Commonwealth v. Pichel

7 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Benitez

    2019 Pa. Super. 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the trial court's finding that consent was voluntary despite the presence of multiple police officers

    This was evident by the fact that the police had previously removed bags of food from the rear seat in preparation for the ensuing dog sniff prior to requesting consent to search. See [ ] Commonwealth v. Pichel, 323 A.2d 113 (1974) (consent can hardly be said to be voluntary if given where a search by police appears inevitable). Id. at 37.

  2. Com. v. Blasioli

    454 Pa. Super. 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that where the prosecutor's wife was a juror's family doctor, and the juror worked at the same hospital as the prosecutor's wife, the relationship did not require a presumption of prejudice, and deferring to the trial court's acceptance of the juror's assertions during jury selection

    The burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a valid consent was given by appellant. Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113, 114 (1974). See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).

  3. Com. v. Bagley

    408 Pa. Super. 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)   Cited 27 times
    In Commonwealth v. Bagley, 408 Pa.Super. 188, 596 A.2d 811 (1991), police executed several warrants while investigating a suspicious death.

    Id., 391 U.S. at 548-550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d at 802-803 (footnotes omitted). See also: Commonwealth v. White, 459 Pa. 84, 327 A.2d 40 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971, 95 S.Ct. 1967, 44 L.Ed.2d 461 (1975); Commonwealth v. Banahasky, 250 Pa. Super. 495, 378 A.2d 1257 (1977); Commonwealth v.Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 323 A.2d 113 (1974). But see: Earlsv.

  4. Com. v. Lowery

    305 Pa. Super. 66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his room because he did not manifest an intent to exclude others

    We disagree and affirm the decision of the lower court on that issue. To be effective, a consent to search must be voluntarily given with a total absence of duress or coercion, express or implied. Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 221, 239 A.2d 290, 293 (1968); Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 323 A.2d 113 (1974). No one factor is determinative in a voluntariness inquiry. . . . It is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced. It is this careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our prior decisions involving consent searches.

  5. Com. v. Duncan

    257 Pa. Super. 277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)   Cited 14 times
    In Commonwealth v. Duncan, 257 Pa. Super. 277, 390 A.2d 820 (1978), the Pennsylvania Superior court adopted the rule that, under the Pennsylvania knock and announce statute, "a ruse or misrepresentation, as allegedly occurred in the instant case, is permissible in the execution of a search warrant if, once a person voluntarily opens the door, the police then announce their authority and purpose prior to entry and do not use force where exigent circumstances do not require it."

    North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968)." Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113, 114 (1974). Because the display of weapons in the instant case was a demonstration of the legal force the executing officers could legitimately bring to bear in their efforts to conduct a search of the premises, the weapons' visibility could not render this otherwise peaceful entry a "forcible" one.

  6. Commonwealth v. Banahasky

    378 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)   Cited 9 times
    In Banahasky, the informant was a chief of police. From this fact the magistrate who issued the search warrant could have reasonably concluded that the informant was familiar with narcotics and that his suspicion was probably accurate that the substance he found on the suspect was marijuana.

    " Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792.Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113, 114 (1974). The conclusion that the search may not be upheld as having been consented to is not, however, dispositive; it remains necessary to consider whether the search was proper because pursuant to a valid warrant.

  7. Commonwealth v. Modich

    233 Pa. Super. 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)   Cited 4 times

    "To be effective, consent to a search and seizure must be voluntarily given with the total absence of duress or coercion, express or implied." Commonwealth v. Pichel, 229 Pa. Super. 103, 106, 323 A.2d 113 (1974), citing Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 221, 239 A.2d 290 (1968). The Commonwealth contends that appellant's agreement to take the breath test after learning that the alternative was the suspension of his license indicates that his choice was voluntary and unconstrained.