Evidence that is relevant, i.e., probative of a material fact, may still be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Commonwealth v. Peer; 454 Pa. Super. 109, 684 A.2d 1077 (1996). However, since all Commonwealth evidence in a criminal case will be prejudicial to the defendant, exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence will only be necessary where "the evidence is so prejudicial that it may inflame the jury to make a decision based upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case."

The court found that the evidence of the defendant's running through a stop sign and blocking the path of other drivers while fleeing from a police officer was sufficient to sustain a conviction for recklessly endangering another person even though no one was injured. See also Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (possessing and brandishing a weapon, combined with a struggle over control of the weapon and a threat to kill two people, was sufficient to convict the defendant for recklessly endangering another person). The facts in this case were more dramatic than those in the cases we discuss above and demonstrate that Orban's convictions for recklessly endangering another person were proper.

Our Superior Court has held that the crimes of Simple Assault and [REAP] merge as long as they both arise from the same set of facts. Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077[, 1081] (Pa. Super. 1996).In this case, four victims were injured because of [Woodley's] actions: Jaret Simpson, Kristen Richetts, Brandon Purvis, and Joshua Rodriguez.

However, as the Superior Court noted, "[Pennsylvania] provides that specific acts of alleged misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach a witness. The proper method of cross examination is to impeach a witness by demonstrating that the witness had a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity," Gladfelter I at p. 4 (quotingPennsylvania v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1082-83 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1996)). This evidentiary edict is not contrary to federal law.

All evidence against a defendant in a criminal case will be prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 1996). Our determination in this context, however, must be whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial.

This Court has held that a loaded gun can cause serious bodily injury or death for purposes of REAP. See Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1081 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Moreover, the simple act of brandishing a loaded firearm "provides a sufficient basis on which a factfinder may conclude that a defendant proceeded with conscious disregard for the safety of others, and that he had the present ability to inflict great bodily harm or death. Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Pa. Super. 1996).

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1081 (Pa. Super. 1996) (determining that the jury's acquittal of lesser included offense did not preclude conviction of the greater offense). Here, the jury's verdict is logically and legally consistent, as it indicates that the jury simply did not believe Y.C.'s testimony whereas it believed K.R.

This Court has held that both a handgun and a BB gun are capable of causing serious bodily injury or death. Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1081 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2007).

"The mens rea for [REAP] is 'a conscious disregard of a known risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.'" Id. at 916 (citing Commonwealth v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Pa. Super. 1996)). Here, Rodriguez testified that Martinez-Rivera possessed a gun, used it to pistol whip J.R. in the back, flailed the firearm at both himself and J.R., pointed it at them while making threatening statements, and fired a shot into the closet while J.R. was "in the line of fire."