However, Appellant fails to acknowledge that this Court subsequently held this statement in Van Wright โ that the trial court should still provide an alibi instruction when the only evidence of an alibi comes from the Commonwealth โ was "merely dictum." Commonwealth v. Fromal , 572 A.2d 711, 722 (Pa. Super. 1990). In Fromal , this Court emphasized that in both Van Wright and Bonomo , "it was the defense who presented evidence of alibi."
When the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the evidence, we may reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those findings. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 111, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (1990), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 629, 592 A.2d 1297 (1990). We will review the trial court's disposition of appellant's suppression claims in accordance with this standard.
Commonwealth v. Korenkiewicz, 743 A.2d 958, 963-65 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted). While Korenkiewicz involved the police receiving information from a known citizen, in Commonwealth v. Framed, 392 Pa.Super. 100, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (1990), we explained that one officer may also act upon information received from another officer, albeit in the context of an arrest rather than an investigative detention; a distinction without a difference as applied to the case before us. An arresting officer is not required to have sufficient information to establish probable cause for the arrest so long as the officer ordering the arrest possessed sufficient information giving rise to probable cause.
Where an alibi defense is presented, such an instruction is necessary due to the danger that the failure to prove the defense will be taken by the jury as a sign of the defendant's guilt. Pounds, 490 Pa. at 634, 417 A.2d at 603; Willis, 520 Pa. at 294, 553 A.2d at 962; Commonwealth v. Gainer, 397 Pa. Super. 348, 356, 580 A.2d 333, 337 (1990); Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 120, 572 A.2d 711, 721 (1990). The instruction on alibi is to emphasize that the defendant is not required to disprove any elements of the crime charged, but that the defense's evidence of alibi, even if not wholly believed, may create a reasonable doubt.
When the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the evidence, we may reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings.Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 111, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (1990), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 629, 592 A.2d 1297 (1990) (citations omitted). We shall evaluate the suppression ruling and appellant's arguments with these principles in mind.
All that is required before a weapon may be introduced into evidence is a sufficient foundation demonstrating circumstances justifying an inference of likelihood that the weapon was used in the course of the crime charged. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 125, 572 A.2d 711, 724 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 629, 592 A.2d 1297. The Commonwealth is not compelled to establish that the particular weapon was the actual weapon used in the commission of the crime. Id., 392 Pa.Super. at 125, 572 A.2d at 724.
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 272-273, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (1991). See also: Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 112-113, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (1990); Commonwealth v. Butler, 354 Pa. Super. 533, 537-538, 512 A.2d 667, 669-670 (1986). `When we examine a particular situation to determine if probable cause exists, we consider all the factors and their total effect, and do not concentrate on each individual element . . .
As we stated in Commonwealthv. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 572 A.2d 711 (1990): In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress our role is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings.
Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. at 518, 513 A.2d at 1042. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 111, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (1990). In Pennsylvania, "Any person who drives . . . a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood . . . if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving . . . a motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcohol. . . ." 75 Pa.C.S.A. ยง 1547(a)(1).
It is axiomatic that a prosecutor must limit her closing argument to facts and evidence of record and legitimate inferences drawn therefrom. Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 252, 546 A.2d 1101, 1109 (1988); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 175, 189, 546 A.2d 589, 596 (1988); Commonwealth v.Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 470, 364 A.2d 287, 290 (1976); Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa. Super. 100, 116, 572 A.2d 711, 719 (1990). Instantly, there is absolutely no evidence which would tend to indicate that the telephone calls were drug related.