Opinion
Case No. 2:18-cv-04769-JDW
03-05-2020
JASMINE COLON, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPT., et al., Defendants
MEMORANDUM
The Court must decide, without the benefit of an opposition, whether Jasmine Colon, a Philadelphia Police Officer, has enough evidence to proceed to trial on claims against the City of Philadelphia and Sgt. Tony Woo of the Philadelphia Police Department. She does not. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment.
I. FACTS
Ms. Colon and Sgt. Woo attended the Philadelphia Police Academy together in 2008. After graduating from the Academy, they were assigned to different locations. Their paths crossed for an assignment from 2009-2011. They may have spoken once in the intervening seven years, but no more than that. On February 20, 2018, the two were working at different precincts, and Ms. Colon happened to answer a call from Sgt. Woo. That call led to a meeting between Ms. Colon and Sgt. Woo in the parking lot of Sgt. Woo's workplace. Ms. Colon claims that, during that meeting, Sgt. Woo groped her, made sexual advances towards her, and professed his love for her.
Ms. Colon told a co-worker about the incident, then she told two superiors about the incident. She then filed a report with the Police Department's Internal Affairs Division. IAD began an investigation and detailed Sgt. Woo to another district in the Police Department during the course of the investigation.
During the investigation, Ms. Colon claimed that her co-workers were hostile to her and made comments to and about her. Ms. Colon asked to be detailed to a different location because she felt uncomfortable going to work because everybody "knew [her] personal situation there." (ECF No. 22-3 at 22-23.) Ms. Colon was detailed to a different location, and she remains employed at that district today, though as of October 1, 2019, she was on "injured on duty" status. Ms. Colon alleges that she was constructively discharged and has brought claims under Title VII, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance, asserting discrimination, retaliation, and violations of her Fourth Amendment rights against both Sgt. Woo and the City of Philadelphia.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to seek, and a court to enter, summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quotations omitted). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.'" Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quotation omitted). However, "[t]he non-moving party may not merely deny the allegations in the moving party's pleadings; instead he must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a material fact." Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make such a showing. Dodson v. Coatesville Hosp. Corp., No. 18-3065, --- Fed. App'x ----, 2019 WL 2338461, at *2 n.6 (3d Cir. June 3, 2019) (quotation omitted).
"If a party fails to . . . properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; [and] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3). Thus, a moving party is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of right just because the adverse party does not respond. Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). Instead, the court must conduct a full analysis to determine "whether the moving party has shown itself to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Title VII Claims
The Court analyzes Ms. Colon's Title VII, PHRA, and PFPO claims coextensively. See Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2015); Childers v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, No. 14-2439, 2016 WL 1086669, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2016). Ms. Colon's Title VII claims include both discrimination and retaliation claims. However, Ms. Colon has not made clear which types of discrimination or retaliation claims are contained in her Complaint, and this ambiguity persists given that she did not respond to Defendants' motion.
First, Ms. Colon's Complaint does not specify whether she is bringing a discrimination claim, a discriminatory hostile work environment claim, or both. Defendants moved for summary judgment on both types of claims. The Court finds no basis in the Complaint to suggest that Ms. Colon asserts a hostile work environment claim, however. The Court therefore declines to read such a claim into her pleadings. Second, Ms. Colon's Complaint does not specify whether her retaliation claim is one of pure retaliation or retaliatory hostile work environment. See Petrulio v. Teleflex Inc., No. 12-7187, 2014 WL 5697309, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2014) (retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment are two separate claim). The City moves for summary judgment on a retaliatory hostile work environment claim and is silent on any claim for retaliation. The Court concludes that the pleadings encompass both claims.
All of Ms. Colon's Title VII claims are controlled by the three-step burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.2d 668 (1973). Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 15-1090, 636 Fed. Appx. 831, 841, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 521 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2015). This framework requires that plaintiff first establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 842. For each of Ms. Colon's Title VII claims, a prima facie case requires that Ms. Colon suffered an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Komis v. Sec'y of United States Dep't of Labor, 918 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 2019) (prima facie case of discrimination, discriminatory or retaliatory hostile work environment requires that plaintiff suffered an adverse action); EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., 778 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2015) (prima facie case of retaliation requires an adverse employment action).
Ms. Colon's claims fail at the first step because she cannot show that she suffered an adverse employment action. Although Ms. Colon alleges that she suffered a constructive discharge, her deposition shows otherwise. In fact, she was detailed to another Police District and then was placed on "injured on duty" status due to a back injury. As of the date of her deposition, she was still a police officer, and as of October she claimed to be on the verge of returning to work, fully healed. In addition, she has not suffered any adverse change in pay, time, or other terms of her employment. Although a transfer could constitute an adverse employment, Ms. Colon would have to demonstrate her transfer "to be detrimental or undesirable in some objective way." Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 982 F. Supp. 2d 462, 479 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff'd, 776 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2015). She has not done this. Accordingly, Ms. Colon is unable to make out a prima facie case on any of her discrimination or retaliation claims, and the Court must grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
B. Section 1983 Claims
Ms. Colon brings Fourth Amendment claims against all Defendants, arising out of the parking lot incident in which she alleges that Sgt. Woo groped her. Although Fourth Amendment protections may extend to "[s]earches and seizures by government employers or supervisors" (O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987)), they "do[] not provide a cause of action for unwanted sexual advances in the workplace." Goodall-Gaillard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 625 F. App'x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2015). In addition, any constitutional violation could occur only if Sgt. Woo was acting under color of state law. Sgt. Woo's meeting with Ms. Colon was a social one, not an official one. It therefore did not constitute an action under color of state law. See Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1994).
IV. CONCLUSION
Ms. Colon's failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment leaves the Court to take the City's statement of undisputed material facts as true. Those facts establish that there is no claim for trial here. The Court will therefore grant the Motion. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joshua D . Wolson
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J. March 5, 2020