Opinion
Case No. 3:00 CV 7160
November 21, 2002
ORDER
Plaintiff pro se Michael D. Colvin brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Maryann Schaublin, Elizabeth Osborne, and John/Jane Does "x50." This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pending is defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendants' motion shall be granted.
BACKGROUND
In February, 1994, plaintiff pled guilty to sexually assaulting his son and was sentenced to ten to twenty-five years in prison. He was incarcerated at the Allen Correctional Institution ("ACI"), a state prison in Lima, Ohio. Defendant Mary Ann Schaublin was the Education/Library Administrator at ACI, and defendant Elizabeth Osborne was the Librarian (II) at ACI.
On October 7, 1998, plaintiff filed a post-conviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea with the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas. In Ohio, a court may grant such a petition only to correct a "manifest injustice." Ohio R.Crim.P. 32.1.
On November 17, 1998, the court denied the petition. The court noted that DNA found in the victim's diaper was a "nonsperm cell fraction" that "may be that of the victim, is not that of the defendant, and . . . . was not from a sperm cell." The court nonetheless found that plaintiff had not shown "manifest injustice" because he freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pled guilty to the offense. (Doc. 41, Exh. B-6).
On December 14, 1998, plaintiff committed three class II violations of ACI rules. He was found guilty of threatening and disrespecting a corrections officer, and possession or manufacture of a weapon or contraband. On December 18, 1998, plaintiff was sentenced to fifteen days of segregation followed by thirty days of cell isolation. His segregation began on December 18, 1998.
Also on December 18, 1998, plaintiff's appeal of the denial of his petition to withdraw his guilty plea was filed with the Ohio Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District. His notice and appeal brief were filed one day late. Ohio App.R. 4(A) prescribes that an appeal must be filed within thirty days of the order, and the trial court filed its order on November 17, 1998. Plaintiff manually dated the notice of appeal and the appeal brief December 17, 1998, and alleges that he placed them in the prison mailbox on December 17, 1998.
On January 1, 1999, plaintiff was released from segregation and began his thirty days of cell isolation. Cell isolation and segregation are parts of ACI's progressive discipline policy. When inmates violate ACI rules, they may be placed on cell isolation and their privileges are restricted. Inmates on cell isolation must obtain passes to enter the law library. Passes are requested through the "kite" system. The inmate kites (i.e., sends a note to) the librarian, and the librarian checks the inmate's schedule and schedules the inmate's library pass. Inmates on cell isolation may obtain two passes per week, and each pass grants the inmate about two and one half hours in the library, for a total of five hours per week access to the library. Inmates on cell isolation or segregation may also receive library materials via information request when they are on segregation.
On January 5, 1999, the Ohio Court of Appeals sent a letter to plaintiff requesting that he complete the appendix, as required by the court's rules. The appendix was incomplete because it did not include a copy of the order being appealed. The court's letter cited the applicable rule and warned plaintiff that if he did not complete the appendix by January 15, 1999, his appeal would be dismissed.
Plaintiff did not timely complete the appendix, and thus missed the January 15, 1999, deadline. In his memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff states that he "immediately" responded to the court's January 5, 1999, letter, by asking for more time to correct the appendix and stating that, because his library access was restricted, he could not get a copy of the applicable local rule. (Doc. 43, at 1). This letter does not appear in the record, and the appeals court's docket does not show that it was received. The library's kite log does not show whether plaintiff requested library access from January 5 to January 15, 1999, because the kite log in the record begins on January 20, 1999.
On January 16, 1999, plaintiff violated an ACI rule against wearing personal clothing, and on January 22, 1999, plaintiff was sentenced to sixty more days of cell isolation.
On March 1, 1999, the Ohio Court of Appeals sua sponte dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's denial of the petition to withdraw the guilty plea, for want of jurisdiction. The court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal because of plaintiff's failure to timely file the notice of appeal by December 17, 1998.
Plaintiff alleges that he desired to file a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal, in which he planned to argue that his notice of appeal was timely delivered to prison officials on December 17, 1998, and therefore was timely filed under the "prison mailbox rule." Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was due on March 11, 1999, ten days after his appeal was dismissed. Plaintiff did not meet this deadline. Plaintiff argues that he was unable to file within the ten-day period because of his restricted law library access in cell isolation. On March 4 and March 10, 1999, plaintiff requested library passes via the kite system and defendant Osborne granted them. Plaintiff has not alleged that he told any library official about his upcoming deadline. Plaintiff did not request an extension of time to file the motion for reconsideration, and in fact did not file any documents with the appeals court after December 18, 1998.
