Thus, a PCRA petition may only be filed after an appellant has waived or exhausted his or her direct appeal rights. See Commonwealth v. Fralic, 625 A.2d 1249, 1252 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1993); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) ("A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.").

Indeed, if a PCRA petition is filed before the petitioner "has waived or exhausted his direct appeal rights," the PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the action. Commonwealth v. Leslie, 757 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa. Super. 2000); see also Commonwealth v. Fralic, 625 A.2d 1249, n.1 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 573 A.2d 1112, 1116 (Pa. Super. 1990). In this case, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on August 16, 2017, 30 days after the time for seeking appellate review with this Court expired.

A defendant may not file a PCRA petition prior to a judgment of sentence becoming final; a petition will only be considered after he has waived or exhausted his direct appeal rights. See Commonwealth v. Fralic, 625 A.2d 1249, 1252 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1993) (holding that appellant's PCRA petition was premature because he filed it before he exhausted his direct appeal rights). Here, because of the unique circumstances of the case and the lower court's actions, the finality of Appellant's judgment of sentence presents a procedural quagmire.

¶ 15 Conversely, caselaw indicates that the PCRA does not apply until there is a "final judgment." See Commonwealth v. Fralic, 625 A.2d 1249 (Pa.Super. 1993). Indeed, it was for this reason that Appellant's "first" PCRA petition was dismissed without prejudice, an appeal was pending to this court that made the petition premature.

This appeal timely followed. ¶ 5 A PCRA petition may only be filed after an appellant has waived or exhausted his direct appeal rights See: Commonwealth v. Fralic, 625 A.2d 1249, 1252 n. 1 (Pa.Super. 1993). The comments to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1501 clearly state that the PCRA "is not intended to be a substitute for . . . the availability of appeal or a post-sentence motion."

As a general rule, a trial court may not modify a final order beyond the thirty day statutory time limit set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. Commonwealth v. Fralic, 425 Pa. Super. 581, 585, 625 A.2d 1249, 1251 (1993). A trial court, however, has the power to rescind a pretrial order discharging a defendant if the court acts within thirty days of the entry of the order.