"Criminal contempt is a necessary sanction utilized by the courts to protect the dignity and structure of the court and to protect the interests of the general public." Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa.Super. 79, 563 A.2d 1193, 1197 (1989). ¶ 7 The power to impose summary punishment for contempt of court, including criminal contempt, is controlled by 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 4132.
Crawford County District Attorney Mark D. Waitlevertch appeals from the same order under Pa.R.A.P. 501. Because District Attorney Waitlevertch was not a party to the proceeding in the trial court and has not demonstrated that he has a direct, immediate, and substantial interest in this matter, his portion of the appeal is quashed. See Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa. Super. 79, 85 n. 1, 563 A.2d 1193, 1196 n. 1 (1989). The contempt order was entered after a series of statements Ferguson made during the course of a criminal trial.
"The ability to issue a criminal contempt citation empowers a trial judge with the ability to maintain command over his or her courtroom. Effectively, the criminal contempt sanction gives credence to a judge's status as commander in chief over his or her courtroom. If we continually carve away at this power, the sanctity and balance of the courtroom may be in jeopardy." Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 1008, 1013 (Pa.Super. 1997) (quoting Commonwealth v. Martorano, 563 A.2d 1193, 1200 (Pa.Super. 1989)). In connection with this sentiment, however, this Court has also noted that a trial court should not use the drastic sanction of finding a person in criminal contempt when a lesser measure will suffice.
If the courts continually carve away at this power, the balance, dignity, and integrity of the courtroom may be in jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Martorano, 563 A.2d 1193, 1200 (Pa.Super. 1989). Thus, "[w]hen reviewing the propriety of a contempt conviction, we place great reliance upon the discretion of the trial judge, . . . and are confined to a determination of whether the facts support the trial court's decision."
Consequently, to sustain a conviction for direct criminal contempt under this provision there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that obstructs the administration of justice. Williams v. Williams, 554 Pa. 465, 469, 721 A.2d 1072, 1073 (1998); Commonwealth v. Martorano, 563 A.2d 1193, 1197 (Pa.Super. 1989), appeal denied 529 Pa. 632, 600 A.2d 952 (1991). ¶ 16 Appellant does not dispute that his choice of verbal epithet and contemporaneous gesture with his middle finger constituted misconduct.
A conviction pursuant to section 4132(3) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) which obstructs the administration of justice. Campolongo; Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa. Super. 79, 563 A.2d 1193 (1989). To obstruct justice, conduct must significantly disrupt proceedings.
A conviction pursuant to section 4132(3) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) which obstructs the administration of justice. Campolongo; Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa. Super. 79, 563 A.2d 1193 (1989). To obstruct justice, conduct must significantly disrupt proceedings.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Martorano, 563 A.2d 1193, 1200 (Pa.Super. 1989)).
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Martorano, 563 A.2d 1193, 1200 (Pa.Super. 1989)).
A conviction pursuant to section 4132(3) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) which obstructs the administration of justice. Campolongo; Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa.Super. 79, 563 A.2d 1193 (1989). To obstruct justice, conduct must significantly disrupt proceedings.