d 282, 285 [3rd Dep't 1999]).
Plaintiffs argue that this action is not barred by the First Amendment because this case does not implicate ecclesiastical matters (see, First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 62 N.Y.2d 110; Park Slope Jewish Center v. Cong, B'nai Jacob, 90 N.Y.2d 517), but rather involves the application of 'neutral principles' of contract law and promissory estoppel based on the funds collected by Father Conway for the repair of the building, and a determination as to whether the decision to demolish the building was made in compliance with RCL § 91 absent a properly constituted Board of Trustees, including two lay leaders.
RCL § 91 provides, in relevant part, that
[t]he archbishop or bishop and the vicar-general of the diocese to which any incorporated Roman Catholic church belongs, the rector of such church, and their successors in office shall, by virtue of their offices, be trustees of such church. Two laymen, members of such incorporated church, selected by such officers or by a majority of them, shall also be' trustees of such incorporated church, and such officers and such laymen trustees shall together constitute the board of trustees thereof.
However, this action does not involve a dispute regarding the ownership of the funds collected, but rather seeks an order directing the Cardinal to use those funds for a specific purpose; namely, the restoration and eventual reopening of the church.
Based on the papers submitted and the oral argument held on the record on August 30, 2005, this Court finds that it would be an "impermissible intrusion" into Cardinal Egan's ecclesiastical authority to mandate that he use those funds to reopen the building as a church and/or to require him to operate a parish therein, as plaintiffs seek in their first, second and fourth causes of action. Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 625 N.E.2d 1352 (1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994). See also, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976) (in which the United States Supreme Court held that the state court exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing the Mother Church's reorganization of the American-Canadian Diocese, and should have deferred to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals); Burke v. Rector, Churchwardens and Vestrymen of Trinity Church, 63 Misc. 43 (Sup. Ct, N.Y. Co. 1909),aff'd 132 A.D. 930 (1st Dept 1909) (in which the court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction barring vestry from closing a chapel and from interfering with the continuation of the usual religious services therein).
The third cause of action which is based solely on the application of the Religious Corporation Law does not appear to implicate any religious doctrine or ecclesiastical issue. See, e.g., Filetto v. St. Mary of the Assumption Church of Binghamton, 61 Misc.2d 278 (Sup.Ct., Broome Co. 1969).
However, the defendant concedes that St. Brigid does not currently have a properly constituted board of trustees, and acknowledged on the record during the oral argument that no demolition of the Church building could be undertaken absent a duly made decision by such a board. Therefore, this Court finds that plaintiffs' third cause of action and the corresponding branch of their motion for injunctive relief, are not ripe for determination.
The Archdiocese indicates that it plans to form a board and to schedule a meeting once the necessary permits are obtained, and prior to commencing any demolition work.
Accordingly, based on the papers submitted and the oral argument held on the record on August 30, 2005, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is denied, and defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted.
The temporary restraining order contained in the Order to Show Cause is, therefore, vacated, and plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed without costs or disbursements. The Clerk may enter judgment accordingly.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.