Although the confrontation in the instant case did not occur at the scene of the crime, it contained the most important elements of a classic "on the scene" identification, and it was certainly far removed from a formal, custodial lineup, the situation addressed by the court in Richman. In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 78, 323 A.2d 826, 828 (1974), we stated that: "A fresh, on-the-scene confrontation is admissible evidence.
We disagree. The identifications made by the bank manager prior to appellant's arrest and by the bank teller after the arrest were made on-the-spot and therefore were properly admissible. Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 321 Pa. Super. 323, 328, 468 A.2d 500, 503 (1983), citing Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 520, 314 A.2d 496 (1974); Commonwealth v. Aaron, 255 Pa. Super. 289, 386 A.2d 1006 (1978); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974). As our supreme court stated in Commonwealth v. Mackey, 447 Pa. 32, 288 A.2d 778 (1972):
Finally, it is now settled that prompt on-the-scene identifications are generally reliable and, in the absence of some special element of unfairness, are not subject to suppression on constitutional grounds. Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 520, 314 A.2d 496 (1974); Commonwealth v. Aaron, 255 Pa. Super. 289, 386 A.2d 1006 (1978); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974). The police conduct was not unlawful or unreasonable, and the trial court properly refused to suppress the inculpatory evidence which police obtained as a result of the stopping of appellant following the robbery.
Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 259 Pa. Super. 240, 393 A.2d 806 (1978). As was explained in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826-828 (1974). . . . The primary reason for the admissibility of such confrontations is that the close proximity in time and place to the actual offense so enhances the reliability as to outweigh the prejudice.
Appellant argues that the identification procedure was suggestive because he was in police custody at the time. This argument is clearly meritless.See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974). Appellant also states in his brief that he was handcuffed when Officer Stankiewicz identified him.
Commonwealth v. Turner, supra, (police questions); Commonwealthv. Perdie, 249 Pa. Super. 406, 378 A.2d 359 (1977) (handcuffs); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974) (same). Nor does the fact that there were three police vehicles constitute a special element of unfairness.
Preliminarily, it is well settled that an on-the-scene identification made shortly after the occurrence of the crime does not ipso facto offend a suspect's due process rights. Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 520, 314 A.2d 496 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bullock, 259 Pa. Super. 467, 393 A.2d 921 (1978); Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 359 Pa. Super. 240, 393 A.2d 806 (1978); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974). Absent some special element of unfairness, the close proximity in time and place to the actual offense so enhances the reliability of such an identification as to outweigh any possibility of irreparable misidentification that might arise from the witness's observance of the suspect in police custody.
We find that the witness' remembrance of appellant clear, and not tainted by a circumstance which would be unnecessarily suggestive and lead to mistaken identity. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 232 Pa. Super. 523, 335 A.2d 463 (1975) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974). At trial he bolstered this identifying testimony with further statements as to weight and clothing, as well as a clear recollection of hair style, which he noted had been altered in the interim before trial.
Any such identification is to some extent suggestive, for it represents a one-on-one confrontation between the complainant and a person in police custody. It has nevertheless been held that evidence of the identification will be admitted if the identification procedure was not "unduly suggestive." See Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 520, 314 A.2d 496 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ray, 455 Pa. 43, 315 A.2d 634 (1974); Commonwealth v. Aaron, 255 Pa. Super. 289, 386 A.2d 1006 (1978); Commonwealth v. Perdie, 249 Pa. Super. 406, 378 A.2d 359 (1978); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974). The reasoning is that the reliable aspect of an "on the scene" identification may offset the suggestive aspect.
Appellant argues that the identification was obtained through suggestive circumstances amounting to a denial of due process. The evidence fully supports the suppression judge's finding that the incident giving rise to the identification was both accidental and not suggestive. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 229 Pa. Super. 74, 323 A.2d 826 (1974). 4. Refusal to permit polygraph examination of appellant understipulation that results would come into evidence.