On appeal, he presents the following single issue for our review: whether the trial court, acting as the pretrial suppression court, erred when it denied his motion to suppress the physical evidence. More specifically, he argues that the police attained a warrant in the case sub judice in anticipation of future events, which in most situations he claims Commonwealth v. Reviera, 387 Pa. Super. 196, 563 A.2d 1252 (1989), appeal dismissed 526 Pa. 41, 584 A.2d 308 (1991), teaches is improper. We affirm, as we disagree with appellant's reading of Reviera and we adhere to federal precedents that have declared probable cause exists in identical scenarios.
He also obtained an anticipatory search warrant, defined as "`a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified place.'" Commonwealth v. Reviera, 387 Pa. Super. 196, 200-02, 563 A.2d 1252, 1254 (1989), appeal dismissed, 526 Pa. 41, 584 A.2d 308 (1991), quoting 1 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c) at 94 (2d ed. 1987). After searching Osborne and his vehicle, Trooper Merritt gave the re-packaged marijuana to Osborne.
Where the warrant is an anticipatory warrant, the magistrate must conclude "that there is a fair probability that evidence of current or past criminal activity will be on the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is executed." Commonwealth v. Reviera, 563 A.2d 1252, 1255 (Pa. Super. 1989). "This determination must be based on facts described within the four corners of the supporting affidavit." Commonwealth v. Stamps, 493 Pa. 530, 535-36, 427 A.2d 141, 143 (1981).
See Commonwealth v. DiGiovanni, 630 A.2d 42 (Pa.Super. 1993); Commonwealthv. Reviera, 563 A.2d 1252 (Pa.Super. 1989). We stated:
Although anticipatory warrants are issued in advance of the happening of events that are a necessary prerequisite to the constitutionality of the warrants themselves, federal and state courts that have addressed the issue are almost unanimous in holding that the warrants are not per se unconstitutional. United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1990); Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703; United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 1639, 104 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 110, 93 L.Ed.2d 59 (1986); United States v. McGriff, 678 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 n. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Commonwealth v. Reviera, 563 A.2d 1252, 1254 (Pa.Super. 1989); State v. Wright, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250, 258 (Ct.App. 1989); State v. Mier, 147 N.J. Super. 17, 370 A.2d 515, 517 (Ct.App. Div. 197 7); People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659, 282 N.E.2d 614, 615, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct. 58, 34 L.Ed.2d 91 (1972); Alvidres v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App.3d 575, 581, 90 Cal.Rptr. 682 (1970). The linchpin of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and courts have concluded that it is "not unreasonable for a magistrate to believe certain controllable events will occur in the near future, e.g., that the post office will deliver a package the next day, when responsible officials so advise him."
1005, 109 S.Ct. 1639, 104 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 110, 93 L.Ed.2d 59 (1986); United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 869, 99 S.Ct. 198, 58 L.Ed.2d 180 (1978); United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980); State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603, 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1988); State v. Wright, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Ct.App. 1989); People v. Galdine, 212 Ill. App.3d 472, 156 Ill. Dec. 595, 571 N.E.2d 182 (1991); Russell v. State, 182 Ind. App. 386, 395 N.E.2d 791 (1979); Commonwealth v. Soares, 384 Mass. 149, 424 N.E.2d 221 (1981); State v. Doyle, 336 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 1983); State v. Mier, 147 N.J. Super. 17, 370 A.2d 515 (Ct.App. Div. 1977); People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, 282 N.E.2d 614, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct. 58, 34 L.Ed.2d 91 (1972); Commonwealth v. Reviera, 387 Pa. Super. 196, 563 A.2d 1252 (1989); State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 216 S.E.2d 501 (1975); State v. Coker, 746 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988); McNeill v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 674, 395 S.E.2d 460 (1990). OTHER STATES
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 769 A.2d 462, 464 (Pa.Super. 2001) ( Coleman II), citing Glass, 754 A.2d at 663. In again deeming the affidavit deficient here, the panel contrasted this case with two other Superior Court panel decisions pre-dating this Court's decision in Glass, i.e., Commonwealth v. Reviera, 563 A.2d 1252 (Pa.Super. 1989) and Commonwealth v. DiGiovanni, 630 A.2d 42 (Pa.Super. 1993). In the panel's view, in each of those cases the warrant affidavits described circumstances where, although there was no reason to believe that contraband or other evidence of a crime was then on the targeted premises, there was reliable information that contraband would be arriving shortly.
This Court granted review to determine whether Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution categorically proscribes the issuance of what is commonly referred to as an "anticipatory search warrant," i.e., "'a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified place.'" Commonwealth v. Glass, 718 A.2d 804, 806 (Pa. Super. 1998), citing Commonwealth v. Reviera, 387 Pa. Super. 196, 563 A.2d 1252, 1254 (Pa. Super. 1989), appeal dismissed, 526 Pa. 41, 584 A.2d 308 (1991), quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c) (3d ed.1996). We hold that such search warrants do not per se violate Article I, § 8.
Where appropriate, the issuing authority should make the execution of the warrant contingent upon the occurrence of specific events or the passage of time. Commonwealth v.Reviera, 563 A.2d 1252, 1256 (Pa.Super. 1989). This is to ensure that the warrant will not be executed prematurely, i.e., before the evidencearrives at the place to be searched.
Ricciardelli, supra at 11; Garcia, supra at 702-703, and cases cited therein. See also People v Sousa, 18 Cal.App.4th 549; 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 (1993); State v Ulrich, 265 N.J. Super. 569; 628 A.2d 368 (1993); State v Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787 (SD, 1991); Commonwealth v Reviera, 387 Pa. Super. 196; 563 A.2d 1252 (1989); State v Wright, 115 Idaho App 1043; 772 P.2d 250 (1989); State v Coker, 746 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn, 1987); Johnson v State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alas, 1980); People v Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252; 331 N.Y.S.2d 656; 282 N.E.2d 614 (1972). See also State v Lee, 93 Md. App. 408; 613 A.2d 395 (1992) (declining to address whether the state of Maryland will approve the use of anticipatory search warrants).