Rather, the vast majority of cases interpreting KRS 431.076 have dealt with the expungement of charges that were successfully diverted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shouse, 183 S.W.3d 204 (Ky.App.2006) (holding that charges that are “dismissed-diverted” under KRS 533.258(1) qualify for expungement under KRS 431.076). Nonetheless, we believe Jones meets the literal definition of “[a] person who has been charged with a criminal offense.”
More problematic is Moore's argument that the circuit court erred in denying expungement for the conviction which was ultimately dismissed after Moore completed the felony diversion program. Moore cites Commonwealth v. Shouse, 183 S.W.3d 204 (Ky. App. 2006), in support of his position that the legislature intended "that . . . a successful participant in a pretrial diversion program [be allowed] to expunge the record of his participation in that program[.]" Id. at 206.
We can find no authority for York's interpretation of KRS 17.142(4), however. In Shouse v. Commonwealth, 183 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Ky. App. 2006), a panel of this Court summarized the distinction between KRS 17.142 and KRS 431.076 as follows: "[S]egregation applies to 'dismissed' cases and does not affect court records; expungement requires that a case be 'dismissed with prejudice' and seals court records." This alone should signify that sealing records is a property of the expungement statutes, and not KRS 17.142.
This statute does not, however, apply to judicial records. Commonwealth v. Shouse, 183 S.W.3d 204 (Ky.App.2006). While this remedy does not rise to the level of an expungement, it does provide for some relief.
This statute does not however apply to judicial records. Commonwealth v. Shouse, 183 S.W.3d 204 (Ky.App. 2006). While this remedy does not rise to the level of an expungement, it does provide for some relief.