A delay of two minutes beyond the six-hour period has been held to be a violation of the Davenport rule. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 287 Pa. Super. 485, 430 A.2d 994 (1981), aff'd per curiam, 498 Pa. 656, 450 A.2d 970 (1982); see also Commonwealth v.Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1981) ( per curiam; ten minute delay required suppression); cf. Commonwealth v. Robertson, 317 Pa. Super. 158, 463 A.2d 1133 (1983). Here, appellant contends that because arraignment did not take place until approximately twenty and one-half hours after her arrest, her oral statements and the physical evidence obtained as a result of such statements should be inadmissible at trial.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656, 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (Mr. Justice McDermott concurring), (two minute delay beyond the six hour period); Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1980) (Mr. Justice Larsen dissenting), (ten minute delay beyond the six hour period).

Support for the Davenport rule has not always been unanimous among the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1980), rearg. denied, February 18, 1982, Mr. Justice Larsen joined by Mr. Justice Flaherty referred to the Davenport rule as the "quintessential illustration of mechanical jurisprudence" in expressing their dissatisfaction with the "rote application of the Davenport formula" at the "expense of justice." Other members of the Court noted their displeasure with the "iron rule" in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656, 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (Mr.

Thus, in interpreting our Rule 1100, we must throw away the stopwatch and pick up the scales of justice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1980) (dissenting opinion, Larsen, J., in which Flaherty, J. joined). Rule 1100 should not be construed to require Common Pleas Courts with backlogged criminal dockets to devote all their administrative and judicial resources to guarantee that every defendant is tried within the period prescribed by the Rule.

Whatever validity the Davenport rule retains, its "six-hour clock" does not begin to run in such circumstances until the defendant has been returned to the judicial district wherein the arrest warrant was issued. As noted in Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 287, 424 A.2d 864 (1981), "This Court should throw away the stopwatch and pick up the scales of justice." (Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by Flaherty, J.) Appellant crossed the Philadelphia County line at 1:40 p.m. and was arraigned at 7:33 p.m. the same evening.

Thus, in interpreting our Rule 1100, we must throw away the stopwatch and pick up the scales of justice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1980) (dissenting opinion, Larsen, J., in which Flaherty, J. joined). Rule 1100 should not be construed to require Common Pleas Courts with backlogged criminal dockets to devote all their administrative and judicial resources to guarantee that every defendant is tried within the period prescribed by the Rule.

Id., n. 7 (emphasis added)). Although the continuing vitality of the Davenport rule as a whole is subject to speculation after Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by Flaherty, J.), and Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656, 450 A.2d 970, 971-972 (1982) (Flaherty, J. concurring, joined by Hutchinson, J.) [ see also, Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144, 151, 454 A.2d 1004, 1008 (1982) (Concurring Opinion of McDermott, J.)], it is clear that a majority of this Court has recognized the implicit "exigent circumstances qualification." Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461, 462 A.2d 216 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. at 150, 454 A.2d at 1007 (1982).

These goals, though laudable, "should not be exalted at the expense of justice." Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 286, 424 A.2d 864 (1980) (Mr. Justice Larsen, dissenting).

Thus, in interpreting our Rule 1100, we must throw away the stopwatch and pick up the scales of justice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1980) (dissenting opinion, Larsen, J., in which Flaherty, J. joined). Id., 502 Pa. at 402, 466 A.2d at 1014 (emphasis added).

Failure to do so would render inadmissible any statement obtained during this time-frame. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656, 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (new trial awarded where defendant's voluntary statement should have been suppressed where he was arraigned six hours and two minutes after his arrest); Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285, 424 A.2d 864 (1980) (trial court's suppression of confession affirmed where the defendant arraigned six hours and ten minutes after his arrest). Thus, the law evolved from the three-pronged test enunciated in Futch to the fixed time-table adopted in Davenport; nevertheless, the objective of our Supreme Court remained the same, i.e., to discourage the obtaining of incriminating information through coercive means.