Opinion
21-3227-SAC
11-08-2021
JASON ALLEN COLON, Plaintiff, v. (FNU) MASONER, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Sam A. Crow, U.S. Senior District Judge
Plaintiff Jason Allen Colon is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given an opportunity to file a proper amended complaint to cure the deficiencies.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time of filing, Plaintiff was in custody at the Leavenworth County Jail in Leavenworth, Kansas (“LCJ”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On October 18, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Change of Address, noting that he is no longer in custody at the LCJ. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint (Doc. 1) that on August 22, 2021, he had an issue with Sergeant Masoner, a Correctional Officer at the LCJ.
Plaintiff alleges that because Plaintiff was under a lot of stress and depressed, he “felt [his] anger increasing by the day” and he refused to go to his cell when ordered to do so by Sgt. Masoner. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that he wanted to go to a segregation cell so that he could be by himself. Sgt. Masoner cuffed Plaintiff and “pretty much drags” Plaintiff to his cell. Id. at 3. Plaintiff was placed in his cell and his cuffs were removed. Plaintiff then proceeded to flood the toilet in his cell. When Sgt. Masoner saw the water, he came back to Plaintiff's cell and told Plaintiff to cuff up. Plaintiff alleges that he turned around and put his hands behind his back so that Masoner could cuff him.
Plaintiff alleges that Masoner then pulled Plaintiff out of his cell onto the run and kicked Plaintiff's legs out from under him and put his knee in Plaintiff's back. Masoner then realized the toilet was still flushing, so he left Plaintiff and went to the cell to shut the toilet off. Plaintiff alleges that Masoner returned and grabbed Plaintiff's arm and drug him back into his cell and laid him in the toilet water. Masoner then helped Plaintiff's cellmate take his things and relocate to another cell. When Masoner returned, he told another officer to remove Plaintiff's cuffs. As his cuffs were being removed, Plaintiff stated to Masoner that Masoner's actions were uncalled for and unprofessional. At this point, Masoner told the other officer to leave Plaintiff as he was and they left the cell. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that Masoner took Plaintiff's property from the flooded cell when he left. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that he was left with his cuffs on and soaked in toilet water for about an hour. After an hour, they brought Plaintiff a new uniform and uncuffed him. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that he was not given cleaning supplies for his cell until the next day-August 23, 2021. Plaintiff claims that he was given a mattress and blanket on August 22, but he did not get his property back until August 23, and did not get to shower until August 24. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims an Eighth Amendment violation, excessive force, and police brutality. Plaintiff names Sergeant Masoner as the sole defendant and seeks $500,000 in damages.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true, ” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, ” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Excessive Force
Plaintiff alleges that excessive force was used when Sgt. Masoner kicked Plaintiff's legs out from under him and slammed him to the floor. Plaintiff also claims that Masoner put his knee in Plaintiff's back and drug Plaintiff back to his cell. “Excessive force claims are cognizable under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment, depending on where in the criminal justice system the plaintiff is at the time of the challenged use of force.” Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy Sanders, 989 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Claims of mistreatment while in state pretrial confinement are not covered by the Fourth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment. Colbruno v. Kessler, 928 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2019). They are assessed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
The Court held in Kingsley that “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive[-]force claim is solely an objective one” and that therefore “a pretrial detainee can prevail by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.” Brown v. Flowers, 974 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473-74, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015); see also Colbruno, 928 F.3d at 1163 (“[T]here is no subjective element of an excessive-force claim brought by a pretrial detainee.”).
Not every isolated battery or injury to an inmate amounts to a federal constitutional violation. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (stating that not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.”) (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights”)).
