PER CURIAM.The facts of this matter are more fully set forth in a prior decision of this Court ( 138 A.D.3d 1230, 29 N.Y.S.3d 645 [2016] ). Briefly, respondent was admitted to practice by the Appellate Division, Second Department in 1984. He formerly practiced law in the City of Albany, but this Court struck respondent's name from the roll of attorneys by 2012 order ( 95 A.D.3d 1501, 943 N.Y.S.2d 787 [2012] ) upon his plea of guilty to certain felonies. Upon the subsequent vacatur of his guilty plea by County Court, respondent applied for reinstatement (see generally Judiciary Law § 90 [5 ] ). Petitioner opposed said application and, by June 2015 confidential order, we held respondent's application for reinstatement in abeyance and directed petitioner to expeditiously investigate the matter and determine whether a disciplinary proceeding based on the conduct underlying respondent's vacated convictions was warranted.
Briefly, respondent was admitted to practice by the Appellate Division, Second Department in 1984. He formerly practiced law in the City of Albany, but this Court struck respondent's name from the roll of attorneys by 2012 order (95 AD3d 1501 [2012]) upon his plea of guilty to certain felonies. Upon the subsequent vacatur of his guilty plea by County Court, respondent applied for reinstatement (see generally Judiciary Law § 90 [5]). Petitioner opposed said application and, by June 2015 confidential order, we held respondent's application for reinstatement in abeyance and directed petitioner to expeditiously investigate the matter and determine whether a disciplinary proceeding based on the conduct underlying respondent's vacated convictions was warranted.
Upon said conviction, respondent was automatically disbarred from the practice of law (see Judiciary Law § 90 [4] [a], [e]; Matter of Barash, 20 NY2d 154, 157 [1967]). This Court's subsequent acceptance of respondent's resignation from practice (95 AD3d 1501 [2012]) was therefore superfluous (see Matter of Sanderson, 119 AD3d 1318, 1318 [2014]), but the order nonetheless accomplished the formality of striking respondent's name from the roll of attorneys (see Judiciary Law § 90 [4] [b]). In December 2014, respondent's criminal convictions were vacated by Albany County Court (Herrick, J.) on the sole basis that the underlying crimes were held to be unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in an unrelated case (see People v Golb, 23 NY3d 455, 466-468 [2014]).
Upon said conviction, respondent was automatically disbarred from the practice of law (see Judiciary Law § 90[4][a], [e] ; Matter of Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 157, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997, 228 N.E.2d 896 [1967] ). This Court's subsequent acceptance of respondent's resignation from practice (95 A.D.3d 1501, 943 N.Y.S.2d 787 [2012] ) was therefore superfluous (see Matter of Sanderson, 119 A.D.3d 1318, 1318, 989 N.Y.S.2d 713 [2014] ), but the order nonetheless accomplished the formality of striking respondent's name from the roll of attorneys (see Judiciary Law § 90[4] [b] ). In December 2014, respondent's criminal convictions were vacated by Albany County Court (Herrick, J.) on the sole basis that the underlying crimes were held to be unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in an unrelated case (see People v. Golb, 23 N.Y.3d 455, 466–468, 991 N.Y.S.2d 792, 15 N.E.3d 805 [2014] ).