Colorado v. Laughlin

11 Citing cases

  1. Alhilo v. Kliem

    412 P.3d 902 (Colo. App. 2016)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that Colorado's statutory cap on noneconomic damages "does not cause a plaintiff's noneconomic damages to disappear – it merely limits a plaintiff's recovery to a specified maximum amount"

    The administrative appeal described in section 42-2-203 for challenging revocation of a driver's license based on a determination of HTO status by the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicles Division (DMV), is a civil proceeding. State v. Laughlin , 634 P.2d 49, 51 (Colo. 1981). But without the exception in section 42-4-1713, evidence of Article 4 convictions would be prohibited.

  2. Davidson v. State, Dept. of Revenue

    981 P.2d 696 (Colo. App. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    Other than indicating that suspension actions under the Compact shall be "in accordance with the home jurisdiction's procedures" and that "due process safeguards will be accorded," the Compact does not further address the scope of any hearing afforded prior to suspension of a driver's license. In State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981), the supreme court held that, at a license revocation hearing, a motorist contesting revocation of his driver's license did not have the right to raise constitutional challenges to an underlying conviction for driving while impaired. Noting that a license revocation proceeding is a civil proceeding, the court continued:

  3. State v. Madison

    120 Wis. 2d 150 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 29 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In State v. Madison, 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835 (Ct.App. 1984), the court of appeals quoted Plutshack but then applied the Burgett rule.

    At least two other jurisdictions have applied the rule against collateral attack in habitual traffic offender revocation proceedings under state laws similar to ch. 351, Stats. See e.g. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49, 51 (Colo. 1981); State v. Kamalski, 429 A.2d 1315, 1320 (Del.Super.Ct. 1981). Laughlin held that collateral attacks were proscribed because the only issue under the Colorado habitual offender statute was whether the defendant had sustained the requisite number of convictions.

  4. Ryan v. Charnes

    738 P.2d 1175 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 2 times

    This determination is to be made by the hearing officer on the basis of the licensee's driving record, as reflected in the records of the department. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49, 51 (Colo. 1981). "At the administrative hearing, it is the licensee's responsibility to challenge alleged mistakes in the records of the department as to his driving history, but he may not relitigate the issue of guilt as to the offenses shown on his record.

  5. People v. Rocha

    669 P.2d 1366 (Colo. 1983)

    In the course of defending against allegations of criminal conduct in proceedings instituted under section 42-2-206(1), a defendant may attack the constitutionality of any traffic offense conviction underlying a prior administrative determination of habitual traffic offender status. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981); People v. DeLeon, 625 P.2d 1010 (Colo. 1981); People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo.

  6. Thurber v. Charnes

    656 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    Further, he may not now relitigate factual issues of his guilt or the validity of his traffic convictions. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981); Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Division, 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973); Campbell v. Colorado, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971). There is ample support in the record for the suspension of the defendant's driving privileges.

  7. Crocker v. Dept. of Revenue

    652 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982)   Cited 24 times

    We have recently held that a hearing officer in a license revocation hearing is to determine whether the licensee has sustained the requisite number of convictions by reference to the licensee's driving record only and may not address a constitutionally-grounded collateral attack upon one of the convictions used as a predicate for habitual traffic offender status. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981). We have also held that an administrative body cannot rule on the constitutionality of its enabling legislation.

  8. Kelln v. Dept. of Revenue

    719 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1986)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that BAC test reports from both government and private laboratories "have probative value" and "are admissible in a driver's license revocation hearing"

    CRE 803(8). It is offered as evidence in a civil proceeding. See State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981). It is a report of a public office stating matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report. CRE 803(8)(B).

  9. Harris v. Motor Vehicle Division

    714 P.2d 1325 (Colo. App. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    Preliminarily, we note that the plaintiff does not argue the constitutional infirmity of the convictions underlying the suspension of his driver's license. See State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981); People v. Mascarenas, 632 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1981).

  10. Upward v. Department of Licensing

    38 Wn. App. 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 5 times
    Explaining the validity of underlying traffic offenses that caused a driver's license to be suspended were not required to prove a DWLS charge

    See Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wn.2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974). Accord, State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981) (administrative license revocation hearing is not the proper forum to relitigate the issue of guilt as to offenses shown in the record). However, under the present statutory scheme, the defendant had a right to appeal de novo to the superior court and is in no different position than the defendant in State v. Ozuna, supra.