True, the tenant had obligated himself not to sell or remove the hay from the premises, and his infraction of this promise -- admitting, as we may, that the mortgage, inducing a sale and removal, was in contravention thereof -- may have been morally and legally wrong; but it was a wrong for which redress was to be sought by re-entry or appropriate action for damages. (McCombs v. Becker, 3 Hun, 342; Colville v. Miles , 127 N.Y. 159; 24 Am. St. Rep. 433.) Certainly, it seems to us, the lessors have no lien upon or other interest in the hay itself which equity ought to enforce against a third person whose claims thereon were acquired in ignorance of the lessors' pretensions.
The money rental was paid the plaintiff by the tenant in full to October 1, 1934. On October fifteenth the plaintiff and the tenant mutually agreed to a cancellation of the lease and the tenant was dispossessed in a summary proceeding shortly thereafter. Under this lease the plaintiff had at no time title to, or any interest in, the hay and straw. ( Colville v. Miles, 127 N.Y. 159; Briggs v. Austin, 129 id. 208.) Nor has a cause of action been established for the tort of interference with the performance of a contract.
So far as the personal property ("hay, grain and fodder") are concerned, the same being held "as security," the lease was to that extent a mortgage of chattels. ( Colville v. Miles, 127 N.Y. 159; Johnson v. Crofoot, 53 Barb. 574.) Such lease was not recorded or filed, and, consequently, being in contemplation of law a chattel mortgage, it was not effective to defeat the judgment creditor's rights to levy and sale of the property under an execution, although the creditor's rights accrued prior to the lease itself.
The attorneys for the respective parties upon this application have cited numerous cases, some holding that an agreement to work a farm on shares constitutes the lessee a tenant, and in other cases it was held no tenancy was created but that the parties were tenants in common of the crops. (See Stewart v. Doughty, 9 Johns. 180; Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.Y. 129; Caswell v. Districh, 15 Wend. 379; Colville v. Miles, 127 N.Y. 159; Steffin v. Steffin, 4 Civ. Pro. 179; Brandish v. Schenck, 8 Johns. 151; DeMott v. Hagerman, 8 Cow. 220; Foote v. Colvin, 3 Johns. 216; Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill, 234; Dinehart v. Wilson, 15 Barb. 595; Reynolds v. Reynolds Ryan, 48 Hun, 142; Armstrong v. Bicknell, 2 Lans. 216; Matter of Ellis, 78 Misc. 589; Crosby v. Woleben, 149 A.D. 337; Rice v. Peters, 128 id. 776.) Whatever conflict on this point there may be in the various decisions, it has been established by them that the rights of the parties are to be determined by the substance of the agreement rather than by its form.