Defendant Osborne, the librarian, kept the kite log for library passes. The kite log in the record shows that between January 20 and June 21, 1999, plaintiff requested library passes on January 28, February 2 and 16, March 4, 10, 16, and 23, and April 13, 1999. Plaintiff alleges that he requested library passes and some requests were denied because defendants had a policy of restricting law library access as additional punishment. There is no evidence of this in the record beyond plaintiff's allegations.
On March 17, 1999, plaintiff again violated the ACI rule against wearing personal clothing, and on March 23, 1999, plaintiff was sentenced to thirty more days of cell isolation.
On March 14, 2000, plaintiff filed this civil rights action seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging denial of access to the courts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at ACI, defendants denied him access to the courts by enforcing a prison policy that restricts access to the prison law library to inmates who are on cell isolation. Plaintiff also alleges defendants prevented him from receiving library materials from porters. Plaintiff alleged defendant Schaublin placed "incompetent and abusive law clerks" in the law library in order to deny him access to the courts, and that defendant Osborne failed to ensure that he received law library passes while on cell isolation.
Plaintiff alleges that enforcement of these policies caused him to miss two court deadlines: 1) the January 15, 1999, deadline for the appendix correction; and 2) the March 11, 1999, deadline for the motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff alleges defendants, acting under color of state law, denied his rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the Constitution. Plaintiff sues the defendants in their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief, and in their personal capacities for monetary damages, fees, and costs.
This court granted defendants' motion to dismiss this case on December 1, 2000. Colvin v. Schaublin, No. 00-7160 (N.D.Ohio. Dec. 1, 2000). The plaintiff filed a timely appeal, and the Sixth Circuit reversed. Colvin v. Schaublin, No. 01-3038, 31 Fed. Appx. 170 (6th Cir. March 7, 2002). The Sixth Circuit, finding that plaintiff had established actual injury for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), stated:
Colvin alleges that he had a limited amount of time in which to file a motion to reconsider the dismissal of his post-conviction appeal. While he was in cell isolation, he was only permitted four to five hours of law library access to prepare this motion. As a result, his motion was untimely filed and subsequently dismissed. Given that Colvin was afforded very limited access to the law library in which to file a time-sensitive motion regarding his post-conviction appeal, and absent any showing that Colvin was restricted access because of a physical threat that he posed to his fellow inmates and prison guards, Colvin has established for the purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) an actual injury as a result of restricted access to the law library.
31 Fed. Appx. at 172.
The case was remanded to this court for further proceedings. Defendants now move for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production shifts, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is insufficient simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party will be believed as true, all doubts will be resolved against the moving party, all evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences will be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). Summary judgment shall be rendered only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
DISCUSSION I. Official Capacity
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prohibits an individual from suing a state in federal court without a waiver or other abrogation of immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Supreme Court has extended this holding to damages suits against state officials in their official capacities. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). A state official sued for injunctive relief in his or her official capacity is, however, a person under § 1983 because official capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n. 10 (1989); see also McKay v. Thompson, 236 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000).
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but gives plaintiffs an avenue of remedy for deprivations of rights created by other federal laws. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). Plaintiff argues defendants violated his First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him access to the courts.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A. Actual Injury
The Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977), held that the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees prisoners the right of meaningful access to the courts. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996), the Court construed Bounds to mean that a prison's library or legal assistance program is insufficient only when the prisoner suffers "actual injury." The Court in Lewis elaborated:
Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, [so] an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. . . . [T]he inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a complaint.518 U.S. at 351.
Actual injury is a component of standing, the Supreme Court noted in Lewis. The Court described what a plaintiff must show at each stage of his case with respect to standing:
"Since they are not mere pleading requirements, but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element [of standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial."
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
While the plaintiff in this case has pled actual injury, and, therefore, standing, sufficiently to defeat defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff must show more to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment. This he cannot do.
Lewis made clear that the actual injury must result "from the defendant's conduct" and that at the summary judgment stage, plaintiff must set forth "by affidavit or other evidence specific facts" alleging this causal relationship. 518 U.S. at 358; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Plaintiffs must demonstrate, for example, that the inadequacy of the prison law library or the available legal assistance caused such actual injury as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim."). Plaintiff must prove his nonfrivolous post-conviction claim or civil rights action was denied or dismissed, and that this denial or dismissal resulted from the actions of prison officials. In this case, though plaintiff shows that his post-conviction claim was dismissed, plaintiff has not alleged that defendants caused him actual injury.
