1956). Also see Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908); Columbia Savings and Loan Association v. Counce, 167 Colo. 365, 447 P.2d 977 (1968); Chapman v. Breeze, 355 Mo. 873, 198 S.W.2d 717 (1947); Caras v. Parker, 149 Cal.App.2d 621, 309 P.2d 104 (1957). Only when optionee has exercised his option may he be entitled to a decree for specific performance.

While a transaction pursuant to an option contract is functionally the same as a contract for the sale of property, see Ronald Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase Options, 12 Nova L. Rev. 147 (1987), no valid contract to purchase exists until the buyer exercises the option. Columbia Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Counce, 167 Colo. 365, 368, 447 P.2d 977, 978 (1968); see Schreck v. T C Sanderson Farms, Inc., 37 P.3d 510, 513 (Colo.App. 2001). Because a valid contract is a prerequisite to specific performance, a holder of an option must comply with the terms regarding the exercise of the option to be eligible for specific performance.

Moreover, condemnee, the offeror here, did not itself have an interest in the property at the time of its offer. See Columbia Savings Loan Ass'n v. Counce, 167 Colo. 365, 447 P.2d 977 (1968) (option to purchase property only ripens into mutually enforceable contract when option is exercised; when option is not exercised, party gains neither legal nor equitable ownership by equitable conversion); see also Temple Hoyne Buell Foundation v. Holland Hart, 851 P.2d 192 (Colo.App. 1992) (option to purchase may or may not create an enforceable interest in the property). Furthermore, condemnor was at most an incidental third-party beneficiary to the option contract and, consequently, lacks standing to exercise the option.

All that was required for the option to ripen into a binding contract was defendant's acceptance. See Polemi v. Wells, supra; cf. Columbia Savings Loan Ass'n v. Counce, 167 Colo. 365, 447 P.2d 977 (1968). An option must be exercised in strict compliance with its terms.

Instead, the tenor of the statute indicates that persons with ownership interests in the property to which they attempt to claim a lien are not included within the protection of the statute. See Columbia Savings Loan Ass'n v. Counce, 167 Colo. 365, 447 P.2d 977 (1968); International Trust Co. V. Lowe, 66 Colo. 131, 180 P. 579 (1919). See also Fitzgerald v. Van Buskirk, 15 Ill. App. 3d 348, 306 N.E.2d 76 (1974).

As such, it is not an agreement upon which a court may order specific performance in terms of conveyance of land because it does not impose upon the optionee an obligation to purchase. See Columbia Savings v. Counce, 167 Colo. 365, 447 P.2d 977. It merely grants to the optionees the choice of completing the purchase or forfeiting the down payment.