Additionally, "[t]he minimum intent required to prove criminal contempt is 'a volitional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.'" Commonwealth v. Debose, 833 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. Super. 2003). With regard to the fourth element of contempt, it is well-established that for conduct to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt the proceedings.
We note that certain decisions issued by our appellate courts suggest strongly that an attorney's failure to appear at a scheduled court proceeding is not per se grounds for a finding of contempt where other circumstances justify or explain the attorney's absence. See In re Bernhart, 461 A.2d 1232, 1233 (Pa. 1983) (holding that when an attorney notified a court administrator that he had to appear in court in another county, his failure to appear was not contempt because he did not have the intent to disobey an order requiring him to be available); see also Matter of Ring, 424 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 1981) (holding that an attorney with conflicting in-court commitments, who timely notifies one court of his inability to meet his commitment there, cannot be held in direct criminal contempt); Commonwealth v. Debose, 833 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that when an attorney had conflicting in-court commitments and provided timely and sufficient notice to the trial court, there was no willful intent sufficient to support a contempt finding); Ricci v. Geary, 670 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that when there is no proof that an attorney either had notice of his expected appearance in court on a specified date or that the attorney's failure to appear in court was an intentional or willful disregard of the lawful process of the trial court, no contempt conviction will stand). Given our disposition, we need not consider McMahon's remaining issue.
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 90 (Pa. 1998). Compare Commonwealth v. Debose, 833 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that "recusal is required if there is a running, bitter controversy between the judge and offender."). As the PCRA court explained "[t]he judges and other judicial officers who were victims of the first case were not victims or witnesses in the present matter," thus, recusal was not necessary as there was no appearance of impropriety.
See id. The minimum intent required to prove criminal contempt is a volitional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that her conduct is wrongful. Commonwealth v. Debose, 833 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. Super. 2003). However, this Court has established that direct intent is not necessary where a reckless disregard for the directions of the court can be proven.
However, recusal is required if there is a running, bitter controversy between the judge and offender." Commonwealth v. Debose , 833 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied , 577 Pa. 709, 847 A.2d 1278 (2004) (citation omitted).Here, Appellant raised the issue of the trial judge's alleged bias prior to trial, and the judge concluded that he was fully capable of presiding over Appellant's case in a fair and impartial manner.
We have also held, however, that when an attorney had conflicting in-court commitments and provided timely and sufficient notice to the trial court, there was no willful intent sufficient to support a contempt finding. Commonwealth v. Debose, 833 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Super. 2003); see also Ricci v. Geary, 670 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. 1996); In re Bernhart, 461 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 1983). We also reversed a finding of contempt entered when an attorney failed to appear due to an in-court conflict, even though the attorney failed to provide notice of the conflict.
However, we also have held that, when an attorney had conflicting in-court commitments and provided timely and sufficient notice to the trial court, there was no willful intent sufficient to support a contempt finding. Commonwealth v. Debose, 833 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa.Super.2003). See also Ricci v. Geary, 447 Pa.Super. 609, 670 A.2d 190 (1996); In re Bernhart, 501 Pa. 428, 461 A.2d 1232 (1983).