Admittedly, there are cases that state the measure of quantum meruit recovery as the reasonable value of the services performed by plaintiff. See, e.g., Romanek-Golub Co. v. Anvan Hotel Corp., 168 Ill.App.3d 1031, 119 Ill.Dec. 482, 489, 522 N.E.2d 1341, 1348 (1988); Telander v. Posejpal, 94 Ill. App.3d 616, 49 Ill.Dec. 590, 599, 418 N.E.2d 444, 453 (1981); Edens View Realty Inv., Inc. v. Heritage Enter., Inc., 87 Ill. App.3d 480, 42 Ill.Dec. 360, 366, 408 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (1980); O'Neil Santa Claus, Ltd. v. Xtra Value Imports, Inc., 51 Ill. App.3d 11, 8 Ill.Dec. 78, 81, 365 N.E.2d 316, 319 (1977); Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill.App.3d 847, 286 N.E.2d 758, 764 (1972). See also Frisch Contracting Serv. Co., 158 Ill.App.3d 218, 110 Ill. Dec. at 657, 511 N.E.2d at 834.

)." 'A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.'" Chicago's Pizza, Inc., 384 Ill.App.3d at 859 (quoting Judgment Services Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill.App.3d 151, 154 (2001)); Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill.App.3d 847, 853 (1972). "As the trier of fact, the trial judge was in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony."

[Citations.]" ( First National Bank of Lincolnwood v. Glenn (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 322, 324; Comm v. Goodman (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 847, 854; see Rutledge v. Housing Authority (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 1064, 1069; Elliott v. Villa Park Trust Savings Bank (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 714, 717.) Both Posejpal and Telander agree that a crucial inquiry here is whether the defendant received any benefit as a result of the purported rezoning of the Posejpal property. Posejpal argues that the actions of Telander did not confer any benefit upon him and thus the trial court erred in entering the judgment of $25,000 in favor of Telander.

Appellant maintains, however, that the Housing Authority benefited through the preparation of the plans submitted and renegotiated. Nonetheless, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the defendant was enriched, an issue which we see no need to expressly determine, then that enrichment was extended voluntarily to facilitate a business objective, part of an agreed procedure well within the contemplation of the appellant. Rutledge cites the case of Comm v. Goodman (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 847, 286 N.E.2d 758, in which recovery was allowed an architect for services in the form of extensive developmental work in determining the feasibility of an apartment project. In that case the defendant, a real estate developer, approached the complainant requesting the work be done, but later obtained needed financing with other partners and terminated complainant's services.

First National Bank v. Glenn, 132 Ill. App.2d 322, 324, 270 N.E.2d 493, quoting from Board of Highway Commissioners v. City of Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 172, 97 N.E. 280. See also Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill. App.3d 847, 854, 286 N.E.2d 758. • 4 The existence of a relationship between the parties which will give rise to an implied agreement to compensate for services rendered is an issue of fact.

" 'A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.'" Chicago's Pizza, Inc., 384 Ill.App.3d at 859 (quoting Judgment Services Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill.App.3d 151, 154 (2001)); Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill.App.3d 847, 853 (1972). "As the trier of fact, the trial judge was in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony."

'A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.'" Chicago's Pizza, Inc., 384 Ill.App.3d at 859 (quoting Judgment Services Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill.App.3d 151, 154 (2001)); Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill.App.3d 847, 853 (1972). "As the trier of fact, the trial judge was in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony." Chicago's Pizza, Inc., 384 Ill.App.3d at 859.

¶ 69 But the legal theories are altogether different. Contract damages are fixed by the parties, while quantum meruit damages are fixed in law, based on principles of equity and justice. See id. at 533; Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill.App.3d 847, 855 (1972). And in any event, the trial court rejected Ashlaur's theory of damages as to count 3 for much the same reason it did as to count 2-that Ashlaur failed to provide sufficient evidence, under either theory, that it was entitled to the amount of money it claimed.

A judgment is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite outcome is apparent. Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill. App. 3d 847, 853 (1972). ¶ 80 The difficulty with the facts in this case stems from the invalidity of the power of attorney document. All parties agree that Charles did not sign the legal document in the presence of a notary public, and that therefore, the power of attorney was never valid.

For the reasons stated earlier in this order, we do not find that the opposite conclusion—that J.H. is not a neglected minor—is evident or appropriate. Comm v. Goodman, 6 Ill. App. 3d 847, 853, 286 N.E.2d 758, 763 (1972).¶ 58 Tammy and James also argue that there is no evidence that whatever drug James may have smoked causes intoxication or impairment, that there is no evidence that James has an ongoing pattern of drug use, and that periodic use of drugs does not constitute neglect.