) This language suggests that the proceedings are private unless the parties request otherwise. (Compare with Com. v. Milice (1991) 401 Pa.Super. 96, 99 [ 584 A.2d 997] [holding that trial court retains discretion to close the hearing because the statute requires that the hearing be open to the public unless the parties request otherwise].) The LPS Act does not address whether the court retains discretion to deny the request for open proceedings or independently authorize public access.
The potential disclosure of mental illness does not necessarily mandate the closure of judicial proceedings. SeeCom. v. Milice, 401 Pa. Super. 96, 584 A.2d 997 (1991). The preference for access should prevail even though the Mental Health Procedures Act specifically allows hearings to be closed if "it is requested to be private by the person or his counsel."
Here, however, the Superior Court decisions on which Appellant relies are of limited value, as they all pertain to the question of whether the proceedings at issue should be open or closed in the first instance. See PA ChildCare LLC v. Flood, 887 A.2d 309 (Pa.Super. 2005); Zdrok v. Zdrok, 829 A.2d 697 (Pa.Super. 2003); M.B., 819 A.2d at 61; R.W. v. Hampe, 426 Pa.Super. 305, 626 A.2d 1218 (1993); Commonwealth v. Milice, 401 Pa.Super. 96, 584 A.2d 997 (1991); Hutchison v. Luddy, 398 Pa.Super. 505, 581 A.2d 578 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 527 Pa. 525, 594 A.2d 307 (1991) (per curiam); cf. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 426-28, 414 A.2d 318, 321-22 (1980) (plurality) (allowing for public exclusion from criminal proceedings "where the interests of justice require" it, but stating that any limitation on access should be "carefully drawn"). Where a judicial record has been impounded and there is no claim that such action was improper, a qualitatively different circumstance pertains.
While appellate courts are not in accord as to the standard to be employed in reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for closure, see Morgan v. Foretich, 528 A.2d 425, 427 n. 3 (D.C.App. 1987), it appears that a large number of courts employ an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury, 864 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989); Post-Newsweek Stations v. Doe, 612 So.2d 549, 553 (Fla. 1992); People v. Brown, 178 A.D.2d 280, 577 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1991), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 918, 582 N.Y.S.2d 78, 590 N.E.2d 1206 (1992); Commonwealth v. Milice, 401 Pa. Super. 96, 584 A.2d 997, 998 (1991). Cf. United States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[t]he decision to close a portion of a trial is a discretionary one").