A guilty plea does not foreclose a defendant from questioning all of the proceedings which occurred before the entry of the plea. See, e.g. Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 489, 218 A.2d 230 (1966). For example, the entry of a guilty plea does not prevent a defendant from challenging his conviction on the basis that he lacked counsel at the time of the plea.
Immediately before defendant-relator entered his plea of guilty and while he was represented by counsel, the Court below questioned him as follows: "The Court: Mr. Booker, you understand that you are pleading guilty generally to this indictment charging you with murder and you are asking me to hear the testimony and fix the degree of guilt; you understand that, don't you? The Defendant: Yes, sir." Commonwealth ex rel. Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 85, 202 A.2d 299, holds that such questioning and explanation by the trial Judge is sufficient, where defendant's attorney has fully explained the charges against him. Furthermore, Crosby and Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230, hold that where an accused pleads guilty to an indictment it is presumed that he knows what he is doing and the burden is on the defendant to prove otherwise. Defendant-relator has not met this burden.
Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed. 2d 408 (1965); United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1967). See also, Commonwealth ex rel. Booker v. Duggan, 424 Pa. 394, 400, 227 A.2d 168, 172 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Swilley v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 419, 218 A.2d 242 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Blackshear v. Myers, 419 Pa. 151, 213 A.2d 378 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Taylor v. Maroney, 419 Pa. 149, 213 A.2d 355 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Sanders v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 380, 207 A.2d 789 (1965).Right to Appeal
The alleged improper action by the trial Judge is of no moment, because, as we recently said in Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643 (page 26): " ' "A plea of guilty, knowingly made, constitutes an admission of guilt and is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses." Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 597, 229 A.2d 922, 924 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A.2d 528 (1964).' Commonwealth v. Hill, 427 Pa. 614, 617, 235 A.2d 347." See also Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 440 Pa. 97, 269 A.2d 457; Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 237 A.2d 172.
In Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643, the Court said (page 26): "Moreover, ' "A plea of guilty, knowingly made, constitutes an admission of guilt and is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses." Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 597, 229 A.2d 922, 924 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A.2d 528 (1964).' Commonwealth v. Hill, 427 Pa. 614, 617, 235 A.2d 347." We find no merit in any of appellant's contentions.
Hence, the burden of proving otherwise is upon him.'. . . "As this Court has said on numerous occasions: 'A plea of guilty, knowingly made, constitutes an admission of guilt and is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses.' Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 597, 229 A.2d 922, 924 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A.2d 528 (1964)." Accord: Commonwealth v. McBride, 440 Pa. 81, 269 A.2d 737.
' " In our opinion, a jury or trier of fact could have properly concluded from the evidence hereinabove summarized that the defendant murdered Ernest McNeil. Moreover, " 'A plea of guilty, knowingly made, constitutes an admission of guilt and is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses.' Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 597, 229 A.2d 922, 924 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A.2d 528 (1964)." Commonwealth v. Hill, 427 Pa. 614, 617, 235 A.2d 347.
As this Court has said on numerous occasions: "A plea of guilty, knowingly made, constitutes an admission of guilt and is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses." Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 597, 229 A.2d 922, 924 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A.2d 528 (1964). That the court had jurisdiction over Hill is obvious.
The burden of proving that Phelan did not understand the nature and effect of his guilty pleas, or there existed after discovered evidence which would warrant the withdrawal thereof was upon him. See Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966), and Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney, 424 Pa. 493, 227 A.2d 159 (1967). This burden was not met. As noted before, there was no attempt to meet it, although ample opportunity was afforded.
While it is presumed that an accused who pleads guilty to an indictment in court knows what he is doing and the burden is on him to prove otherwise, we have not concerned ourselves with this rule in the instant case, but rather have read and reread the complete record in an effort to determine the relevant truth. It is our conscientious conclusion, that at all relevant times Hilberry had a rational understanding of the nature of the plea and sentence proceedings; that he had a rational and factual understanding of the charges involved; that he was able to and did cooperate in a rational manner in assisting his lawyers in preparing a defense; that his plea was knowingly, intelligently and understandingly entered; and that there is no valid reason why either his conviction or sentence should be nullified. See Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966), and Commonwealth ex rel. Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 202 A.2d 299 (1964). We note that the court before whom the plea was entered included statements in its adjudication which indicate a conclusion inconsistent with Hilberry's competency; however, we are now satisfied that the court was thereby merely attempting to explain and warrant its action in imposing a life sentence rather than death.