Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it permitted Kimberly Souder to testify as an expert in analyzing and identifying the alleged contraband as cocaine. In Commonwealth v. McCloy, 393 Pa. Super. 217, 574 A.2d 86 (1990), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 585, 588 A.2d 508 (1991), the Superior Court reviewed the applicable law as follows: To qualify as an expert witness, a witness need only have a "reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge," on a subject for which expert testimony is admissible. Commonwealth v. Washington, 235 Pa. Super. 339, 340 A.2d 896 (1975).
See Commonwealth v. Burton, 417 A.2d 611, 614-615 (Pa. 1980) (finding that counsel's alleged inebriation during trial did not constitute ineffectiveness where there was no indication on record that counsel's drinking had affected the quality of his representation); Commonwealth v. McCloy, 574 A.2d 86, 90-91 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding "that where β¦ defense counsel's personal, legal troubles are unrelated to those of the client whom he is representing, there is no per se rule which commands that counsel be deemed constitutionally ineffective[;]" instead, "the defendant must affirmatively show that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by his counsel's representation"). Noble has failed to meet this burden.
The determination of whether a witness is qualified to offer an expert opinion on a particular subject is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its discretion will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. McCloy, 574 A.2d 86, 88 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citations omitted), appealdenied, 588 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1991). An abuse of discretion has been defined as "the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence or the record."
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra [446 U.S.] at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 348.Commonwealth v. McCloy, 574 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa.Super. 1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 585, 588 A.2d 508 (1991); see also Commonwealth v.Munson, 615 A.2d 343, 347 (Pa.Super. 1992). ΒΆ 21 In the instant case, Appellant presents only the bald assertion that the representation of the prosecution's witness by trial counsel's employer created a conflict of interest.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra [446 U.S.] at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 348. Commonwealth v. McCloy, 393 Pa. Super. 217, 223-224, 574 A.2d 86, 89-90 (1990). It is important to note that appellant's allegations concern past representations by counsel of witnesses and co-defendants in cases which were unrelated to the corrupt organization charge to which appellant entered his plea of guilty. Of such alleged conflicts of interest, it has been observed:
This assertion is without merit. In Commonwealth v. McCloy, 393 Pa. Super. 217, 220-21, 574 A.2d 86, 88 (1990), we considered the propriety of a trial court's decision to permit certain expert testimony and, quoting Commonwealth v. Pearsall, 368 Pa. Super. 327, 534 A.2d 106 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealthv. Garcia, 403 Pa. Super. 280, 588 A.2d 951 (1991) ( en banc), we stated: To qualify as an expert witness, a witness need only have a "reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge," on a subject for which expert testimony is admissible. Commonwealth v. Washington, 235 Pa. Super. 339, 340 A.2d 896 (1975).
"The concern [in these circumstances is] that a layman posing as an attorney might fear that vigorous representation could lead to inquiry into his background and discovery of his lack of credentials * * *." ( United States v. Mouzin (9th Cir. 1986), 785 F.2d 682, 699.) Courts have also found a per se conflict of interest where the attorney engaged in acts similar to those for which the defendant was convicted ( United States v. Cancilla (2d Cir. 1984), 725 F.2d 867; Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp (3d Cir. 1984), 748 F.2d 125; see also Commonwealth v. McCloy (1990), 393 Pa. Super. 217, 574 A.2d 86 (no per se conflict or ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney under investigation for unrelated criminal charge while representing defendant)), or when the attorney was under investigation or indictment by the same office that was prosecuting the defendant ( United States v. DeFalco (3d Cir. 1979), 644 F.2d 132 ( en banc); United States v. McLain (11th Cir. 1987), 823 F.2d 1457). However, courts have held that there is no per se conflict of interest when the attorney has been suspended or disbarred for conduct unrelated to defendant's trial.