On July 29, 1986, the judgment was affirmed, and Smith's petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari was denied thereafter. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 513 A.2d 1371 (Pa. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617 (1987) ("Smith I"). The Governor of Pennsylvania subsequently signed Smith's death warrant, fixing his execution for November 13, 1990.
The following list illustrates the history and proclivity for violence of twenty-two death row inmates at Graterford and Huntingdon.Inmate Citation Facts of Case 510 Pa. 603 511 A.2d 764 511 Pa. 343 513 A.2d 1371 521 A.2d 1 505 Pa. 279 479 A.2d 460 510 Pa. 363 508 A.2d 1167 511 Pa. 429 515 A.2d 531 508 Pa. 322 496 A.2d 1144 512 Pa. 235 516 A.2d 656 512 Pa. 298 516 A.2d 689 504 Pa. 428 475 A.2d 700 511 Pa. 553 515 A.2d 865 508 Pa. 425 498 A.2d 833 502 Pa. 511 467 A.2d 307 505 Pa. 152 477 A.2d 1309 511 Pa. 299 513 A.2d 373 510 Pa. 43 507 A.2d 23 508 Pa. 212 495 A.2d 183 504 Pa. 455 475 A.2d 714 506 Pa. 228 484 A.2d 1365 502 Pa. 474 467 A.2d 288 511 Pa. 232 512 A.2d 1152 500 Pa. 16 454 A.2d 937 Alfred Albrecht , Set house on fire killing wife, (1986) mother, and daughter.
1982) (pathologist testified that the decedent was shot with a handgun of mid-caliber size consistent with the size of a .38 caliber bullet). However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with a similar question in Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 513 A.2d 1371 (1986). The defendant alleged that Chief Deputy Medical Examiner for the City of Philadelphia, a forensic pathologist, should not have been permitted to testify as an expert witness giving his opinion as to the caliber of bullet which caused the death of the victim.
Pennsylvania "courts have been liberal in allowing a party to cross-examine his own witness when it is believed that the interests of truth and justice so require." Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 353, 513 A.2d 1371, 1376 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987). The general rule for allowing a party to cross-examine his own witness on a plea of surprise is that the current testimony must be: 1) unexpected; 2) contradictory to prior statements; and 3) harmful to the party calling the witness and beneficial to the opposing side.
The only issue is whether the area covered by the instruction adequately, clearly and accurately presents the issue to the jury. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 528 Pa. 57, 595 A.2d 28 (1991) (the trial judge has broad discretion in phrasing points for charge and is not bound to give instructions in the form requested); see also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 513 A.2d 1371 (1986). Appellant claims that the charge regarding mitigating circumstances improperly informed the jurors that mitigating circumstances were only those that made the murders themselves less terrible, and that the instructions failed to inform the jury that appellant's character could be considered to support a finding of mitigating circumstances.
Where there are no mitigating factors and a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, the sentencing court has no discretion but to impose the death penalty. Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 358-59, 513 A.2d 1371, 1378 (1986), citing, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). Additionally, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. at 63, 454 A.2d at 961, this Court has conducted an independent evaluation of all of the cases decided as of September 13, 1978, in order to determine whether appellant's sentence was proportional to the sentences imposed in similar cases taking into consideration both the circumstances of the offense and the character and record of the defendant.
Such acts further the conspiracy by assisting the conspirators in realizing the benefits from the offenses which they agreed to commit"); Commonwealth. v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 513 A.2d 1371, 1375 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987) ("[f]light from the crime scene and division of the robbery proceeds were certainly parts of a common design to carry out the robbery"). Appellant, therefore, cannot tenably argue that the statements to Duckett were not made in the course of the conspiracy — defined to include the division of the spoils.
Both theUnited States Supreme Court and this Court haverejected the argument that the death qualificationprocess produces juries which are "slanted" towardconviction. Lockhart v. McCree, [ 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986)], Commonwealth v.Smith, [ 511 Pa. 343, 513 A.2d 1371 (1986)], cert.denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987)], Commonwealth v. Morales, [ 508 Pa. 51, 494 A.2d 367 (1985)], Commonwealth v. Colson, [ 507 Pa. 440 EQD, A.2d 811 (1985)]. Commonwealth v. Maxwell, [ 505 Pa. 152, 477 A.2d 1309 (1984)].
A common-law marriage in Pennsylvania "can only be created by an exchange of words spoken in the present tense, verba de praesenti, spoken with the specific purpose that the legal relationship of husband and wife be thereby created." Commonwealth v. Gorby, 527 Pa. 98, 110, 588 A.2d 902, 907 (1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 513 A.2d 1371 (1986)). If there is no evidence of such an in verba praesenti exchange, there is a rebuttable presumption of common law marriage if the couple has been living together with the reputation of marriage.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also found, following McCree, that death qualified juries are not more prone to convict. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264, 1283 (1989); Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 513 A.2d 1371 (1986); Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811, 817-18 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 2245, 90 L.Ed.2d 692 (1986). Petitioner's claim herein arises because, after his first trial in 1975, the Pennsylvania death penalty statute pursuant to which he was sentenced to death was declared unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.