Com. v. McGuire

6 Citing cases

  1. In Interest of M.M

    439 Pa. Super. 307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)   Cited 6 times
    Stating court's order placing juvenile on intensive drug and alcohol probation constitutes final order subject to appeal

    Courts have consistently refused to make the same assumption about alcohol, and have held that only evidence of intoxication, and not mere consumption, is relevant as to whether alcohol affected a witness' perception. See Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 448 A.2d 609 (1982) (holding that "it is not merely the consumption of alcohol that is relevant to attack the credibility of a witness"); In re Wright, 265 Pa. Super. 278, 401 A.2d 1209 (1979) (deciding that "the fact that a person drinks does not impeach his credibility; evidence of drinking is admissible only because it lays a foundation for an opinion of the intoxication of the witness") (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 177 Pa. Super. 640, 112 A.2d 434 (1955) (holding that "[w]hether one may have partaken of some liquor is not the test of one's credibility and is the type of question, whether answered in the affirmative or negative, that may create in the minds of some jurors a most unfavorable inference"). Impeachment evidence is evidence which is presented as a means of attacking the witness' credibility.

  2. Com. v. Brady

    338 Pa. Super. 137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    "It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness are not admissible as substantive evidence of the truth of the matters asserted therein." Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 234, 448 A.2d 609, 613 (1982). See alsoCommonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 39 n. 2, 444 A.2d 653, 656 n. 2 (1982); Commonwealth v. Brown, 302 Pa. Super. 391, 448 A.2d 1097 (1983).

  3. In Interest of M.M

    547 Pa. 237 (Pa. 1997)   Cited 19 times
    Discussing the right to appeal in proceedings under the Juvenile Act generally

    showing that the court abused that discretion. Commonwealth v. Birch, 532 Pa. 563, 566, 616 A.2d 977, 978 (1992). While a witness may be cross-examined as to whether he was intoxicated at the time of an occurrence to which he has testified, there must be, at a minimum, some factual basis upon which to conclude or to suspect that the witness was intoxicated before questions regarding alcohol consumption are permissible. Commonwealth v. Drew, 500 Pa. 585, 591, 459 A.2d 318, 321-22 (1983) (questions regarding defendant's alcohol consumption on the evening of the crime are admissible where prior testimony had established that defendant had been drinking and playing cards for seven hours prior to the crime and where defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of arrest was .18). While evidence of intoxication may be admissible to challenge a witness' ability to perceive the events to which he is testifying, evidence that the witness was simply drinking prior to the observations is not. Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 233, 448 A.2d 609, 613 (1982); see also Morreale v. Prince, 436 Pa. 51, 53, 258 A.2d 508, 508-09 (1969) (evidence of drinking is prejudicial in automobile negligence action; only evidence of intoxication permitted). In the present case there was no evidence that Officer Perez was intoxicated.

  4. Com. v. Pacell

    345 Pa. Super. 203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)   Cited 12 times

    Commonwealth v. Cragle, 281 Pa. Super. 434, 436-37, 422 A.2d 547 (1980) (collecting cases). See also Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 231-32, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982). Nevertheless, the testimony was admissible, albeit for a purpose other than to impeach Appellant.

  5. Com v. McCue

    487 A.2d 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)   Cited 16 times

    See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 311, 362 A.2d 217, 220 (1976) ("Evidence of prior misconduct unrelated to the issues at trial is admissible only insofar as it bears directly on the witness' `character fortruth.'"); Commonwealth v. Truitt, 369 Pa. 72, 80, 85 A.2d 425, 429 (1951) ("A witness cannot be contradicted on collateral matters to test credibility[.]"); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 232, 448 A.2d 609, 612 (1982) (credibility of witness may not be attacked by questions regarding instances of misconduct unrelated to the issue on trial); Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa. Super. 430, 434-45, 62 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1948) (witness can be contradicted only on matters germane to issue at trial; no contradiction shall be permitted on collateral matters). Cf. Commonwealth v.Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 556, 307 A.2d 255, 257 (1973), and McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 432 Pa. 123, 125, 247 A.2d 467, 468 (1968) (prior convictions used to impeach credibility are limited to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements).

  6. Reichman v. Wallach

    306 Pa. Super. 177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)   Cited 22 times
    In Reichman, plaintiff's medical malpractice action was based upon the alleged failure of physicians to treat promptly internal bleeding which followed the performance of a hysterectomy.

    This overlooks the fact that Mrs. Reichman not only offered the statement on her side of the case but offered it, as it was received, to show substantive negligence on the part of Dr. Wallach. If the anesthesiologist's statement had been admitted as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach his credibility, the jury would have been cautioned of the limited purpose for which it had been received and that it was not to be considered as substantive evidence. Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 39 n. 2, 444 A.2d 653, 656 n. 2 (1982); Commonwealth v. Russell, 456 Pa. 559, 565-566, 322 A.2d 127, 130-131 (1974); Wilson v.Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 421 Pa. 419, 431-432, 219 A.2d 666, 673 (1966); Dincher v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 356 Pa. 151, 156, 51 A.2d 710, 713 (1947); Commonwealth v.McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 234, 448 A.2d 609, 613 (1982); Westerman v. Stout, 232 Pa. Super. 195, 202-203, 335 A.2d 741, 745 (1975); Crawford v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company of NewYork, 208 Pa. Super. 150, 162, 221 A.2d 877, 884 (1966). A majority of the court en banc which heard the post verdict motions concluded that the admission of the hearsay statement had been error but that the error was harmless.