" See also Commonwealth ex rel. Trotter v. Hendrick, 197 Pa. Super. 230, 177 A.2d 162 (1962); State v. McCall, 27 N.J. Super. 157, 99 A.2d 153 (1953); Winn v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.2d 275, Ky. (1957); Ex parte Farr, 87 Okla. Cr. 411, 198 P.2d 748 (1948); Tanzer v. United States, (9th Cir. 1960), 278 F.2d 137; People v. Barwick, 7 Cal.2d 696, 62 P.2d 590 (1936); People v. Clapp, 67 Cal.App.2d 197, 153 P.2d 758 (1944); People v. Rave, 364 Ill. 72, 3 N.E.2d 972 (1936); State v. Olson, 200 Iowa 660, 204 N.W. 278 (1925). We are not inclined to follow the reasoning of the cases which have adopted the view that a conviction followed by suspended sentence does not have the essential finality necessary to render it available to enhance the penalty under habitual criminal acts.

Jurisdictions across the country are divided on whether convictions upon which sentences have been deferred or suspended may be used as convictions for the purpose of the habitual criminal statutes. Illustrative of cases permitting such use are State v. Robison, 99 Ariz. 241, 408 P.2d 29 (1965); State v. O'Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 225 P.2d 1020 (1950); Winn v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. 1957); State v. Cerny, 248 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1952), aff'd, 286 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1956); and Commonwealth ex rel. Trotter v. Hendrick, 197 Pa. Super. 230, 177 A.2d 162 (1962). On the other hand, Cromeans v. State, 160 Tex.Crim. 135, 268 S.W.2d 133 (1954), and People ex rel. Knapp v. Jackson, 6 App. Div.2d 151, 175 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1958), did not permit a suspended or deferred sentence to be used as a qualifying link.