Com. v. Whitner

13 Citing cases

  1. Com. v. Randall

    515 Pa. 410 (Pa. 1987)   Cited 95 times
    Holding that a conviction for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement may be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant who chooses to testify

    Pa. Super. 595, 504 A.2d 1310 (1986); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 347 Pa. Super. 564, 500 A.2d 1200 (1985); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 341 Pa. Super. 152, 491 A.2d 196 (1985); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 340 Pa. Super. 26, 489 A.2d 821 (1985); Commonwealth v. Bunch, 329 Pa. Super. 101, 477 A.2d 1372 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kearse, 326 Pa. Super. 1, 473 A.2d 577 (1984); Commonwealth v. Toomey, 321 Pa. Super. 281, 468 A.2d 479 (1984); Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa. Super. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983); Commonwealth v. Zabala, 310 Pa. Super. 301, 456 A.2d 622 (1983); Commonwealth v. Tabas, 308 Pa. Super. 43, 454 A.2d 12 (1982); Commonwealth v. Brunner, 305 Pa. Super. 411, 451 A.2d 714 (1982), vacated on other grounds, 502 Pa. 358, 466 A.2d 991 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kaster, 300 Pa. Super. 174, 446 A.2d 286 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 290 Pa. Super. 254, 434 A.2d 740 (1981); Commonwealth v. Clark, 280 Pa. Super. 1, 421 A.2d 374 (1980), aff'd. per curiam, 501 Pa. 393, 461 A.2d 794 (1983); Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980); Commonwealth v. Woods, 275 Pa. Super. 392, 418 A.2d 1346 (1980); Commonwealth v. Washington, 274 Pa. Super. 560, 418 A.2d 548 (1980); Commonwealth v. Dombrauskas, 274 Pa. Super. 452, 418 A.2d 493 (1980); Commonwealthv. Stafford, 272 Pa. Super. 505, 416 A.2d 570 (1979); Commonwealth v. Herman, 271 Pa. Super. 145, 412 A.2d 617 (1979); Commonwealth v. Epps, 270 Pa. Super. 295, 411 A.2d 534 (1979); Commonwealth v. Henson, 269 Pa. Super. 314, 409 A.2d 906 (1979); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 267 Pa. Super. 34, 405 A.2d 1290 (1979).

  2. Com. v. Larsen

    452 Pa. Super. 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)   Cited 33 times
    Holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion

    See Vol. IV, 4/7-9/94 at 1151 (Defendant agreed with another that either would engage in conduct constituting a crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit those crimes, and defendant did so with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of those crimes); at 1182 (In response to a second question, the jury was informed: "the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knew he was receiving a controlled substance."). To read the preceding instructions as not informing the jury that "knowledge" was an element of the offenses would do violence to the tenet that jury charges are to be read as a whole to determine if they instruct the jury on the law, and the court may use its own language provided it adequately, accurately and clearly expresses the precepts of law. Commonwealth v. Jones, 449 Pa. Super. 58, 672 A.2d 1353, 1358 (1996); Commonwealth v. Balog, 448 Pa. Super. 480, 672 A.2d 319, 323 (1996); Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486, 490 (1980). Consistent with such remarks, we find the commission of no error by the trial court in failing to quote Lurie verbatim.

  3. Com. v. Patosky

    440 Pa. Super. 535 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)   Cited 25 times
    Holding "victim's nervous demeanor when reporting" indecent assault by a coworker to her supervisor "was not a statement as it was not intended as a communication"

    A court is free to use its own form of expression in charging the jury as long as it adequately, accurately and clearly explains the principle of law. Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 182, 420 A.2d 486, 490 (1980). In order for a party to be entitled to a new trial, the jury instruction must be fundamentally in error, or have misled or confused the jury.

  4. Com. v. Merriwether

    382 Pa. Super. 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that because the defendant had the legal alternative of contacting the authorities that he could not invoke the defense of necessity

    With respect to pretrial motions, our Court has followed the Jones case in finding that when the motion has been expressly reserved for the time of trial and the "guilt determining process" directly follows a decision on the motion, trial has commenced for purposes of Rule 1100. See, Commonwealth v. Bell, 328 Pa. Super. 35, 476 A.2d 439 (1984); Commonwealth v. Derrick, 322 Pa. Super. 517, 469 A.2d 1111 (1983); Commonwealth v. Machi, 294 Pa. Super. 338, 439 A.2d 1230 (1982) (first requirement met where court had ordered motion to be heard "on the date of trial, immediately prior to trial"); Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980). We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing on the suppression motion in the instant case and have found that immediately prior to proceeding on the Motion to Suppress, individuals who were going to testify at trial were asked by the court to stand and be sworn in.

