In this case the suppression court determined on competent evidence of record that Appellant had not requested to speak to an attorney. More importantly, however, in Columbus v. Reid, 32 Ohio App.3d 7, 513 N.E.2d 351 (1986) (appeal denied, Supreme Court of Ohio, May 6, 1987), the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to apply an exclusionary rule to a violation of R.C. § 2935.20. The court in Reid stated:
Appellee asserts that despite the brevity of Mattachione, it may be discerned that the majority considered and rejected the application of the Due Process Clause to a violation of R.C. 2935.20. Mattachione was certified to the Supreme Court as being in conflict with a decision from this court, Columbus v. Reid (1986), 32 Ohio App.3d 7, 513 N.E.2d 351. The court in Fairborn v. Mattachione (Jan. 26, 1994), Greene App. No. 93-CA-0027, unreported, 1994 WL 21877, relied on its earlier decision in Scarlett and found that the acts in the case before it which violated R.C. 2935.20 also violated the defendant's due process rights, and that excluding the defendant's test results was the only effective sanction.
See State v. Larson (Dec. 8, 1988), Fairfield App. No. 16-CA-88, unreported, 1988 WL 138429; State v. Scarlett (Sept. 3, 1987), Montgomery App. No. 10378, unreported, 1987 WL 16568. But, see, Mason v. Albertson (May 4, 1992), Warren App. No. CA91-07-059, unreported, 1992 WL 93075; State v.Fullan, supra; Columbus v. Reid (1986), 32 Ohio App.3d 7, 513 N.E.2d 351. In this case, where a definite period of time was provided by the police to Mason's father for response, and where there would have been time to proceed with the test after waiting the allotted time, the failure by the police to abide by the time allotted by them to Mason's father is deemed by us to be police interference with Mason's ability to speak with an attorney and, therefore, denied Mason due process of law.
Moreover, it is generally well accepted that Ohio does not recognize the application of the exclusionary rule to violations of R.C. 2935.20 in prosecutions for driving under the influence. Columbus v. Reid (1986), 32 Ohio App.3d 7, 513 N.E.2d 351. Until today, this court has followed the general rule.
Peter B. Ruffing, Chief City Prosecutor, and Richard M. Garner, Assistant City Prosecutor, for appellant. Stuart A. Benis, for appellee. This cause is before this court upon the certification of the court of appeals that its judgment conflicted with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in Columbus v. Reid (1986), 32 Ohio App.3d 7, 513 N.E.2d 351, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in Lakewood v. Waselenchuk (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 684, 641 N.E.2d 767, upon the following question: "Does imposition of the exclusionary rule lie as a remedy for police violation of the accused's statutory right to counsel under Section 2935.20 of the Revised Code in a prosecution arising under Section 4511.19(A)(3) of the Revised Code such that the prosecution should be precluded from presenting evidence of the results of an otherwise admissible breath alcohol content analysis of the accused solely because of police failure to comply with Section 2935.20 of the Revised Code?
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, Deputy Chief Counsel, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General. The cause is before this court upon the certification of the court of appeals that its judgment conflicted with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in Columbus v. Reid (1986), 32 Ohio App.3d 7, 513 N.E.2d 351, upon the following question: "[W]hether or not the exclusionary rule is applicable as a sanction for violation of R.C. 2935.20."
Layton at 79. Mattachione was certified to the Supreme Court as being in conflict with Columbus v. Reid (1986). 32 Ohio App.3d 7. In a well-reasoned opinion, the court in Reid acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme Court of Ohio has not, to this date, imposed an exclusionary rule for violations of provisions of the Ohio Constitution, let alone violations of state statutes."
It is well-settled that there is no exclusionary rule for violations of state statutes, let alone for violations of the Administrative Code. See, e.g., Columbus v. Reid (1986), 32 Ohio App.3d 7, 513 N.E.2d 351; Taylor, supra, at 11; see, also, State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196-197, 55 O.O. 2d 447, 450-451, 271 N.E.2d 245, 250. Rather, if the state in fact failed to properly adopt rules regarding the validity of the BAC verifier, the results obtained are no longer entitled to the presumption of validity accorded them by State v. Vega (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 185, 12 OBR 251, 465 N.E.2d 1303.