This court has recognized that a general verdict for one party raises a presumption that the jury found every issue in favor of "`the prevailing party.'" Alfano v. Insurance Center of Torrington, 203 Conn. 607, 613, 525 A.2d 1338 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 202, 520 A.2d 208 (1987); Colucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489-90, 441 A.2d 575 (1981). Thus, we must uphold the jury's findings of falsity if the evidence is sufficient in respect to any of the defamatory statements made by the defendants. Applying the ordinary standard of appellate review, we conclude that testimony regarding the April 27, 1982 determination of the Association of Assessing Officers and the June 22, 1982 OPM committee report, both of which declared the defamatory accusations untrue, furnished a reasonable basis for the jury's findings of falsity.
Under the general verdict rule, "if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party." Curry v. Burns, supra, 225 Conn. 786. Thus, in a case in which the general verdict rule operates, if any ground for the verdict is proper, the verdict must stand; only if every ground is improper does the verdict fall. Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 100, 544 A.2d 164 (1988); LaFleur v. Farmington River Power Co., 187 Conn. 339, 342, 445 A.2d 924 (1982); Colucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 490, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). The rule rests on the policy of the conservation of judicial resources, at both the appellate and trial levels.
As it has generally been understood, and to the extent that it is not in dispute in this case, "[t]he so-called general verdict rule provides that, if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party. Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982); Collucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). The rule applies whenever a verdict for one party could reasonably be rendered on one or more distinct causes of action; see Matthews v. F.M.C. Corporation, 190 Conn. 700, 706, 462 A.2d 376 (1983); or distinct defenses.
"The so-called general verdict rule provides that, if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party. Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982); Collucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). The rule applies whenever a verdict for one party could reasonably be rendered on one or more distinct causes of action; see Matthews v. F.M.C. Corporation, 190 Conn. 700, 706, 462 A.2d 376 (1983); or distinct defenses.
Recently in Fig v. Aetna Lee Casualty Co., supra, 202-204, we said: "The so called general verdict rule provides that, if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party. Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982); Collucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). The rule applies whenever a verdict for one party could reasonably be rendered on one or more distinct causes of action; see Matthews v. F.M.C. Corporation, 190 Conn. 700, 706, 462 A.2d 376 (1983); or distinct defenses.
The plaintiff has not argued that a different proximate cause analysis may or should apply to the different causes of action alleged. Therefore, although the jury's general verdict requires us to "presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party"; Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 202, 520 A.2d 208 (1987); Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982); Collucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489, 441 A.2d 574 (1981); our analysis of the proximate cause issue embraces the plaintiffs separate claims of common law negligence, statutory negligence and public nuisance. "In order to establish liability as a result of a statutory violation, a plaintiff must: satisfy two conditions.
The rule provides that if "a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party. Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982); Colucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489, 441 A.2d 574 (1981)." Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., supra. "A party desiring to avoid the effects of the general verdict rule may elicit the specific grounds for the verdict by submitting interrogatories to the jury.
Where "a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party." Find v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 202, 520 A.2d 208 (1987); Slob v. Bastarache 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982); Colucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). As we stated in Find v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., supra, 202-203, this rule applies whenever a verdict for one party could reasonably be rendered on one or more distinct causes of action or defenses.
The usual statement of the rule is that a general verdict for one party raises a presumption that the jury found every issue in favor of "the prevailing party." Find v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 202, 520 A.2d 208 (1987); Colucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489-90, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). The plaintiff would ordinarily be regarded as "the prevailing party," since he did recover damages against the defendant, but it is plain that he did not prevail on the issue of contributory negligence.
The so-called general verdict rule provides that, if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party. Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 204, 449 A.2d 142 (1982); Collucci v. Pinette, 185 Conn. 483, 489, 441 A.2d 574 (1981). The rule applies whenever a verdict for one party could reasonably be rendered on one or more distinct causes of action; see Matthews v. F.M.C. Corporation, 190 Conn. 700, 706, 462 A.2d 376 (1983); or distinct defenses.