Colorado v. Est. of Fisch

8 Citing cases

  1. In re Continental Airlines, Inc.

    149 B.R. 76 (D. Del. 1993)   Cited 9 times

    AtlanticCoast Line R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 172, 67 S.Ct. 1584, 1587, 91 L.Ed. 1977 (1947); American Respiratory Care Services v. Manager of Revenue, City and County of Denver, 835 P.2d 623, 625 (Colo.App. 1992) (citations omitted); Denver Center for the Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 299, 308 (Colo. 1985); State v. Fisch's Estate, 153 Colo. 525, 387 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo. 1963); Den.Rev.Mun. Code § 53-11.

  2. Rancho Colo. v. Broomfield

    586 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1978)   Cited 21 times
    In Rancho Colorado, Broomfield's municipal services expansion fee was measured by the building inspector's estimated value of the improvement described in the building permit application.

    Posey v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396, 586 P.2d 36. If, however, in analyzing a taxing statute or ordinance, there appears any doubt concerning the legislature's intent, the statute or ordinance is to be construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the taxpayer. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S.Ct. 53, 62 L.Ed. 211; Colorado v. Est. of Fisch, 153 Colo. 525, 387 P.2d 282; Bedford v. Johnson, 102 Colo. 203, 78 P.2d 373; Golden State Bank v. Dolan, 37 Colo. App. 29, 543 P.2d 1307. Further, courts should not interpret a statute or an ordinance to mean that which it does not express.

  3. First Nat'l Bk. v. People

    183 Colo. 320 (Colo. 1973)   Cited 5 times
    Upholding distinction between grandchildren and stepgrandchildren

    Moreover, we deal here with a situation where the legislature has enacted specific legislation which disposes of the appellant's claim, and we refuse to carve out an exception where the legislature has spoken. State v. Estate of Theresa C. Fisch, Deceased, 153 Colo. 525, 387 P.2d 282 (1963); Carpenter v. May Department Stores Co., 111 Colo. 479, 143 P.2d 270 (1943); Bedford v. Hartman Brothers, Inc., 104 Colo. 190, 89 P.2d 584 (1939). The judgment is affirmed.

  4. United Presby. v. Co. Comm

    167 Colo. 485 (Colo. 1968)   Cited 35 times
    In United Presbyterian Ass'n, supra, the issue was whether a home for physically independent elderly persons which required payment of a substantial occupancy fee and monthly rental varying according to the desirability of each unit was entitled to a charitable tax exemption.

    [9,10] Turning to the judicial construction of Art. X, § 5, we find the firmly established rule is that the presumption is against tax exemption, and the burden is on the one claiming the exemption to establish clearly his right thereto. Colorado v. Estate of Fisch, 153 Colo. 525, 387 P.2d 282, Bedford v. Hartman Brothers, 104 Colo. 190, 89 p. 2d 584; Murray v. Montrose County, 28 Colo. 427, 65 P. 26; Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Seminary, 12 Colo. 497, 21 P. 490. The rationale underlying the strict construction of exemptions from taxation is stated by the court in the Colorado Seminary case, supra, which quotes with approval the following excerpt from an early United States Supreme Court opinion:

  5. Manor Vail Condo. v. Board, Equal

    956 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1998)   Cited 8 times
    In Manor Vail, a condominium association owned common elements including a lobby, a restaurant, meeting and conference rooms, and a swimming pool.

    Further, and contrary to taxpayer's contention, we do not consider 38-33.3-105(2) a manifest expression of legislative intent to exempt non-residential common elements from the non-residential valuation for assessment ratio. See State v. Estate of Fisch, 153 Colo. 525, 387 P.2d 282 (1963) (exemptions will not be granted unless the statute is clear and unambiguous). In summary, we reject taxpayer's interpretation of 38-33.3-105(2) and conclude that the Administrator's interpretation of the statute, as embodied in the ARL procedures applied by defendants here, is more consistent with the overall legislative scheme.

  6. In re Matter of Golden St. BK

    543 P.2d 1307 (Colo. App. 1975)   Cited 3 times

    Further, if the legislature's intent in this regard is in doubt or ambiguous, the statute is to be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Colorado v. Estate of Fisch, 153 Colo. 525, 387 P.2d 282. Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the trial court with directions to remand the cause to the Director of the Department of Revenue for determination of the amount of the refund due and entry of an order thereon.

  7. Security Life & Acc. Co. v. Barnes

    494 P.2d 1294 (Colo. App. 1971)   Cited 1 times

    Any doubt concerning the meaning of a taxing statute must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing power. Bedford v. Johnson, 102 Colo. 203, 78 P.2d 373; City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441; Colorado v. Estate of Fisch, 153 Colo. 525, 387 P.2d 282. Furthermore, the legislature's own definition of insurance, where that definition is unambiguous, must prevail.

  8. No. 84-18

    No. 84-18 (Ops.Colo.Atty.Gen. Nov. 14, 1984)

    Id. at 826. In addition, the court noted that the assessment of possessory and leasehold rights of private citizens are taxable under Colorado statute.Id.; see also State of Colorado v. Fisch's Estate, 387 P.2d 282 (1963), where the court stated at 285: "In Colorado at least, exemptions are a matter of grace and a claimed exclusion will not be granted unless given by the constitution or unless the statute is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 285.