He now contends that his attorney's waiver of the suppression motion allowed both his arrest and the out-of-court identification to go unchallenged and that he was prejudiced thereby. Since no physical evidence was seized, and appellant could not have suppressed his person as the product of an illegal arrest, see Commonwealth v. Verdekal. 351 Pa. Super. 412, 506 A.2d 415 (1986), he sought only to suppress the identification evidence as the fruit of his allegedly illegal arrest. However, appellant has not shown that the suppression motion would have been successful.
Our Courts have found manifest necessity on deliberations significantly shorter than the one here. See Myers, supra at 1260 (three hours on one issue; total of seven hours of deliberations); see also Monte, supra at 840 (six and one-half hours); Commonwealth v. McCord, 700 A.2d 938, 945 (Pa. Super. 1997) (six and one-half hours); Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 506 A.2d 415, 418 (Pa. Super. 1986), appeal denied, (September 16, 1986) (less than two hours). Appellant's claim does not merit relief.
Moreover, "'[w]hen conflicts and discrepancies arise, it is within the province of the jury to determine the weight to be given to each [witness's] testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence as [it] deems appropriate.'" Commonwealth v. Wright, 722 A.2d 157, 161 (Pa.Super.1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 351 Pa.Super. 412, 506 A.2d 415, 419 (1986)).To convict an accused of third degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the accused killed another person with malice.
We agree with the trial court that, when one considers these facts in combination, they are sufficient to justify an arrest. See Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 506 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 1986) ("Facts insufficient to justify an arrest if considered separately may in combination supply probable cause.") (citation omitted). Moreover, we note that the C.I. was known to police and was actively participating in criminal activity.
¶ 6 Moreover, "`[w]hen conflicts and discrepancies arise, it is within the province of the jury to determine the weight to be given to each [witness's] testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence as [it] deems appropriate.'" Commonwealth v. Wright, 722 A.2d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 1998) ( quoting Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 351 Pa.Super. 412, 506 A.2d 415, 419 (1986)). ¶ 7 To convict an accused of third degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the accused killed another person with malice.
Commonwealth v. Rose, 344 A.2d 824 (Pa. 1975). A mere conflict in the testimony does not render the evidence insufficient, Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 506 A.2d 415 (Pa.Super. 1986), because it is within the province of the fact finder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v.Whitfield, 380 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1977).
When conflicts and discrepancies arise, it is within the province of the jury to determine the weight to be given to each [witness's] testimony and to believe all, part or none of the evidence as [it] deem[s] appropriate." Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 351 Pa. Super. 412, 419-420, 506 A.2d 415, 419 (1986). Therefore, the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth "need not be absolutely incompatible with [the] defendant's innocence, but the question of any doubt is for the jury unless the evidence is `so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.'"
Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264 , 344 A.2d 824 (1975). A mere conflict in the testimony does not render the evidence insufficient, Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 506 A.2d 415 (Pa.Super. 1986), because it is within the province of the fact finder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v.Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 380 A.2d 362 (1977).
To determine if the evidence is sufficient, we view the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 344 A.2d 824 (1975). A mere conflict in the testimony does not render the evidence insufficient, Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 506 A.2d 415 (Pa.Super. 1986), because it is within the province of the fact finder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 380 A.2d 362 (1977).
Commonwealth v.Krall, 452 Pa. 215, 304 A.2d 488 (1973). 351 Pa. Super. 412, 421, 506 A.2d 415, 419-420 (1986). Accordingly, we conclude that it is not necessary to consider whether appellant's arrest should be suppressed. Additionally, we note that the admissibility of the marijuana obtained on October 19, 1993, is unaffected by the legality of the police actions at the time of appellant's arrest since such was obtained prior thereto.