Plaintiff missed the January 15, 1999, deadline for correcting his appeal brief's appendix. Though he claims he responded to the court's instructions and asked for more time to respond, there is no record that he did so. He offers no proof that he did so other than his conclusory assertion, and that is not sufficient. The appeals court sent plaintiff the citation of the rule requiring that the appendix include the order from which he appealed. Plaintiff has not presented evidence of why he could not have looked up the rule during the week's allotted five hours of library time or requested it from a porter, and mailed the order to complete the appendix. Moreover, the court dismissed plaintiff's appeal because it was filed one day late, on December 18, 1998, and not because his appeal brief was incomplete. Plaintiff lost nothing, therefore, by his alleged inability to complete the appeal brief's appendix.
Plaintiff missed the March 11, 1999, deadline for filing the motion for reconsideration, even though he visited the library on March 4 and March 10, 1999. The record does not show whether this was the maximum time available to the plaintiff during the 10-day window, nor does it indicate whether plaintiff requested more library visits or attempted to request additional legal materials through a porter. There is no evidence that the limited library access resulted in plaintiff's inability to file this motion or to file a motion for an extension. There also is no evidence that he told either defendant he was facing a court deadline of March 11, 1999.
The right of access to the courts prohibits prison officials from "actively interfering with inmates' attempts to prepare legal documents, or file them." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. There is no evidence that defendants here did anything other than follow ACI procedures regarding library access by prisoners in cell isolation. The evidence shows that defendants merely worked in the library, and were not responsible for plaintiff's missed deadlines.
There is no evidence in the record that either defendant had any discretionary authority about how often inmates in cell isolation could visit the library, or how long they could spend there. There is no evidence that defendants were responsible for plaintiff being put on cell isolation. There is no evidence that defendants formulated the policy limiting inmates in cell isolation to five hours of in-person library access per week. There is no evidence that defendants treated plaintiff any differently from other inmates in cell isolation.
While plaintiff presents the affidavit of an inmate, Eugene Parra, who worked in the library and testified that he was not allowed to bring inmates in cell isolation legal materials, plaintiff has not shown that he attempted to use the porter system.
In short, there simply is no evidence that defendants were personally involved in any deprivation plaintiff may have suffered. Plaintiff faced the March 11, 1999, deadline because he wished the court to reconsider a motion he filed while he was under no disability, not because of any acts by the defendants. Plaintiff has failed to show the causal link required to hold defendants liable under § 1983.
Courts apply less stringent standards to pro se litigants, but where one fails to comply with an easily understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than a represented litigant. Pilgrim, 92 F.3d at 416 (where a pro se litigant became aware of his deficiencies and was given the opportunity to remedy any deficiencies, he cannot seek shelter in his pro se status).
The issues raised in this case are similar to those in Kain v. Bradley, 959 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). In Kain, the court granted summary judgment for defendant prison officials because plaintiff inmates had not demonstrated actual injury in their access-to-courts claim. One inmate, Kain, claimed that the lack of legal facilities at South Central Correctional Center ("SCCC") prevented him from presenting an argument that may have prevented the dismissal of his underlying claim. The district court found that it need not consider whether plaintiff would have been successful with his alternative argument, because "this is not the type of `actual injury' contemplated by the Lewis Court." 959 F. Supp. at 468.
While incarcerated at Northeastern Correctional Center ("NCC"), a facility at which he conceded adequate legal assistance was available, Kain filed a § 1983 case in federal district court and also filed a separate claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission ("TCC") raising similar factual allegations. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff's TCC claim waived his federal claim. Plaintiff then was transferred to SCCC, where he prepared a response to the motion to dismiss. The district court granted the defendants' motion, disagreeing with plaintiff's argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies. 959 F. Supp. at 464-65.
In his subsequent access-to-courts claim, plaintiff argued the legal facilities at SCCC were inadequate and that with better facilities his response to the motion to dismiss would have been more effective. The court noted:
It is undisputed that Plaintiff . . . actually filed a response to the defendants' motion to dismiss in the civil rights case. Indeed, the Eastern District Court specifically addressed the exhaustion argument raised in that response. This Court is simply not persuaded that Plaintiff Kain has suffered "actual injury," as described in Lewis, by his inability to discover a legal argument that may have been more successful than the one he actually made.
