This was evident by the fact that the police had previously removed bags of food from the rear seat in preparation for the ensuing dog sniff prior to requesting consent to search. See [ ] Commonwealth v. Pichel, 323 A.2d 113 (1974) (consent can hardly be said to be voluntary if given where a search by police appears inevitable). Id. at 37.
The burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a valid consent was given by appellant. Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113, 114 (1974). See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).
Id., 391 U.S. at 548-550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d at 802-803 (footnotes omitted). See also: Commonwealth v. White, 459 Pa. 84, 327 A.2d 40 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971, 95 S.Ct. 1967, 44 L.Ed.2d 461 (1975); Commonwealth v. Banahasky, 250 Pa. Super. 495, 378 A.2d 1257 (1977); Commonwealth v.Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 323 A.2d 113 (1974). But see: Earlsv.
We disagree and affirm the decision of the lower court on that issue. To be effective, a consent to search must be voluntarily given with a total absence of duress or coercion, express or implied. Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 221, 239 A.2d 290, 293 (1968); Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 323 A.2d 113 (1974). No one factor is determinative in a voluntariness inquiry. . . . It is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced. It is this careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our prior decisions involving consent searches.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968)." Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113, 114 (1974). Because the display of weapons in the instant case was a demonstration of the legal force the executing officers could legitimately bring to bear in their efforts to conduct a search of the premises, the weapons' visibility could not render this otherwise peaceful entry a "forcible" one.
" Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792.Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113, 114 (1974). The conclusion that the search may not be upheld as having been consented to is not, however, dispositive; it remains necessary to consider whether the search was proper because pursuant to a valid warrant.
"To be effective, consent to a search and seizure must be voluntarily given with the total absence of duress or coercion, express or implied." Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113 (1974), citing Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 221, 239 A.2d 290 (1968). The Commonwealth contends that appellant's agreement to take the breath test after learning that the alternative was the suspension of his license indicates that his choice was voluntary and unconstrained.