Com. v. Perkins

4 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Goodermuth

    No. 2110 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2016)

    Accordingly, for penalty purposes, the conspiracy conviction is tantamount to a conviction for retail theft. See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 448 A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. Super. 1982) (explaining that "criminal conspiracy in any one particular criminal incident is the same grade offense as the most serious offense which is the object of the conspiracy"). Furthermore, we agree with the Commonwealth and the trial court that Commonwealth v. Gibson, 668 A.2d 552 (Pa. Super. 1995), is supportive of this determination.

  2. Com. v. Riley

    2002 Pa. Super. 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)   Cited 21 times
    In Commonwealth v. Riley, 811 A.2d 610 (Pa.Super.2002), this Court held that where the jury renders a general verdict and there is an absence of clear evidence of the jury's intent, a defendant can only be sentenced for conspiracy to commit the less serious underlying offense.

    (a) Grading. — Except as otherwise provided in this title, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy. As the Commonwealth itself concedes (Brief for Commonwealth, at 13-14), the two cases cited by the trial court to support its conclusion — Commonwealth v. Major, 377 Pa. Super. 282, 547 A.2d 370 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Perkins, 302 Pa. Super. 12, 448 A.2d 70 (1982) — do not address the precise situation presented herein. ¶ 24 The conspiracy count of the information, which we have quoted above, appears to encompass both underlying crimes as objects of the conspiracy.

  3. Com. v. Major

    547 A.2d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)   Cited 1 times

    Criminal conspiracy is the same grade offense as the most serious offense which is the object of the conspiracy. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 905. Commonwealthv. Perkins, 302 Pa. Super. 12, 17, 448 A.2d 70, 72-3 (1982). Judgment of Sentence is affirmed.

  4. Com. v. Grady

    455 A.2d 112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)   Cited 4 times
    In Commonwealth v. Grady, 309 Pa. Super. 187, 455 A.2d 112 (1982), it was held that the double jeopardy clause was violated when an orally-imposed initial sentence was increased after the sentencing hearing was completed.

    Commonwealth v. Hodge, 246 Pa. Super. 71, 82, 369 A.2d 815, 820 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v. Foster, 229 Pa. Super. 269, 271, 324 A.2d 538, 539 (1974). Accord: Commonwealth v. Perkins, 302 Pa. Super. 12, 18-19, 448 A.2d 70, 73 (1982); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 296 Pa. Super. 382, 442 A.2d 820 (1982); Commonwealth v. Evans, 254 Pa. Super. 93, 96, 385 A.2d 540, 542 (1978); Commonwealth v.Green, 232 Pa. Super. 555, 557-558, 335 A.2d 392, 393 (1975); See also: Commonwealth v. Thomas, 219 Pa. Super. 22, 28, 280 A.2d 651, 654 (1971). In the instant case, the sentencing judge initially pronounced concurrent judgments of sentence of imprisonment of four (4) to ten (10) years on all bills. After defense counsel suggested that the sentences as imposed on the convictions for assault and battery and aggravated assault and battery were in excess of the statutory maximums, the sentencing judge agreed to "put [appellant] on probation on the other bills for a period of three years."