Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity

11 Citing cases

  1. In the Matter of Vsetecka

    337 Or. 502 (Or. 2004)   Cited 37 times
    Following directive to give effect to all the parts of a statute

    As the various ways of phrasing the required contents of the notice make clear, ORS 656.265 directs injured workers to include enough information about the when, where, and how of an injury to put an employer on notice that, as the third sentence in subsection (2) puts it, the worker may have sustained a compensable injury. ORS 656.265 requires prompt notice so that an employer can conduct a timely investigation into the nature and cause of a worker's injury. See Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or 743, 747, 725 P2d 356 (1986) (interpreting ORS 656.265). As the court explained in Colvin:

  2. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Angus

    112 P.3d 474 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 1 times

    "`Generally, in order that knowledge be imputed to the employer, the person receiving it must be in some supervisory or representative capacity, such as foreman, supervisor, insurance adjuster, personnel worker, corporate officer, physician or nurse. Knowledge of or notice to a mere co[-]employee is not sufficient. But any degree of authority that places a [ person] in charge of even a small group of workers is enough to confer this representative status.'"Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or 743, 747, 725 P2d 356 (1986) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). Employer first contends that Jacobsen did not know that claimant's injuries were work related and therefore employer did not know of claimant's injuries for purposes of ORS 656.265(4)(a).

  3. Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity

    730 P.2d 585 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    WARDEN, J. This workers' compensation case comes to us on remand from the Oregon Supreme Court, Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 725 P.2d 356 (1986), which held that we had misinterpreted ORS 656.265(4)(a) and, therefore, reversed our decision. An order of the Workers' Compensation Board had reversed the referee and concluded that the claim was untimely, because claimant had not given notice to her employer pursuant to ORS 656.265.

  4. Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc.

    320 Or. 509 (Or. 1995)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that, where an employee filed for compensation but was denied because he failed to prove the compensability of his condition and then sued in tort, the exclusivity provision of the act did not apply because it applied only to compensable injuries, although the claimant's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment

    The court never has deviated from that holding and has restated it repeatedly. See, e.g., Dragicevic v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 112 Or. 569, 571, 230 P. 354 (1924) (court will not "entertain" claim that is untimely filed); Rosell v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 164 Or. 173, 192, 95 P.2d 726 (1940) (same); Landauer v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 175 Or. 418, 421, 154 P.2d 189 (1944) (same); Johnson v. Compensation Department, 246 Or. 449, 452, 425 P.2d 496 (1967) (same); Colvin v.Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 748, 725 P.2d 356 (1986) ("a claimant may not avoid the notice requirements if the [employer] has clear procedures for reporting accidents and injuries and the employe knows or should know of and is able to follow the procedures, but does not"). A second category of cases recognizes that a worker can sustain an on-the-job injury but collect no benefits due to an intrinsic reason, such as failure to sustain the applicable burden of proof.

  5. Dep't of Consumer & Bus. Servs. v. Muliro (In re Comp. of Muliro)

    267 Or. App. 526 (Or. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 2 times

    We concluded that the worker's misrepresentations “were not sufficiently material to justify SAIF's backup denial,” because the worker's supervisor “knew what [the worker's] status at the mill was and that he had filed the claims,” and “[t]hat knowledge was attributable to [the employer] as well as to its insurer, SAIF.” Abbott, 103 Or.App. at 53, 796 P.2d 378 (citing Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 725 P.2d 356 (1986) ; Nix, 80 Or.App. at 660, 723 P.2d 366 ). In those cases, it is true that we held that the employer's conduct or knowledge of the circumstances could affect the obligations of the insurer.

  6. Godfrey v. Fred Meyer Stores

    202 Or. App. 673 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 21 times

    The courts have characterized the purpose of the statute in similar terms. In Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or 743, 747, 725 P2d 356 (1986), for example, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the notice requirement is to "facilitate prompt investigation and diagnosis of the injury." Likewise, in Vsetecka, the court characterized the purpose of the notice provisions of ORS 656.265 as ensuring "prompt notice so that an employer can conduct a timely investigation into the nature and cause of a worker's injury.

  7. Keller v. Saif Corp.

    175 Or. App. 78 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    "The issue is what knowledge will excuse an otherwise untimely notice. In Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 747, 725 P.2d 356 (1986), the court said: "`Timely notice "facilitates prompt investigation and diagnosis of the injury.

  8. Tri-Met, Inc. v. Odighizuwa

    828 P.2d 468 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    Hogan v. Alum. Lock Shingle Corp., 214 Or. 218, 228, 329 P.2d 271 (1958); Phillips v. Colfax Company, Inc., 195 Or. 285, 300, 243 P.2d 276, 245 P.2d 898 (1952). In Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 725 P.2d 356 (1986), the court held that knowledge of a claimant's injury may be imputed to an employer on the basis of apparent authority, if the employee who received the information had supervisory authority over the claimant. Colvin dealt only with the issue of whether a supervisor's knowledge should be imputed to an employer for purposes of a timely notice of a claim.

  9. Saif v. Abbott

    796 P.2d 378 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 5 times
    In Abbott, we concluded that the worker's misrepresentations to both the employer and the insurer about his employment status and injury claims were not sufficiently material to justify a backup denial, because the worker's supervisor knew what the worker's status was and also knew that the worker had filed claims with the insurer, and that knowledge was attributable to both the employer and the insurer.

    Meek knew what claimant's status at the mill was and that he had filed the claims. That knowledge was attributable to Olympic as well as to its insurer, SAIF. Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 725 P.2d 356 (1986); Nix v. SAIF, 80 Or. App. 656, 660, 723 P.2d 366, rev den 302 Or. 158 (1986). Meek did not follow up on the claims or take any action to see that they were not sent to SAIF.

  10. ARGONAUT INSURANCE CO. v. MOCK

    768 P.2d 401 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 9 times
    In Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Mock (A41801), 95 Or. App. 1, 768 P.2d 401, rev den 308 Or. 79 (1989), this court said that the employer's "knowledge of the injury" under ORS 656.265(4)(a)

    Injuries sustained while commuting to and from work are ordinarily not compensable. The issue is what knowledge will excuse an otherwise untimely notice. In Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 747, 725 P.2d 356 (1986), the court said: "Timely notice, `facilitates prompt investigation and diagnosis of the injury. It assures the opportunity to make an accurate record of the occurrence, and decreases the chance for confusion due to intervening or nonemployment-related causes.' Vandre v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 42 Or. App. 705, 709, 601 P.2d 1265 (1979)."