Standing alone, and without reference to Morris' statement of questions involved, we would find the second issue raised in Morris' Rule 2119(f) statement does not raise a substantial question insofar as it fails to specify which reasons relied upon by the court were contrary to which fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 641 A.2d 617, 618 (Pa. Super. 1994). Morris combines the three reasons raised in her Rule 2119(f) statement into only two subparts in the argument section of her brief, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

For instance, a flat assertion that a sentence "` flies in the face of fairness' because `[he] was given a sentence of three (3) months [incarceration] for the theft by deception of a $20.00 bottle of perfume[,]"' fails to raise a substantial question, relying on the proposition that "an argument concerning the weight that a sentencing court gives to legitimate sentencing factors ... does not raise a substantial question..." See Commonwealth v. Rose, 641 A.2d 617, 618 (Pa. Super. 1994); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 575 A.2d 150, 167 (Pa. 1990)(finding the claim that the sentence "` was so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion where the defendant received a sentence at the top of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines [j"' did not raise a substantial question).