Colorado v. Industrial

10 Citing cases

  1. Denver v. State

    788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990)   Cited 33 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the residency of a home-rule city's employees is a matter of local concern and that therefore, a state statute did not limit the authority of the city to require city employees to reside within the city limits as a condition of continuing employment

    Evert v. Ouren, 37 Colo. App. 402, 549 P.2d 791 (1976). See City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988) (eligibility of municipal employees for unemployment compensation benefits was a matter of statewide concern); City of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters' Protective Ass'n, 193 Colo. 437, 566 P.2d 1356 (1977) (collective bargaining of public employees matter of both statewide and local concern). Although we agree with the state that the enumeration in Section 6 of matters subject to regulation by home rule municipalities is not dispositive, we also agree with the cities that it is significant.

  2. Maryland Casualty Company v. Messina

    874 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1994)   Cited 26 times
    Recognizing that the determinations of "an administrative agency, acting in a judicial capacity, may be binding on the parties in a subsequent proceeding if the agency resolved disputed issues of fact which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate," but concluding that the workers’ compensation proceeding and the civil action at issue did not involve identical issues

    4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. See Bennett College v. United Bank of Denver, 799 P.2d 364, 366 (1990); City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo.

  3. Stone v. Department of Aviation

    296 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2003)   Cited 6 times
    In Stone v. Department of Aviation, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (D.Colo. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 453 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2006), the court explained that res judicata ordinarily is used to "bar" a second action and "[a]s a general rule, courts will not apply the doctrine.... offensively" (quoting St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F. 3d 425, 439 (5th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that "[r]es judicata [] is typically a defensive doctrine").

    As a general rule, a pending appeal does not preclude the application of res judicata to a trial court's judgment. See Miller v. Lunnon, 703 P.2d 640, 643 (Colo.App. 1985); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. f (1982); cf. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Indus. Comm'n, 698 P.2d 1350, 1353 (Colo.App. 1984) (applying this rule regarding collateral estoppel to an administrative hearing), implicitly overruled on other grounds as stated in City of Colo. Springs v. Indus. Comm'n of State of Colo., 749 P.2d 412, 416 n. 4 (Colo. 1988). The Miller case provides an exception to this rule when the appellate court reviews the judgement de novo.

  4. FRATERNAL ORDER, POL. v. CITY/COUNTY

    926 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1996)   Cited 15 times
    Concluding that the qualification and certification of deputy sheriffs is a matter of local concern and that therefore, a state statute's requirements of statewide training and certification of peace officers could not be imposed on the city's deputy sheriffs

    Indeed, certain aspects of municipal employment exist which are of statewide concern and where state interests are pervading, state statutes would supersede inconsistent municipal provisions. See, e.g., City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988) (unemployment benefits); Huff v. Mayor of Colorado Springs, 182 Colo. 108, 512 P.2d 632 (1973) (pension plans); City County of Denver v. Thomas, 176 Colo. 483, 491 P.2d 573 (1971) (worker's compensation); Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958) (income tax). However, we find today's case distinguishable from those cases.

  5. Bennett College v. United Bank

    799 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1990)   Cited 21 times
    Finding that issue preclusion does not necessarily arise from a settlement between parties

    Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue that was determined at a prior proceeding if: (1) the issue precluded is identical to an issue actually determined in the prior proceeding; (2) the party against whom estoppel is sought was a party to or was in privity with a party to a prior proceeding; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. E.g., City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412, 414 (Colo. 1988); Industrial Comm'n v. Moffat County School Dist. RE No. 1, 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo. 1987); United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 503-04 (Colo.

  6. Colo. Division of Employment v. Hewlett

    777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989)   Cited 13 times
    In Hewlett, 777 P.2d at 707, we "emphasize[d] that the unemployment law is intended to provide a speedy determination of eligibility through a simplified administrative procedure.

    Foremost among these principles is our recognition that the Colorado Employment Security Act, section 8-70-101 to 8-82-105, 3B C.R.S. (1986), was designed to lighten the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. Under the law, unemployment benefits must be granted to an employee unless the job separation was due to one or more statutorily enumerated causes. Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412, 414 (Colo. 1988); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987).

  7. School District No. 1 v. Fredrickson

    812 P.2d 723 (Colo. App. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    Moreover, in so doing, the hearing officer is not bound by determinations of any other agency, administrative body, or forum which is not required to make its decisions under the Employment Security Act. See § 8-74-108, C.R.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.); Colorado Springs v. Industrial Commission, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988). Employer also contends that the evidence would have supported a disqualification of claimant from benefits pursuant either to § 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI) (insubordination) or § 8-73-108(5)(e)(VII), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B) (violation of a company rule which could have resulted in serious damage to employer's interests), and it concludes that, therefore, the Panel erred in not disqualifying her pursuant to one of these sections.

  8. Schenck v. Minolta Office Systems, Inc.

    802 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1990)   Cited 14 times
    In Schenck, supra, Schenck brought a malicious prosecution action against the defendants, who had initiated civil and criminal actions against him.

    See Konas v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 158 Colo. 29, 404 P.2d 546 (1965). Since the issues involved in the two proceedings were not identical, collateral estoppel does not apply. Colorado Springs v. Industrial Commission, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988). IV.

  9. Gramiger v. Cty. of Pitkin

    794 P.2d 1045 (Colo. App. 1989)   Cited 6 times

    In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue determined in the first proceeding must be identical to the issue presented in the later proceeding. Colorado Springs v. Industrial Commission, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988); Industrial Commission v. Moffat County School District RE No. 1, 732 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987).

  10. Kohnen v. Safeway

    761 P.2d 231 (Colo. App. 1988)

    While physical impairment is one of several basic factors to consider, it is not dispositive of the ultimate question of permanent disability. Hence, the arbitrator's finding regarding the basic fact that claimant suffered from a physical impairment was not the identical issue addressed by the Panel; and therefore, the Panel was not collaterally estopped from ultimately concluding, as it did, that claimant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a permanent disability as a result of an industrial injury. See City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Commission, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988) Claimant also contends that the hearing officer erred in denying his request for a de novo hearing and that the hearing officer's denial of permanent disability attributable to the 1980 and 1983 injuries is not supported by the evidence.