* * * * *
Furthermore, to the extent the waiver argument was a `technical requirement' which Plaintiff Kain could not have discovered without adequate legal facilities, the Court notes that Plaintiff Kain was incarcerated at NCC when he filed the Tennessee Claims Commission Action that ultimately required dismissal of his civil rights claim. Plaintiffs have conceded that the legal facilities at NCC were adequate, and yet, Plaintiff Kain did not identify the waiver problem when he had access to those facilities. Indeed, he admits that he did not use the legal facilities while at NCC. In that regard, any injury to Plaintiff Kain was self-inflicted and not the result of any acts or omissions of Defendants.
Id. at 468.
In this case, the seeds of plaintiff's problem were sown while plaintiff had unrestricted access to legal materials. For purposes of this motion, I will assume that plaintiff's appeal was sent on December 17, 1998, the day before plaintiff's library access was restricted. There is no evidence that plaintiff was denied library access between November 17, 1998, and December 17, 1998. The defendants, as noted, did not prevent plaintiff from presenting this argument to the state Court of Appeals in a motion for reconsideration. Thus, as in Kain, "any injury . . . was self-inflicted and not the result of any acts or omissions of Defendants." Id.
The record is not clear as to when plaintiff learned his appeal had been filed a day late, but it is plain that plaintiff did not avail himself of all the library access available to him during his cell isolation. It is immaterial that plaintiff found out about the late filing problem when he was under a disability; the court in Kain dismissed plaintiff's complaint while plaintiff was incarcerated at a facility with allegedly substandard legal facilities, and the district court found Kain was able to respond adequately, if not completely effectively.
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiff must show the personal involvement of each defendant. Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 1994). Defendants Schaublin and Osborne were not personally responsible for plaintiff's being placed in cell isolation. Thus defendants' alleged actions are in no way connected to the cause of the plaintiff's alleged injury. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' acts of honoring the plaintiff's cell isolation restricted his access to the law library. Honoring plaintiff's cell isolation was within the job responsibilities of the defendants, however, and not the cause of plaintiff's restricted access to the law library. I conclude that plaintiff has not shown actual injury. If the court of appeals erred in not considering the prison mailbox rule, it is not the place of this court to correct it.
B. Nonfrivolousness
To make out an access-to-courts case, the inmate must show his claim was nonfrivolous. "Depriving someone of a frivolous claim, . . . deprives him of nothing at all, except perhaps the punishment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n. 3. See also Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 406 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[O]nly prisoners with non-frivolous underlying claims can have standing to litigate an access-to-courts action."). Even if plaintiff was actually injured, I find that his legal claim was frivolous.
Here, plaintiff's underlying claim was a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Such motions will be granted when the plaintiff establishes that a manifest injustice exists. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (1977). Under this standard, "a postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases." Id. Furthermore, "an undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal and the filing of the motion is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion." Id. In this case, the motion was filed nearly five years after the plaintiff pled guilty. The record is not clear as to whether the DNA evidence plaintiff used as the basis of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was newly discovered when plaintiff filed the motion.
To reverse a trial court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a post-sentence plea, the appeals court must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. "An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of law; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
The court of appeals will grant a motion for reconsideration when "the motion calls to the attention of the court an obvious error in its decision or raises an issue for reconsideration that was either not considered at all or was not fully considered by the court when it should have been." Columbus v. Hodge, 37 Ohio App.3d 68, 68 (1987). Plaintiff argues that his motion for reconsideration would have presented the argument that the court of appeals should have considered the prison mailbox rule in judging whether his appeal was timely filed. If the court accepted this argument, it would have gone on to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found that there was no manifest injustice created by plaintiff's guilty plea.
A pro se prisoner is deemed to have filed a court document on the date it was delivered to prison officials for mailing or otherwise entered into the prison mailing system. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).
Even assuming plaintiff's notice of appeal and brief were timely filed under the prison mailbox rule, I find plaintiff's underlying claim to be frivolous. It is clear that the trial court's decision denying his motion to withdraw his plea was entirely correct. There was no merit to plaintiff's claim or appeal. Thus, even if defendants had done something (which they did not) to restrict his access to the library (which was not restricted unduly, in view of his failure to take advantage of the access that was available), plaintiff was not harmed. His appeal had no merit, so he lost nothing by not being able to perfect it.
C. Access to Courts Limited to Certain Types of Cases
The Court in Lewis also stated that "the tools [Bounds] requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement." 518 U.S. at 355. In short, Lewis provides that plaintiff "must prove actual injury to existing or contemplated litigation of nonfrivolous claims which challenge the plaintiff's sentence or condition of confinement." Id. at 354-55.
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was a collateral attack on the sentence, so plaintiff had a constitutional right to access the courts for that purpose.