Plaintiff has not alleged wrongdoing that is objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation. In Snyder v. Spilde, the court found that:
Merely grabbing and twisting Mr. Snyder's arms does not allege a constitutional violation. See e.g., Norton v. The City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005) (dismissing claim in which prison guards were alleged to have injured prisoner by grabbing him around his neck and twisting it because the guards' actions were not objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional
violation); Reed v. Smith, No. 97-6341, 1999 WL 345492, at *4 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissing excessive force claim based on allegations that prison officials grabbed inmate, tried to ram him into a wall, and dragged him while walking him through the prison); Marshall, 415 Fed. App'x at 853-54 (dismissing excessive force claim based on allegations that corrections officer dug his fingernails into prisoner's arm without cause to do so resulting in redness and bruising). Accord De Walt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 610-11 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that shoving a prisoner into a doorframe, which resulted in bruising on his back, did not state a constitutional violation); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that bumping, grabbing, elbowing, and pushing a prisoner was “not sufficiently serious or harmful to reach constitutional dimensions.”); Black Spotted Horse v. Else, 767 F.2d 516, 517 (8th Cir. 1985) (pushing cubicle-cell wall onto prisoner's leg, causing bruises, was insufficient use of force to state a constitutional violation); Olson v. Coleman, 804 F.Supp. 148, 149-50 (D. Kan. 1982) (single blow to prisoner's head while escorting him into prison, causing contusion, was de minimis use of force not repugnant to conscience of mankind).Snyder v. Spilde, No. 15-cv-2169-GPG, 2016 WL 1059612, at *3-4 (D. Colo. March 17, 2016). Plaintiff acknowledged that he refused to return to his cell, flooded his toilet, and was trying to be placed in segregation. Plaintiff should show good cause why his excessive force claim should not be dismissed.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff claims that he was left in cuffs and soaked in toilet water for an hour. After an hour he received a clean uniform, but he was not allowed to shower for about 48 hours. Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief based on his conditions of confinement.
The Tenth Circuit has held that a pretrial detainee's claims regarding conditions of confinement are governed by the Due Process Clause, and that “the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.” Routt v. Howard, 764 Fed.Appx. 762, 770 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (quoting Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998)).
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a pretrial detainee be provided ‘humane conditions of confinement by ensuring the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee his safety.'” Routt, 764 Fed.Appx. at 770 (citing Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (ellipsis, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kelley v. Wright, No. 2:19-CV-02278-JAR-JPO, 2019 WL 6700375, at *10 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2019). To establish liability, a pretrial detainee must show: “(1) the official[ ] knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health and safety, and (2) the alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious.” Routt, 764 Fed.Appx. at 770 (citing Ledbetter, 318 F.3d at 1188 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, “jail conditions may be restrictive and even harsh without violating constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Ledbetter, 318 F.3d at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff has not alleged long-term exposure to the conditions. “An important factor in determining whether conditions of confinement meet constitutional standards is the length of the incarceration.” Id. (citing Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998)). Thus, “[t]ime can play a significant part in a court's analysis of these issues, ” and “[t]here is . . . a de minimus level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.” Kelley, 2019 WL 6700375, at *10 (citations omitted). Plaintiff was left cuffed and soaked in toilet water for an hour. After an hour he was provided a clean uniform and he was allowed to shower around 48 hours later. Plaintiff's claims do not state a constitutional violation and are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Pretrial detainees, “may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (citations omitted). “A person lawfully committed to pretrial detention has not been adjudged guilty of any crime . . . [and] has had only a ‘judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to [the] extended restraint of [his] liberty following arrest.” Id. (citations omitted). The government may “detain him to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-37. To determine when restrictions pass, as a matter of law, from constitutionally acceptable to constitutionally impermissible, a court must ask two questions. Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2013). “First, we must ask whether an ‘expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials' exists” and “[i]f so, liability may attach. If not, plaintiff may still prove unconstitutional punishment by showing the restriction in question bears no reasonable relationship to any legitimate governmental objective.” Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39).
Plaintiff has not alleged an intent to punish on the part of staff at the LCJ. “Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540. “[I]n addition to ensuring the detainees' presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id. The Supreme Court has warned that these decisions “are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Id. at 540, n.23 (citations omitted). Plaintiff must show good cause why his claims regarding the conditions of his confinement should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
3. No. Physical Injury
Plaintiff's request for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), because Plaintiff has failed to allege a physical injury. Section 1997e(e) provides in pertinent part that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
IV. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper amended complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein.Plaintiff is given time to file a complete and proper amended complaint in which he (1) raises only properly joined claims and defendants; (2) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation and show a cause of action in federal court; and (3) alleges sufficient facts to show personal participation by each named defendant.
To add claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum to the original complaint, and instead completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or allegations not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that a plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all allegations and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained from the original complaint. Plaintiff must write the number of this case (21-3227-SAC) at the top of the first page of his amended complaint and he must name every defendant in the caption of the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the body of the amended complaint, where he must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts taken by each defendant including dates, locations, and circumstances. Plaintiff must allege sufficient additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein, this matter will be decided based upon the current deficient Complaint and may be dismissed without further notice for failure to state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Plaintiff is granted until December 7, 2021, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until December 7, 2021, in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed herein.
The clerk is directed to send § 1983 forms and instructions to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.