That defense requires, among other things, that an "escapee must return to official detention as soon as possible after leaving the prison." Commonwealth v. Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311 EQD,, 460 A.2d 1155, 1159 (1983) (emphasis added). While the Commonwealth undisputedly bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that due diligence was exercised by the police in their efforts to arrest a defendant, "due diligence," as the term is used in the Rule 1100(d) context, means reasonable efforts are required, not perfect vigilance or exhaustive and constant investigation.

When a sentence is within statutory limits, and the court has complied with the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701-9781, we will not reverse the sentencing court's decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311 , 323, 460 A.2d 1155, 1161 (1983). Here, appellant's sentence was within the statutory limits, and, after reviewing the record, we find that the lower court did consider appellant's personal background.

The evidence supported a finding that he intended, as part of his kidnapping plan, to deprive the victim of her firearm permanently. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 460 A.2d 1155, 1160 (Pa.Super. 1983) (stating evidence sufficient to prove Theft by Unlawful Taking where defendant argued he had taken jacket from cabin when he was surprised by the arrival of the owner and fled, but defendant's flight, in the course of his prison escape, made it unlikely the owner would have ever recovered the jacket).

A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Whether a new trial should be granted on grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.Zapata, 447 Pa. 322, 327, 290 A.2d 114, 117 (1972); Commonwealth v. Ruffin, supra, 317 Pa. Super. at 133, 463 A.2d at 1120; Commonwealth v. Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311, 322, 460 A.2d 1155, 1161 (1983); Commonwealth v. Starks, 298 Pa. Super. 213, 216, 444 A.2d 736, 738 (1982). The test is not whether the court would have decided the case in the same way but whether the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

the escapee must be confronted with a specific threat of death or serious bodily injury; there musteither be no time to complain to authorities, or ahistory of futile complaints; there must be no evidence of force by the escapee against prison personnel or others in the escape; and the escapeemust return to official detention as soon as possibleafter leaving the prison. Id., 349 Pa. Super. at 87, 502 A.2d at 1285 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311, 460 A.2d 1155, (1983)) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Slavik, 297 Pa. Super. 135, 137, 443 A.2d 336, 337 (1982) (prisoner who was beaten and threatened by fellow inmate could not assert duress as defense to escape because he made no complaint to prison authorities or effort to return to custody as soon as possible).

"When a sentence is within statutory limits, and the court has complied with the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701-9781, we will not reverse the sentencing court's decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 452, 510 A.2d 735, 749 (1986); Commonwealth v.Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311, 460 A.2d 1155 (1983). Pennsylvania trial judges are vested with broad sentencing discretion with which the appellate courts will not interfere absent manifest abuse. Commonwealth v. Green, 494 Pa. 406, 431 A.2d 918 (1981); Commonwealth v. White, 341 Pa. Super. 261, 491 A.2d 252 (1985).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (b). See Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa. Super. 473, 467 A.2d 631 (1983); Commonwealth v. Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311, 460 A.2d 1155 (1983). The court here did not address such considerations.

In reviewing the imposition of sentence, this court should ordinarily defer to the trial court which was better able to weigh the various considerations and should not replace the trial court's judgment with its own unless the sentence demonstrates that the sentencing court clearly abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Long, 310 Pa. Super. 339, 456 A.2d 641 (1983), Commonwealth v. Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311, 460 A.2d 1155 (1983). Although the Sentencing Guidelines do not permit consideration of a conviction for which sentence has not been imposed in computing a previous record score, such a consideration is proper as it relates to a defendant's character.

Whether a new trial should be granted on grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Zapata, 447 Pa. 322, 327, 290 A.2d 114, 117 (1972); Commonwealth v. Ruffin, supra, 317 Pa. Super. at 133, 463 A.2d at 1120; Commonwealth v.Brown, 314 Pa. Super. 311, 322, 460 A.2d 1155, 1161 (1983); Commonwealth v. Starks, 298 Pa. Super. 213, 216, 444 A.2d 736, 738 (1982). The test is not whether the court would have decided the case in the same way but whether the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.