Nevertheless, because plaintiff has not established a causal link between defendants' actions and the dismissal of his appeal, and because plaintiff's underlying claim was frivolous, I conclude that plaintiff has not established that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial as to whether plaintiff was actually injured.
D. Balancing Access to Courts and Penological Interests
Even if plaintiff was actually injured in his pursuit of a nonfrivolous collateral appeal of his sentence, actual injury would be permissible if the prison regulation at issue was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361.
When deciding whether a prison regulation impinging on an inmate's constitutional rights can be sustained as "reasonably related" to legitimate penological interests, courts should consider: 1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest at issue; 2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right open to prison inmates; 3) the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates; and 4) whether there are ready alternatives to the regulation that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 78, 89-91 (1987).
In this case, the prison regulation limited inmates in cell isolation to five hours weekly in the law library, but allowed them to receive additional materials in their cells by asking porters to bring them.
Defendants argue that cell isolation serves the valid penological interest of maintaining security and control. Used as an alternative to sending an inmate to segregation, cell isolation means that activities such as visiting the law library are accessible only by pass. Defendants also argue that cell isolation was appropriate for plaintiff, who had "a history of violent and poor behavior." (Doc. 39 at 15).
Plaintiff's behavioral record indicates five class II violations in 1994 (two for fighting, two for being out of place, and one for arguing with an officer); two class II violations in 1995 (both for threatening other inmates); one class II violation in 1996 for being out of place; two class II violations in 1998 (for possession of contraband and threatening and disrespecting staff); and three class II violations in 1999. In 2001, Colvin was sentenced to four years for attempted possession of a deadly weapon while incarcerated at ACI. Plaintiff currently is incarcerated at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, Ohio, a maximum-security facility.
Limiting inmates' visits to the library while not limiting their access to library materials serves the valid penological interest of punishing inmates for violating institutional rules while leaving them free to protect their legal interests. Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison regulation failed to serve a legitimate penological interest.
II. Qualified Immunity
The defendants also seek summary judgment on plaintiff's claim against them in their personal capacities, in which he seeks monetary damages, on the ground that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity provides an alternative ground on which to grant summary judgment for the defendants with regard to the claims against them in their personal capacities.
Officials sued in their individual capacities are "persons" under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991). Personal-capacity suits seek to impose individual liability on a government officer for actions he or she has taken under color of state law. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. The plaintiff must show the person, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federally created right. Id.; see also Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001).
A person acts under color of state law only when exercising power "`possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'" Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-318 (1981), citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
Qualified immunity enables costly but insubstantial lawsuits against government officials in their personal capacities to be terminated quickly, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808 (1982), and guards against the risk that "fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
The standard for qualified immunity, as set forth in Harlow, is: "Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U.S. at 818.
Evaluating a qualified immunity claim requires application of a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether, based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff show that a constitutional violation has occurred. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If no constitutional right would have been violated if the allegations were established, the qualified immunity inquiry is finished. Id. If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the plaintiff's submissions, the next step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. "A right is clearly established when the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. The unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
As noted above, I conclude that plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional injury. Even if plaintiff did suffer a constitutional injury, I find that the unlawfulness of defendants' actions would not have been apparent to them.
Even where the plaintiff's federal rights and the scope of the official's permissible conduct are clearly established, qualified immunity protects a state actor if it was objectively reasonable for him or her to believe that his or her actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41.
The Supreme Court decided Bounds in 1977 and Lewis in 1996. The constitutional right of access to the courts was well established by 1999, when the events resulting in this case took place. The relevant question, therefore, is the "objective legal reasonableness of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (citations omitted). "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the right." Id. at 640.
In this case, the defendants did not know about plaintiff's March 11, 1999, court deadline. Plaintiff requested and received two library visits between March 1 and March 11, 1999, and plaintiff did not request additional visits or request materials via porter. Defendants merely applied ACI's rules in granting plaintiff's library requests. No reasonable jury could find that defendants knew or should have known that their conduct violated, or even arguably violated, plaintiff's constitutional rights. Defendants, therefore, are immune from suit in their personal capacities under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not shown he suffered actual injury because he has not shown defendants' actions caused him to miss his court-imposed deadlines, and he has not shown his underlying claim to be nonfrivolous. Furthermore, even if plaintiff suffered actual injury, the injury was visited pursuant to a legitimate penological interest. The doctrine of qualified immunity also shields defendants from suit.
It is, therefore,
ORDERED THAT defendants' motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is, granted.
So ordered.