Raheb v. Lemenski, 115 R.I. 576, 350 A.2d 397 (1976); Barattini v. McGovern, 110 R.I. 360, 292 A.2d 860 (1972). The plaintiff argues and the trial justice determined that the problems in this case were defined and governed by Colonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 A. 47 (1927). As in the instant case, Colonial Laundries did not involve a contract forbidding post-employment competition or the piracy of copyrighted or patented materials.
Equitable protection will be provided against the competitive use of a list of customers which is confidential in nature. Callahan v. R.I. Oil Co., 103 R.I. 656, 660, 240 A.2d 411, 413 (1968); Colonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 336-37, 138 A. 47, 48-49 (1927). Whether a list is confidential generally depends upon how readily ascertainable the information is for a person conducting an independent investigation.
Appellant, recognizing that this is the general rule, invokes and cites that line of cases involving the ice man and the laundry man, about whose recurrent visits a large and essential part of the life of the average household revolves, whose access to the households of and personal contacts and standing with their customers, because their activities are periodical and recurring, furnish really the substantial basis of the good will of such businesses, and are intimate to their very creation and maintenance. Cali v. National Linen Service Corp. (C.C.A.) 38 F.2d 35; Carpenter v. Southern Properties (Tex.Civ.App.) 299 S.W. 440; Jennings v. Shepherd Laundries Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 276 S.W. 726; Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 A. 47, 54 A.L.R. 343; Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 P. 1180, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1159, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 628; Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N.E. 568. Appellant seeks also to analogize this case to and invoke precedents in cases where some secret process or information has been divulged, and it is being used contrary to the covenant, such as was the case of Pfefferkorn, where the court, refusing to enjoin an employee from taking employment, enjoined him only from breaching that clause of his contract which forbade the disclosure of the names of his customers, holding that the decree which had enjoined him from taking employment was wrong because the clause of the contract which forbade that went too far. "The facts of each case," said the court "must decide the measure of relief in it."
Rhode Island's implied post-departure duty is not all-encompassing. See Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 A. 47, 48 (1927) ("[A]ll knowledge acquired by the employee is not of a confidential nature."). Moreover, the case law shows that such a duty only arises in limited circumstances: the employment relationship must be one of "trust and confidence."
Levy, 106 R.I. at 446, 260 A.2d at 924. The defendants argue that the prior holdings of this court in Colonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 A. 47 (1927), and Go-Van Consolidators, Inc. v. Piggy Back Shippers, Inc., 111 R.I. 697, 306 A.2d 164 (1973) clearly demonstrate that the trial justice erroneously applied the proper rule of law. From our reading of those cases, we can discern no such mistake. Colonial Laundries announced the general rule that misuse of an employer's confidential customer list by a former employee constitutes unfair business solicitation which may be properly enjoined.
In the present case there is no dispute that the customer data of the plaintiff company was both confidential and highly valuable, and the court en banc so found. Whether this information was embodied in written lists or committed to memory is, we believe, of no significance; in either case the data are entitled to protection. See Boylston Coal Co. v. Rautenbush, 237 Ill. App. 550 (1925); Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 A. 47 (1927); J. L. Cooper Co. v. Anchors Securities Co., 9 Wn.2d 45, 113 P.2d 845 (1941); 2 Callmann, op. cit. supra at 844. All the defendants were given customer data in the course of their employment with Morgan and its predecessor, and all admit to using and divulging the information subsequently in their rival employment.
Each sale is a distinct transaction, not necessarily implying that another will follow. ( Colonial Laundries Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332 [ 138 A. 47, 54 A.L.R. 343].) Plaintiff's testimony did not disclose the particular time when sales were made to the purchasers listed.
( Pasadena Ice Co. v. Reeder, supra.) (See, also, ColonialLaundries, Inc., v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332 [54 A.L.R. 343, 138 A. 47].) The judgment is affirmed.
G.L. 1956 ยง 6-41-1. Although the holder of a trade secret may be considered to have acquired a property right therein, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984); see also Colonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 337, 138 A. 47, 49 (1927), the Act does not require ownership of the property in order to have trade secret protection thereof. "[T]he inherent nature of trade secret limits the usefulness of an analogy to property in determining the elements of a trade secret misappropriation claim."
Cf. Pittsburgh Cut Wire Co. v. Sufrin (1944) 350 Pa. 31 [ 38 A.2d 33]; Belmont Laboratories v. Heist (1930) 300 Pa. 542 [ 151 A. 15]; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co. (1904) 210 Pa. 464 [60 A. 4]; Witherow Steel Corp. v. Donner Steel Co. (D.C.W.D.N.Y. 1929) 31 F.2d 157; Philadelphia Extracting Co. v. Keystone Extracting Co. (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910) 176 F. 830; Junker v. Plummer (1946) 320 Mass. 76 [ 67 N.E.2d 667, 167 A.L.R. 1449]; Aronson v. Orlov (1917) 228 Mass. 1 [ 116 N.E. 951]; Cincinnati Bell Foundry v. Dodds (1887) 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154; Colonial Laundries v. Henry (1927) 48 R.I. 332 [ 138 A. 47, 54 A.L.R. 343]; cases collected in Annotation, 165 A.L.R. 1453; Sun Dial Corporation v. Rideout (1954) 29 N.J. Super. 361 [ 102 A.2d 90]; Franke v. Wiltschek (2 Cir. 1953) 209 F.2d 493; Smith v. Dravo Corp. (7 Cir. 1953) 203 F.2d 369.] In such a case the trust and confidence upon which legal relief is predicated stems from the instance of the employer's turning over to the employee the pre-existing trade secret.