If "covered," as used in Affiliated's exclusionary clause, is susceptible of the meaning Affiliated attaches to it, the word is at least ambiguous. In that event the ambiguity must be resolved against Affiliated. Combined Mut. Cas. Co. v. Metheny, 203 Okl. 522, 223 P.2d 533, 535 (1950). Affirmed.
13 Appleman Insurance Law and Practice § 7522, p. 249, and see 1961 pocket part, p. 87. Oklahoma follows this rule, Springfield Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Dickey, 73 Okla. 57, 174 P. 235, 238, and see Johnston v. Shaffer, 74 Okla. 25, 176 P. 901, wherein the rule was applied to an oil and gas lease. County Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Harper, 207 Okla. 359, 249 P.2d 705, 707; Combined Mut. Cas. Co. v. Metheny, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533, 535. One further argument of the insurer should be mentioned. It is asserted that the provision for premium adjustment on the basis of gross receipts shows an intent to exclude the period when the circus is in winter quarters because at that period there are no admission receipts. It is a sufficient answer that method of premium adjustment has no relation to risk coverage and that a substantial minimum premium was required and paid.
Floods could have taken place and caused damage to the insured property only on the earth's surface. County Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Harper, 207 Okla. 359, 249 P.2d 705; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Cole, 207 Okla. 171, 248 P.2d 608; Combined Mutual Casualty Co. v. Metheny, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 191 Okla. 236, 129 P.2d 71; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 187 Okla. 214, 101 P.2d 826; Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Spitler, 178 Okla. 537, 63 P.2d 82; National Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. May, 170 Okla. 198, 39 P.2d 107; Employers' Casualty Co. v. T.E. Wiggins, Inc., 168 Okla. 295, 32 P.2d 886; Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Bacon, 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 360; Suggs v. Mutual Ben. Health Acc. Ass'n, 10 Cir., 115 F.2d 80. National Aid Life Ass'n v. May, 201 Okla. 450, 207 P.2d 292; Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Howell, 176 Okla. 451, 56 P.2d 138; Friend v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., 80 Okla. 76, 194 P. 204; Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Gilmore, Gardner Kirk Oil Co., 10 Cir., 157 F.2d 929; Mandles v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 10 Cir., 115 F.2d 994.
Miller v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. , 1978 OK 92, 588 P.2d 1078, 1081 ("We have repeatedly held that when ambiguity exists in the meaning of an insurance contract the doubt is to be resolved against the company."), quoting Combined Mut. Cas. Co. v. Metheny , 1950 OK 269, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533, 535. ¶26 We construe the meaning and effect of a common insurance term in § 3624, a "policy," using its well-settled meaning at both the time § 3624 was created in 1957 and used today in Johnson's policy of property insurance.
This being the case, we must, as a matter of construction, construe the ambiguity in favor of the insured. See e.g., Combined Mut. Cas. Co. v. Metheny, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533 (1950), in which we stated: "We have repeatedly held that when ambiguity exists in the meaning of an insurance contract the doubt is to be resolved against the company.
"The rule is settled that an insurance policy must be construed to give effect to all of its provisions, where possible, and that its terms and provisions are to be accepted in their usual and ordinary sense, and that exceptions which are inserted by the insurer to exempt it from liability are to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the insurer. See Great American Insurance Company v. O.K. Packing Company, 202 Okla. 231, 211 P.2d 1014; and Combined Mutual Casualty Company v. Metheny, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533."
Ambiguous provisions of an insurance policy, open to two different constructions, are to be construed most strongly against the insurer, and in favor of the insured. Combined Mutual Cas. Co. v. Metheny, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533; Cooper v. New York Life Ins. Co., 198 Okla. 611, 180 P.2d 654; Benefit Ass'n of Railway Employees v. Mitchell, 129 Okla. 114, 263 P. 652; Oklahoma Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 44 Okla. 783, 145 P. 1138, L.R.A. 1915E, 695; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Hite, 37 Okla. 305, 132 P. 333, 46 L.R.A., N.S., 986. The law favors awarding purchasers of insurance the protection and benefits which they have paid for when such benefits can be justified on sound legal considerations.
Explosion, Hail or Water G — Combined Additional $ Actual Cash Value $ $ 1.30 Coverage H — Towing and Labor Costs $10 for each disablement $ $ J — $ $ $ Total Premium $61.30" In determining the intention of the parties, the rule to be followed was recently stated by this court in the case of Combined Mut. Cas. Co. v. Metheny, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533, as follows: "Contracts of insurance will be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished, and conditions and provisions of every contract of insurance will be construed against the insurer who proposes and prepares the policy.
The rule is settled that an insurance policy must be construed to give effect to all of its provisions, where possible, and that its terms and provisions are to be accepted in their usual and ordinary sense, and that exceptions which are inserted by the insurer to exempt it from liability are to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the insurer. See Great American Insurance Co. v. O.K. Packing Co., 202 Okla. 231, 211 P.2d 1014; and Combined Mutual Casualty Co. v. Metheny, 203 Okla. 522, 223 P.2d 533. The language of said exclusion provision is not susceptible of the construction assigned to it by the defendant insurance company, and it is, therefore, immaterial that the insured was in fact, a machinist by trade at time of the accident which resulted in his death.