We so refuse because the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony is a matter exclusively within the province of the suppression court. Commonwealthv. Lapia, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 281, 457 A.2d 877, 886 (1983); Commonwealth v. Neely, 298 Pa. Super. 328, 340, 444 A.2d 1199, 1205 (1982). The evidence which appellants argue was suppressible included: (1) photographs of the borehole and premises as well as a videotape of the entire premises; (2) the results of the die tests subsequently conducted; and (3) soil samples from the borehole area and samples from the interior of the borehole.
Although the statutory provisions and regulations do not directly authorize the warrantless search of airport passengers, we nevertheless must conclude that the requirements of search implicit in the statute provisions and regulations must comport with the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Lapia Dugger, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983): "The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as is also so of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, prohibits only `unreasonable searches and seizures.'" We further stated in Lapia, that "there is no test of reasonableness `capable of precise definition or mechanical application' . . . . [r]ather determining reasonableness involves balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights against the government's need to conduct the intrusion."
The Superior Court also made an independent determination that it could no longer "accept" an appeal from an order suppressing evidence following the Commonwealth's good faith certification that the prosecution will be terminated or substantially handicapped. Commonwealth v. Dugger, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 276, 457 A.2d 877, 883 (1983). The Superior Court held that an order suppressing evidence is appealable only when it is apparent from the record that the order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution.
(Appellee has filed a motion to quash the appeal, but even without such a motion, we should have to decide appealability.) In Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 270, 457 A.2d 877, 880 (1983), we held that "an order suppressing evidence is appealable when it is apparent from the record that the order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution." Here, appellee was charged with possession of, and possession with intent to deliver, controlled substances.
first, that the person must be "reasonably suspected" of having narcotics; second, that after being informed that before he may make his visit he must submit to a search, the person must consent to be searched; and third, that the search that the warden then conducts must be a reasonable search.Commonwealth v. Dugger, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 302-303, 457 A.2d 877, 897 (1983), reversed on other grounds, Commonwealth v.Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985) (the Supreme Court expressly affirmed this court's interpretation of the statute and adopted the "reasonable suspicion" standard for evaluating a prison search. See Dugger, 506 Pa. at 541, 486 A.2d at 384.).
Commonwealth v. Dugger was a companion case to Commonwealthv. Lapia, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983) when Dugger was initially decided by the Superior Court. The Superior Court opinion in that case held that Commonwealth v. Hill, 497 Pa. 230, 439 A.2d 1153 (1982), sub silentio, overruled the holding of Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).
We disagree and, therefore, reverse. Initially we must determine whether the Commonwealth's appeal is properly before us. Recently in Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983), our Court engaged in an exhaustive discussion of prior case law in this area, and concluded "that an order suppressing evidence is appealable when it is apparent from the record that the order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution." Id., 311 Pa. Super. at 270, 457 A.2d at 880.
We must first determine whether the Commonwealth's appeal is properly before this Court. In Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983), we held that "[w]hen confronted with a Commonwealth appeal from an order suppressing evidence, we must first determine for ourselves whether the order is appealable — whether it terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution; and we must make that determination on the basis of the record, and on that basis alone." Applying that test to this case, we conclude that the suppression order is appealable.
Commonwealth v. Throckmorton, 241 Pa. Super. 62, 70, 359 A.2d 444, 448 (1976) (footnote omitted). This Court sitting en banc in Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983) recently clarified our standard for reviewing a Commonwealth appeal from an order suppressing evidence. The Lapia Court held:
We must first determine whether the lower court's order is appealable. In Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa. Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983), this court held that "[w]hen confronted with a Commonwealth appeal from an order suppressing evidence, we must determine for ourselves whether the order is appealable — whether it terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution; and we must make that determination on the basis of the record, and on that basis alone." Id., 311 Pa.Superior at 277, 457 A.2d at 884.