Committee for Better Health Care v. Meyer

69 Citing cases

  1. FABEC v. BECK

    922 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1996)   Cited 16 times
    Holding a court should consider the following factors in determining whether a party has substantially complied with statutory requirements: " the extent of noncompliance, the purpose of the applicable provision and whether that purpose is substantially achieved despite the noncompliance, and whether there was a good-faith effort to comply or whether noncompliance is based on a conscious decision to mislead the electorate"

    That form required the circulator to indicate the date that the circulator signed the affidavit and included a jurat stating that the affidavit was "[s]ubscribed and sworn to before me this __ day of ____ 19__." We specifically considered an affidavit form that included these requirements in Committee For Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 898 (Colo. 1992). We addressed the effect of a discrepancy between the date of the circulator's signature and the date on the notary's affirmation:

  2. Loonan v. Woodley

    882 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1994)   Cited 30 times
    Upholding order vacating the Secretary's determination of sufficiency and enjoining the Secretary from certifying proposed initiative to the ballot due to circulator's failure to comply with statutory requirements

    The right to initiative and referendum is not a federal constitutional right, but is guaranteed by the state under Article V, section 1 of the Colorado Constitution. See Committee for Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 890 n. 7 (Colo. 1992). In the voting rights context we have held that the rule of "substantial compliance" provides the appropriate level of statutory compliance to "facilitate and secure, rather than subvert or impede, the right to vote."

  3. McClellan v. Meyer

    900 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1995)   Cited 36 times
    Validating petition signatures even though circulator's signature on affidavit had different date than notarization

    Our review of the issues articulated in the appellants' petition for review filed in the district court and in their brief filed before us reveals that this issue is not properly before us on this appeal. See Committee For Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1992). Whether the Secretary of State's use of temporary personnel violated the Colorado Constitution Art. XII, Section 13(9).

  4. Ponis v. Timme

    Civil Action No. 12-cv-00141-LTB (D. Colo. Aug. 7, 2012)

    To the extent the grounds are not duplicative, Mr. Ponis failed to articulate a separate basis for each of those claims in his opening brief to the Colorado Court of Appeals so as to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Committee for Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 890 (Colo. 1992) (appellant must do more than merely assert error in a vague and unexplained fashion); Cherry Creek Aviation, Inc. v. City of Steamboat, 958 P.2d 515, 523 (Colo. App.1998) (declining to address issue not properly framed by appellant).

  5. American Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer

    120 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1997)   Cited 53 times
    Finding that statutory requirement that circulators wear identification badge was "not narrowly tailored to serve the state's asserted interest"

    The Colorado Constitution grants the general assembly the authority to adopt legislation "designed to prevent fraud, mistake, or other abuses" in the petition process. Committee for Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (citing Colo. Const. art. V, § 1( 2), which provides petitions shall be filed "in such form as may be prescribed pursuant to law," and Colo. Const. art. VII, § 11, which grants general authority to regulate elections and elective franchise). The manner in which petitions may be circulated and by whom, and how they may be signed and by whom are regulated by C.R.S.A. §§ 1-40-101 et seq. (West Supp. 1996).

  6. Ritchie v. Polis

    467 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2020)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that the Colorado Disaster Emergency Act (CDEA), §§ 24-33.5-701 to - 716, C.R.S. 2020, does not authorize the Governor to suspend a constitutional requirement

    Loonan v. Woodley , 882 P.2d 1380, 1388 (Colo. 1994). And we have explained that the purpose of the constitutionally required affidavit "is to ‘ensure that circulators, who possess various degrees of interest in a particular initiative, exercise special care to prevent mistake, fraud, or abuse in the process of obtaining thousands of signatures of only registered electors throughout the state.’ " Id. at 1388–89 (quoting Comm. for Better Health Care for All Colo. Citizens by Schrier v. Meyer , 830 P.2d 884, 894 (Colo. 1992) ). ¶13 Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Meyer v. Grant , 486 U.S. 414, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988), "the circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as ‘core political speech.’ "

  7. Board of County Comm'rs v. DeLozier

    917 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1996)   Cited 42 times
    Holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where "the facts that support claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation"

    The doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be confused with the doctrine of equitable estoppel. While the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable to promises, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to misstatements of fact. See Committee for Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1992). Specifically, to establish a claim of equitable estoppel,

  8. Jafay v. Board of County Commissioners

    848 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 26 times
    Summarizing the principles encompassed by equitable estoppel

    This court has repeatedly recognized that equitable estoppel may be available as against a governmental agency to prevent manifest injustice. Committee for Better Health Care for all Colorado Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 891-92 (Colo. 1992); Montero v. Meyer, 795 P.2d 242, 252-53 (Colo. 1990) (Quinn, J., dissenting); National Advertising Co. v. Department of Highways, 718 P.2d 1038, 1043-44 (Colo.

  9. Tarco, Inc. v. Conifer Metro. Dist.

    316 P.3d 82 (Colo. App. 2013)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that a defendant is barred from raising an affirmative defense for the first time at summary judgment when doing so would prejudice the plaintiff

    ¶ 39 Equitable estoppel is based on principles of fair dealing and is designed to prevent manifest injustice. Comm. for Better Health Care for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 891 (Colo.1992); Kruse v. Town of Castle Rock, 192 P.3d 591, 603 (Colo.App.2008). The doctrine may be asserted against governmental agencies.

  10. Draper v. Defrenchi-Gordineer

    282 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2011)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that direct effect on plaintiff is requirement; witnessing injury to a loved one is insufficient

    1998) (“It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”); Colby v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 928 P.2d 1298, 1301 (Colo.1996)(appeal from grant of summary judgment; “The record before us compels the conclusion that the second issue upon which we granted certiorari ... was not addressed by the trial court.... Issues not decided by the lower court may not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”); Committee for Better Health Care v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 888 (Colo.1992)(“It is axiomatic that in any appellate proceeding this court may consider only issues that have actually been determined by another court or agency and have been properly presented for our consideration.”); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. April Corp., 855 P.2d 12, 15 (Colo.App.1992) (declining to address issue not reached by trial court).