Com. v. Ritchey

3 Citing cases

  1. Com. v. Taylor

    346 Pa. Super. 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)   Cited 21 times
    Observing that the District Attorney's office has the power to modify the information as it relates to complaint to conform to what it perceives to be its proof or determination of prosecutorial merit

    Aggravated assault, § 2702(a)(4) is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, § 2702(a)(1). Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 313 Pa. Super. 238, 459 A.2d 828 (1983). If, upon a conviction or a plea, the court imposed a sentence relating to one subsection of the Crimes Code, when a different subsection carrying a different penalty was proved, this in effect would be an illegal sentence. This Court concludes on the basis of the charge in the information, the Commonwealth, by limiting the proof to causing or attempting to cause serious bodily injury to another, knowingly or recklessly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, is bound by its charge and cannot go beyond the allegation in the information and proceed to offer proof of the use of a deadly weapon at sentencing.

  2. Com. v. Ferrari

    406 Pa. Super. 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)   Cited 24 times
    Stating that an instruction on a lesser-included offense is warranted "only where the evidence in the record would permit the jury to find, rationally, the defendant guilty of the lesser[-]included offense but not the greater offense."

    With regard to aggravated assault as defined in § 2702(a)(4), the determination has already been made. In Commonwealth v.Ritchey, 313 Pa. Super. 238, 242, 459 A.2d 828, 830 (1983), this Court held that because the "with a deadly weapon" provision of § 2702(a)(4) is not found in § 2702(a)(1), the former is not a lesser included offense of the latter. Appellant attempts to distinguish Ritchey from the case before us by noting that a deadly weapon, the handgun, was involved in the present case.

  3. Com. v. Rhoads

    431 Pa. Super. 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)   Cited 5 times
    In Rhoads, this Court stated that convictions of two separate subsections of the simple assault statute constitute one offense for sentencing when the factual predicate for both convictions was one underlying act because the subsections of the simple assault statute were drafted with the disjunctive "or," and are, therefore, alternative bases for conviction.

    This is not a situation where different criminal offenses are involved rather there is but one offense and alternative bases of culpability for that offense. Finally, we find the Commonwealth's reliance on Commonwealthv. Ritchey, 313 Pa. Super. 238, 459 A.2d 828 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Ostolaza, 267 Pa. Super. 451, 406 A.2d 1128 (1979), to be misplaced. This court in both cases examined subsections of a criminal statute and found them not to represent lesser included offenses of one another.