We granted certiorari, 528 U.S. 985 (1999), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination. Compare Kline v. TVA, 128 F.3d 337 (CA6 1997) (prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence to disbelieve employer's explanation always creates jury issue of whether employer intentionally discriminated); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519 (CA11 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (CA3 1996) (same) (en banc), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1129 (1997); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F.3d 1104 (CA8) (same), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946 (1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (CA7 1994) (same); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421 (CA9 1993) (same), with Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (CADC 1998) (en banc) (plaintiff's discrediting of employer's explanation is entitled to considerable weight, such that plaintiff should not be routinely required to submit evidence over and above proof of pretext), and with Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (CA2 1997) (en banc) (plaintiff must introduce sufficient evidence for jury to find both that employer's reason was false and that real reason was discrimination), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (CA5 1996) (same); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676 (CA4 1995) (same); Woods v. Frict

We have explained that "a plaintiff may not establish that an employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer's reasons, at least not where . . . the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, sub nom., Combs v. Meadowcraft Co., 522 U.S. 1045, 118 S.Ct. 685, 139 L.Ed.2d 632 (1998); see also Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1962, 146 L.Ed.2d 793 (2000) (emphasizing that courts "are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead our sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision."); Deines v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that "it is not the function of the jury to scrutinize the employer's judgment as to who is best qualified to fill the position. . . . The single issue for the trier of fact is whether the employer's selection of a particular applicant over the plaintiff was motivated by discrimination.")

We have held that "a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer's proffered reasons for its challenged action." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1529 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Combs v. Meadowcraft Co., 522 U.S. 1045, 118 S.Ct. 685, 139 L.Ed.2d 632 (1998). Thus the ultimate question under these circumstances is to be resolved by a jury.

Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Black, he has failed to "demonstrate[] such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [defendant's] proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, Meadowcraft, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519, 1428 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998). Therefore, even if Black had supported a prima facie case, he has not demonstrated that the PUD's proffered explanation is pretext or otherwise supports an inference of pretext.

[a] plaintiff may not establish that an employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer's reasons, at least not where ... the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, sub nom., Combs v. Meadowcraft Co., 522 U.S. 1045, 118 S. Ct. 685, 139 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1998); see also Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109, 120 S. Ct. 1962, 146 L. Ed. 2d 793 (2000) (emphasizing that courts "are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead our sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision."); Deines v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that "it is not the function of the jury to scrutinize the employer's judgment as to who is best qualified to fill the position....

"A revenue procedure is defined as a 'statement of procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Code and related statutes or information that, although not necessarily affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.' " Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, 379 F.3d at 1308 (quoting 26 CFR § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b) (2004)); see also In re Peterson, 321 B.R. 259, 261 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2004) ("A revenue procedure is an internal procedural guide. It represents official IRS position on a matter of procedure, but it is not mandatory.") (citing Estate of Shapiro v. Commissioner, 111 F.3d 1010, 1017-18 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998)). "[R]evenue procedures are not produced through formal notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.

This Court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the Board gave an honest explanation for its decision, but it may not reexamine the Board's legitimate business decisions. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991); Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999) (courts are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair, but are to determine whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543, cert. denied 522 U.S. 1045 (1998) (plaintiff may not establish the defendant's proffered reasons are pretextual "merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer's reasons, at least not where . . . the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer"); Chapman v. A.I. Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[a] plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute his business judgment for that of the employer"). This Court simply sees no weaknesses or inconsistencies in the Board's proffered explanation that Wojdula was promoted over Miller based in part on their very different answers to interview question five.

Based upon the undisputed fact that Bray was not meeting the job expectations for several months, placing Bray on the PIP was not an antagonistic or unreasonable action by Robles and neither was Ranson's decision to ultimately terminate Bray. Importantly, the Court finds these arguments do not negate the proffered reason for termination head on and therefore Bray's arguments are misplaced. That is, as attempted here a plaintiff may not establish that a defendant's proffered reason is merely pretext by questioning the wisdom of the employer's reason. Aldabblan v. Festive Pizza, Ltd., 380 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998); Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109 (2000)). Nevertheless, Bray also contends discriminatory remarks were made and that he felt discriminated against because of his age. (Doc. #40-6, at 3).

Once the defendant bears its burden of production, "the plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment action." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Combs v. Meadowcraft Co., 522 U.S. 1045 (1998). [T]his circuit's post-Hicks decisions uniformly hold that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case and has put on sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to disbelieve an employer's proffered explanation for its actions, that alone is enough to preclude [summary judgment or] entry of judgment as a matter of law.

Once the defendant has borne its burden of production, “the plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment action.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir.1997) (citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Combs v. Meadowcraft Co., 522 U.S. 1045, 118 S.Ct. 685, 139 L.Ed.2d 632 (1998). [T]his circuit's post-Hicks decisions uniformly hold that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case and has put on sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to disbelieve an employer's proffered explanation for its actions, that alone is enough to preclude [summary judgment or] entry of judgment as a matter of law.