  5. Com. v. Bond

    350 Pa. Super. 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)   Cited 15 times
    Referring to definitions of "obscene" and "sexual conduct" under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5903(b)'s prohibition of "obscene and other sexual materials and performances"

    (one day between hearing and jury selection); Commonwealthv. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980) (jury selection immediately after suppression hearing); Commonwealth v. Wharton, 250 Pa. Super. 25, 378 A.2d 434 (1977) (one day between hearing and jury selection); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 244 Pa. Super. 361, 368 A.2d 762 (1976) (trial began two days after completion of suppression hearing) (all concluding that trial commenced on date of suppression hearing). Similarly, in Commonwealth v.Bell, 328 Pa. Super. 35, 476 A.2d 439 (1984), the court considered whether a pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion for change of venue constituted commencement of trial.

  6. Com. v. Taylor

    340 Pa. Super. 87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)   Cited 6 times
    In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 489 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 1985), this Court held that the Commonwealth owed no duty to exercise due diligence when the appellant "committed a willful act in dereliction of a serious societal duty after having been subject to process of court."

    Rule 1100 is tolled in a variety of instances where the defendant's actions, or the actions of his attorney, contribute to delay in commencing trial, even in the absence of willfulness. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 262 Pa. Super. 151, 396 A.2d 690 (1978) (the appellant's attorney's thirty-nine day vacation was excluded from the 180 day period); Commonwealth v.Bearish, 321 Pa. Super. 541, 468 A.2d 1121 (1983) (appellant's vacation time excluded); Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Haynes, 245 Pa. Super. 17, 369 A.2d 271 (1976) (delay caused by appellant's hospitalization is excluded). This line of cases includes among those instances giving rise to excludable time occurrences which are not "willful" derelictions of a duty.

  7. Com. v. Glessner

    337 Pa. Super. 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)   Cited 8 times

    See: Commonwealth v. Caden, 326 Pa. Super. 192, 201, 473 A.2d 1047, 1051 (1984) (defendants who are hospitalized when seriously ill are deemed unavailable for Rule 1100 purposes). Accord: Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980); Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 259 Pa. Super. 536, 393 A.2d 955 (1978). When the period of 197 days is excluded from the period preceding appellant's trial on November 17, 1981, it is quite clear that appellant's trial was held within the time constraints of Rule 6013.

  8. Com. v. Bankston

    332 Pa. Super. 393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    Defendants who are hospitalized when seriously ill are deemed unavailable for purposes of Rule 1100(d). Commonwealth v.Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980); Commonwealthv. Haynes, 245 Pa. Super. 17, 369 A.2d 271 (1976).

  9. Com. v. Caden

    326 Pa. Super. 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)   Cited 15 times
    In Caden, the Court held that the defendant's guilty plea in Montgomery County to charges of receiving stolen property and possession of a controlled substance did not preclude his subsequent prosecution and conviction in Delaware County on charges of burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, and criminal mischief.

    We have held in the past that defendants who are hospitalized when seriously ill are deemed unavailable for purposes of Rule 1100(d)(1). Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980); Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 259 Pa. Super. 536, 393 A.2d 955 (1978); Commonwealth v. Haynes, 245 Pa. Super. 17, 369 A.2d 271 (1976). When a defendant's condition renders him "physically or mentally incompetent," criminal proceedings against him must be continued to such time as he is able to participate therein.

  10. Com. v. McKnight

    311 Pa. Super. 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)   Cited 10 times
    In Commonwealth v. McKnight, 311 Pa. Super. 460, 457 A.2d 1272 (1983), however, a panel of this court distinguished Cooley and refused to remand so that appellant could file an appeal nunc pro tunc.

    The trial commenced with a suppression hearing reserved until the time of trial on May 12, 1975. Commonwealth v. Whitner, 278 Pa. Super. 175, 420 A.2d 486 (1980). Hence, 184 days elapsed from the time of the filing of the complaint until the commencement of trial.